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Air pollution, global warming, climate change, and economic development are all reasons for 
governments around the world to incentivize the development of renewable energy generation 
technologies and plan for a transition toward a low-carbon economy. The development of 
renewable energy projects as well as the liberation in electricity systems has led to the emergence 
of multiple stakeholders in energy systems.  
While the research focused on investigating the objective of a single stakeholder in an energy 
system is abundant in the literature, considering the objectives of all stakeholders in a multi-
stakeholder model is a gap in the research. This thesis is aimed at developing a multilevel 
framework for modeling and analyzing the interaction of various stakeholders in energy systems. 
The models developed in this thesis are focused on investigating two areas: 1. The role of energy 
storage systems in Ontario and how they can be used to reduce GHG emissions in the province, 
and 2. Analyzing the interaction of the heat and electricity supply systems in Great Britain. 
The contribution of this thesis is presented through four studies. 
The objective of the first study is to investigate the effect and cost-efficiency of different 
renewable energy incentives and potential for wind and hydrogen energy systems to the perceived 
viability of a microgrid project from the prospective of different stakeholders, i.e., government, 
energy hub operator and energy consumer in the province of Ontario, Canada.  Hourly simulation 
of a microgrid in which wind and/or hydrogen are produced is used for the analysis. Results show 
that using underground seasonal storage leads to the government paying less incentive per kg of 
CO2 emission reduction as it lowers the levelized cost of hydrogen and provides a higher carbon 
emission reduction potential. Results of the first study also show that for the same incentive policy, 
incentivizing hydrogen production with grid electricity or a blend of wind power and grid 
electricity and producing hydrogen using wind power with underground hydrogen storage are 
more cost-efficient options for government than incentivizing wind power production. Regarding 
the renewable energy incentives, a combination of capital grant and FIT is shown to be a more 
cost-efficient incentive program for the government than FIT only programs. However, FIT 
programs are more effective for promoting the development of renewable energy technologies. 
In the second study, the advantages of energy incentives for all the stakeholders in an energy 
system were analyzed in the context of a microgrid using a more comprehensive approach.  
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In the second study, the effect of health impacts from fossil fuel consumption and taxes collected 
from the energy hub operator and energy consumer are considered in the model. The stakeholders 
considered in the second study include the government, the energy hub operator, and the energy 
consumer. Two streams of energy incentives were compared in the second study: incentives for 
renewable energy generation technologies and incentives for energy storage technologies. The 
first stream aims to increase the share of renewable energies in the electricity system while the 
second stream aims the development of systems which use clean electricity to replace fossil fuels 
in other sectors of an energy system such as the transportation, residential and industrial sectors. 
The results of the analysis in the second study show that replacing fossil fuel-based electricity 
generation with wind and solar power is a less expensive way for the energy consumer to reduce 
GHG emissions (60 and 92 CAD per tonne of CO2e for wind and solar, respectively) compared to 
investing on energy storage technologies (225 and 317 CAD per tonne of CO2e for Power-to-Gas 
and battery-powered forklifts, respectively). However, considering the current Ontario's 
electricity mix, incentives for the Power-to-Gas and battery-powered technologies are less 
expensive ways to reduce emissions compared to replacing the grid with wind and solar power 
technologies (1479 and 2418 CAD per tonne of CO2e for wind and solar, respectively). The 
analysis in the second study also shows that battery storage and hydrogen storage are 
complementary technologies for reducing GHG emissions in Ontario. 
This third study aims at developing a game theory model for assessing the potential of fuel cell-
powered and battery-powered forklifts for reducing GHG emissions in the province of Ontario, 
Canada. Two stakeholders are considered in the developed model: government and energy 
consumer, which is an industrial facility operating forklifts. The energy consumer, which is 
assumed to be an industrial facility, operates 150 diesel forklifts but has the option of replacing 
them with fuel cell-powered and battery-powered forklifts. The government can encourage this 
replacement by allocating a percentage of Ontario's surplus power to the energy consumer at a 
discounted price. The discount is assumed to be in the form of exempting the energy consumer 
from paying the global adjustment. As a result, the energy consumer only pays the hourly Ontario 
electricity price when discounted power is available. Discounted electricity will decrease the cost 
of operating battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts for the energy consumer and will 
encourage the use of those technologies instead of diesel forklifts. The government has an 
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incentive to pursue such policy as the replacement of diesel forklifts with fuel cell-powered and 
battery-powered forklifts will reduce GHG emissions and subsequently, the social cost of carbon 
in the province. The results of the third study show that when the government does not allocate 
discounted power to the energy consumer, energy consumer does not reduce emissions and keeps 
using the 150 diesel forklifts. However, when the government provides 0.1% of Ontario's surplus 
power at each hour to the energy consumer at a discounted price, the energy consumer replaces 
31 of diesel forklifts with battery-powered forklifts. When the percentage of discounted power is 
0.6% of Ontario's surplus power at each hour, energy consumer replaces 91 of diesel forklifts with 
battery-powered forklifts and 54 of diesel forklifts with fuel cell-powered forklifts. A policy of 
discounting surplus power to encourage replacing diesel forklifts with battery-powered and fuel 
cell-powered forklifts is shown to benefit both stakeholders in the system. The third study also 
shows that the deployment of both fuel-cell powered and battery-powered forklifts is effective in 
reducing GHG emissions in Ontario when surplus clean power is available. Battery-powered 
forklifts are more cost-effective when lower levels of discounted power are available; however, 
with an increase in the level of available discounted power, fuel cell-powered forklifts become 
more cost-effective technologies compared to battery-powered forklifts. 
The same methodology is also used for analyzing the potential of clean surplus power in Ontario 
to reduce GHG emissions in the residential sector. 
In the fourth study, an iterative optimization model is developed to analyze the interaction of heat 
and electricity sectors at a national level in Great Britain. Independent mathematical models for 
optimizing the selection of technologies in heat and electricity supply systems are developed in 
the fourth study. The optimal mix of technologies for supplying electricity and heat were then 
calculated iteratively to take into account the interactions between the electricity and heat systems 
and their fragmented planning strategies. The capacity and operation of various technologies for 
electricity generation were optimized to supply electricity demand with a minimum annual cost. 
Then, the heat supply options were determined through minimization of the annualized cost of 
the heat supply system. Iterative optimization of electricity and heat was continued until an 
equilibrium was achieved. The results of the iterative approach were compared with a centralized 
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The development of renewable energy projects and energy storage systems, as well as the 
liberalization of electricity systems, has led to the emergence of multiple stakeholders in energy 
systems. Not considering the advantages of all stakeholders in the planning of energy systems 
may lead to suboptimal Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission reduction pathways.  
While Ontario has been successful in phasing out coal power plants and the development of 
renewable energy generation capacity in recent years, such transition has caused challenges in the 
electricity system. Power export at low prices and curtailment of surplus clean power as well as 
rising electricity prices are some of these challenges. In that sense, analyzing the advantages of 
different stakeholders when renewable energy and energy storage programs are developed is of 
great importance. 
Heat decarbonization is another transition in energy systems that has been investigated in this 
study. A favorite policy to decarbonize the electricity sector has been to replace fossil fuel-based 
electricity generation with renewable power in the past few years. For the heat and transportation 
sectors, however, electrification has been suggested as a pathway to reduce GHG emissions. 
Following such pathway will have significant effects on the electricity sector. The interaction of 
the heat and electricity sectors in a national scale is investigated in this work to analyze that effect. 
This thesis starts with deterministic models for analyzing the interaction of stakeholders in a 
microgrid. Then optimization models are presented to analyze the objectives of stakeholders in 
microgrid energy systems. In the last study of this thesis, a framework for modeling the interaction 
of different energy sectors at a national scale is presented.  
1.2 Ontario’s electricity system 
In this section of the thesis, an overview of the transition in Ontario’s electricity systems and 
challenges Ontario has faced in recent years is discussed.  
1.2.1 Ontario’s electricity mix and generation capacity 
Ontario’s electricity system has experienced significant changes in recent years. The government 
of Ontario planned for the phase-out of coal power plants in the province by 2007 in 2004 [1]. 
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The phase-out of coal electricity generation was completed in 2014 in Ontario [1]. Additionally 
and as part of the Green Energy and Green Economy Act, Ontario implemented a feed-in tariff 
(FIT) policy for the development of wind, solar, bioenergy, and hydropower electricity generation 
technologies in 2009 [1]. These policies have led to a change in Ontario’s power generation 
capacity. Figure 1-1 shows the changes in Ontario’s generation capacity from the opening of the 
electricity market in the province (2002) to 2019.   
 
Figure 1-1. Change in Ontario’s generation capacity from 2002 to 2019 [2] 
As can be seen in Figure 1-1, wind, nuclear, and gas/oil power capacity has increased in Ontario 
while coal power generation capacity has dropped significantly as it was eventually phased out in 
2014.  
Figure 1-2 shows the current Ontario’s transmission-connected electricity generation capacity 





Figure 1-2. Current Ontario’s transmission-connected electricity generation capacity [3] 
Figure 1-3 shows Ontario’s electricity generation mix in 2018. As can be seen in Figure 1-3, More 
than 93% of Ontario’s electricity generation mix in 2018 was from emission-free resources. 
 
 
Figure 1-3. Ontario’s electricity generation mix in 2018 [2] 
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These changes have led to a significant decrease in GHG emissions from the electricity sector in 
Ontario. Emissions from the electricity sector in Ontario dropped 67% from 2007 to 2013 while 
the emission from buildings dropped only 2% and emission from the transportation sector 
increased 2% in the same period [4]. 
1.2.2 Electricity price in Ontario 
Hourly Ontario electricity price (HOEP) is the wholesale electricity price in Ontario which is 
determined by clearing the market by IESO. HOEP is affected by the supplied power and demand 
at each hour. Ontario has experienced a drop in HOEP in recent years. Figure 1-4 shows the yearly 
average HOEP from 2002 to 2017. 
 
Figure 1-4. Yearly average HOEP from 2002 to 2017 [5] 
As can be seen in Figure 1-4, HOEP has dropped 73% from 2002 to 2017. HOEP has decreased 
not only because of an increase in supply capacity but also because of a decrease in Ontario’s 
electricity demand. From 2007 to 2018, Ontario’s annual electricity demand dropped from 152 
TWh to 137.4 TWh, a 10.6% decrease [6]. 
HOEP, however, is not the total commodity electricity cost paid by energy consumers in Ontario. 
Global adjustment (GA) is another part of the electricity price charged to developing new 
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electricity infrastructure in Ontario, operate and maintain existing infrastructure, and paying for 
conservation and demand-side management initiatives in the province [7].  
Contrary to the decrease in HOEP, GA has increased in recent years in Ontario. Figure 1-5 shows 
how GA has changed from 2011 to 2018. The values shown in Figure 1-5 have been calculated 
by averaging GA monthly values from 2011 to 2018.  
 
Figure 1-5. GA in Ontario from 2011 to 2018 [8] 
As can be seen in Figure 1-5, Global adjustment has increased by 121% from 2011 to 2017, while 
HOEP has dropped 51% as can be seen in Figure 1-4.  
Figure 1-6 shows HOEP plus GA in Ontario from 2011 to 2017. As can be seen in Figure 1-6, the 

































Figure 1-6. HOEP + GA from 2011 to 2017 
A part of the rise in the GA in Ontario is because of the development of wind and solar power 
generation capacity via FIT programs. In her article, Stokes [1], cites the Auditor General of 
Ontario on stating that electricity bills increased 25% in the 2009-2014 period while the annual 
electricity cost in Ontario increased 2.5 billion dollars in the same period. 
 It is worth mentioning that a significant share of Ontario’s generated electricity is not consumed 
by Ontario consumers while they still have to pay for the GA. The Office of Auditor General of 
Ontario’s 2015 annual report states that Ontario curtailed and exported 11.9 million MWh and 
95.1 million MWh of electricity between 2009 and 2014, respectively [9]. The same report also 
says that Ontario’s revenue from power exports was CAD 3.1 billion less than the power 
generation cost between 2009 and 2014 [9]. In the same report, the Office of Auditor General of 
Ontario estimates 4.1 TWh of surplus power in Ontario in 2032 [9]. 
1.3 Heat decarbonization and its impact on electricity supply  
A transition toward low-carbon and zero-carbon energy systems requires policy and technology 
transition in all the sectors of energy systems. The challenge in analyzing the decarbonization of 
energy sectors is the effect of changes in one sector on other energy sectors.  
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Decision-makers in one energy sector will seek their own advantage regardless of the overall 
operation of the system. This is a trend seen in modern energy systems with multiple stakeholders 
each seeking their own advantage. In conventional energy systems, a single decision-maker (the 
government) makes decisions on different aspects of the system trying to optimize the overall 
performance of the system. 
The heat sector accounts for more than 50% of the energy consumption and 30% of carbon 
emissions in the UK [10]. As a result, any plan for the decarbonization of the heat sector in the 
UK will have a noticeable impact on the electricity supply and thus, has to be investigated. In a 
conventional energy system, the transition in the heat and electricity systems will be decided and 
implemented by a centralized decision-maker aiming at minimizing the overall cost of the system. 
However, a more realistic analysis will include independent decision-making in the heat and 
electricity supply systems. 
1.4 Thesis layout 
This thesis is focused on analyzing the interaction of different stakeholders in a carbon constrained 
system. Figure 1-7 shows how different stakeholders may interact with each other in a microgrid.  
 
Figure 1-7. The interaction of stakeholders 
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The objective of this thesis is to develop models for analyzing the interaction of different 
stakeholders and energy sectors in energy systems. This objective has been pursued in two main 
areas: 
1. Using game theory as a powerful concept in analyzing the interaction of various stakeholders 
in the presence of government incentives; 
2.  Investigating the cost-effectiveness of different renewable energy and energy storage 
technologies in reducing GHG emission in different energy sectors; and 
3.  Investigating the interaction of heat and electricity supply systems through multilevel 
modeling at a national level; 
The contributions of this thesis to the energy system modeling and analysis literature are analyzing 
the objectives of different stakeholders interacting in a microgrid, analyzing the effect of 
government incentives on the development of renewable energy and storage technologies, 
analyzing the cost-effectiveness of government policies for the development of different energy 
conversion and storage technologies for GHG emission reduction, and investigating the 
interaction of the heat and electricity sectors at a national scale. 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the work via presenting the 
overview of the work, thesis objectives, and the thesis layout. Chapter two provides background 
information on Ontario’s electricity system, the importance of energy storage systems, and the 
application of game theory in the modeling of energy systems. 
Chapter three presents a deterministic model developed to simulate the operation of a wind farm 
and hydrogen generation and storage system in Ontario. The study presented in chapter three is 
by Haghi et al. [11], published in the Journal of Energy Policy. In chapter three, the objectives of 
different stakeholders in a microgrid are compared when different scenarios of renewable energy 
generation and hydrogen energy storage are considered. The stakeholders considered in this study 
are the government, the energy hub operator, and the energy consumer. The results of the study 
in chapter three show that the development of renewable energy generation technologies is in 
favor of the energy hub operator (energy investor) while the development of energy storage 
systems is in favor of the government as energy storage projects have the lowest GHG emission 
reduction cost.   
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In chapter four, multiple models are developed to simulate the operation of wind and solar power 
plants, Power-to-Gas systems, and battery-powered forklifts. The study presented in chapter four 
is by Haghi et al. [12], published in the International Journal of Hydrogen Energy. Different 
energy systems are compared by considering the capital costs and operation and maintenance cost 
of technologies, as well as health costs from GHG emission and taxed collected from the energy 
consumer and the energy hub operator. It is shown that wind and solar power generation are more 
cost-effective technologies for reducing GHG emissions when the electricity grid id highly 
dependent on fossil fuels. However, energy storage systems are a more cost-effective option for 
reducing GHG emission compared to wind and solar power generation considering Ontario’s 
current electricity mix.  
In chapter five, an optimization model is developed to assess the potential of battery-powered and 
fuel cell-powered forklifts in reducing GHG emission in Ontario. The study presented in chapter 
five is based on the work by Haghi, E., Shamsi, H., Dimitrov, S., Fowler, M., Raahemifar, K., 
accepted for publication in International Journal of Hydrogen Energy.  In chapter five, a game 
theory model is developed to analyze the interaction of the government and the energy consumer, 
which is a commercial facility operating forklifts. The results of the study show that both battery 
and hydrogen technologies may be cost-effective for reducing GHG emissions. However, their 
cost-effectiveness depends on the social cost of carbon considered by the government.  
In chapter six, an iterative approach is proposed to model the interaction of heat and electricity 
supply systems. The study presented in chapter six is based on the work by Haghi, E., Qadrdan, 
M., Wu, J., Jenkins, N., Fowler, M., Raahemifar, K., and is under review in the Energy journal.  
The model presented in chapter six is used to find the optimum selection of the heat and electricity 
supply technologies, while the effect of changes in one on the other is considered. Optimum 
selection of technologies was considered by solving two separate models iteratively until 
equilibrium is reached. The results of the iterative approach are compared with a centralized 
optimization model.  
Chapter seven presents the summary and contributions of the studies and the recommendations 






2.1 Incentives for the development of renewable energy capacity 
The growth in the level of CO2 emissions has been a challenge worldwide. Conventional sources 
used for generating power and heat were responsible for more than 40% of the CO2 emissions 
worldwide in 2009 [13]. To address these challenges, the development of renewable energy 
generation technologies has been pursued by governments all over the world.  
One crucial obstacle in the development of renewable energy generation capacity is the need for 
investment capital. Investment in energy technology projects requires financial incentives in many 
cases since renewable projects have a higher capital cost compared to conventional energy 
technologies, are considered to be riskier due to technology and resource uncertainties, and could 
not benefit from economies of scale since they are of smaller scale compared to conventional 
technologies [14]. The same challenge exists for alternative heating and electricity supply 
technologies such as heat pumps and fuel cells.  Carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs (FITs), feed-in 
premiums (FIPs), quota systems, cap and trade systems, and capital grants are incentive programs 
and policies designed by governments to overcome the problem of higher investment capital for 
distributed energy technologies. Each incentive program may benefit the development of a 
specific technology due to the unique efficiency, cost, capacity factor, and availability of different 
technologies.  
The question is then how to define, combine, and use incentives in the most effective way to face 
the new challenges in the development of new energy technologies. While research focused on 
the development of distributed energy system and energy storage technologies is abundant in the 
literature, finding the most cost-effective policies and methods for increasing the penetration of 
these new technologies into national energy systems is an area that needs to be further investigated 
[15].  
2.2 The role of energy storage in energy systems 
Widespread deployment of renewable energy generation technologies causes technical challenges 
in electricity systems. Renewable energy generation technologies, such as wind and solar power 
are intermittent. The electricity generation profile of such technologies not only changes by 
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weather conditions during a day, but also has a seasonal variation. Additionally, electricity 
generation by wind and solar technologies does not necessarily match the demand. While the 
output of technologies such as gas turbines can be adjusted based on the demand, wind and solar 
technologies do not have such capability.  
Energy storage technologies are one of the solutions for controlling the variability of renewable 
energy generation technologies. Energy storage technologies enable the storage of energy when 
there is surplus generation for use when there is a demand for it. Combining energy storage and 
distributed energy technologies in microgrids with both electrical, industrial, and mobility energy 
demands is crucial for the efficient operation of the overall energy system.  This is especially 
important for the province of Ontario with increasing penetration of intermittent wind and solar 
generation assets, while its nuclear electricity generation is both reliable and clean but provides 
inflexible baseload generation capacity. 
2.2.1 Hydrogen energy storage 
In this thesis, special attention is given to hydrogen due to its potential in reducing GHG emissions.  
Hydrogen as an energy vector can be used to store and transport energy.  Hydrogen produced 
using electrolysis may be used to reduce GHG emissions in the industrial, residential, and 
transportation sectors. Additionally, hydrogen may be used for storing large amounts of power 
for long durations of time [16].  
Hydrogen can be stored using the existing natural gas infrastructure by injecting hydrogen to the 
natural gas distribution systems. This concept for storing hydrogen is called “Power-to-Gas.” In 
a Power-to-Gas systems, surplus electricity is converted to hydrogen which is then stored and 
directed to different applications in the industrial, transportation, and even residential sectors. It 
should be noted that in Ontario the power grid is dominated by baseload nuclear power, so the 
hydrogen energy storage is also useful for addressing large quantities of the excess off-peak 
baseload nuclear power, which is also a GHG-free source of power generation.  
2.2.2 Battery energy storage 
Batteries are the most widely used energy storage system [17]. Batteries are flexible in terms of 
installation locations which makes them suitable for many such applications [18]. For instance, 
batteries are recognized as suitable energy storage systems in hybrid wind and solar energy 
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systems due to their high efficiency [19] . Additionally, batteries can be used in other applications 
such as grid reliability, residential systems, and electric vehicles. All these specifications have led 
us to investigate the effectiveness of battery energy storage in reducing GHG emission in Ontario 
in this thesis.  
2.3 Game theory modeling of energy systems 
Game theory is used in the modeling of energy systems to develop mathematical models which 
enable us analyze negotiation, conflict and cooperation between individuals, organizations and 
governments. Game theory is applied in energy systems studies to understand why an individual 
makes a particular decision and how the decisions made by one individual affect others. 
Organizational decisions and planning involve several levels of decision making with different 
priorities. Objectives at each level of the organizational hierarchy may be different and decision-
makers within each level may be cooperative or non-cooperative [21]. In order to address 
compromises between the interactive decision-makers that exist in a hierarchical organization, 
multilevel decision-making techniques, motivated by Stackelberg game theory and presented by 
multilevel mathematical programming have been developed.  In a multilevel decision-making 
process, decision-makers at the higher level are called the leaders and the decision-makers at the 
lower level are termed the followers. The decision-makers make their individual decisions in 
sequence with the aim of optimizing their respective objectives [22]. 
This decision-making process means that the leader has priority in making decisions and the 
follower reacts in full knowledge of the leader's decision; however, the leader's decision is 
implicitly affected by the follower's decision. 
Most of these applications of game theory and multilevel programming have been focused on the 
planning of new technologies and their supply chain analysis. A summary of the reviewed 
literature focusing on the application of multilevel programming and game theory is presented in 
Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1. Summary of reviewed literature on multilevel programming and game theory application 
Number Paper’s title Application for game theory  Stakeholders 
1 Security-constrained bi-level 
economic dispatch model for 
Integrated natural gas and 
electricity systems 
Two levels, economic 
dispatch for the electricity 
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integrated natural gas and 
electricity systems considering 
wind power and power-to-gas 
process [22] 
system and gas economic 
allocation 
2 Game theory approach in 
decisional process of energy 
management for industrial sector 
[23] 
Governing energy policy Two levels, industry and 
environment 
3 An interaction between 
government and manufacturer in 
implementation of cleaner 
production: a multi-stage game 
theoretical analysis [24] 
Implementation of cleaner 
production  
Two levels, government 
and manufacturer 
4 A game theory analysis of market 
incentives for US switchgrass 
ethanol [25] 
Biofuel incentives Two levels, farmers and 
ethanol producers 
5 An exploratory game-theoretic 
analysis of biomass electricity 
generation supply chain [26] 
Power generation from biomass 
supply chain 
Three levels, distributor, 
facility developer, and 
participating farmer 
6 A Stackelberg game theoretic 
analysis of incentive effects under 
perceived risk for China’s straw-
based power plant supply chain 
[27] 
Incentives for the biomass supply 
chain 
Three levels, biomass 
power plants, middlemen, 
and farmers 
7 Novel role of rural official 
organization in the biomass-based 
power supply chain in China: a 
combined game theory and agent-
based simulation approach [28] 
 
Biomass feedstock supply model 
for the biomass-based power 
Three levels, farmer, 
broker and biomass plant 
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8 Palm biomass strategic resource 
management–a competitive game 
analysis [29] 
Biomass industry Two levels, industries at 
the same level 
9 A game-theoretic analysis of 
implementation of cleaner 
production policies in the Chinese 
electroplating industry [30] 
Implementation of cleaner 
production policy 
Two levels, local 
government and a 
potentially polluting firm 
10 Sustainable development by waste 
recycling under a three-echelon 
supply chain: A game-theoretic 
approach [31] 
Waste recycling process supply 
chain 
Three levels, collector, 
recycler, manufacturer 
11 An evolutionary analysis of low-
carbon strategies based on the 
government–enterprise game in 
the complex network context [32] 
Adoption of a low-carbon strategy Two levels, government 
and enterprises 
12 For the sustainable performance of 
the carbon reduction labeling 
policies under an evolutionary 
game simulation [33] 
Incentive policies related to the 
implementation of a carbon 
reduction labeling scheme 
Two levels, any 
enterprise in the market 
13 Selecting sustainable waste-to-
energy technologies for municipal 
solid waste treatment: a game 
theory approach for group 
decision-making [34] 
The municipal solid waste 
treatment options 
Two levels, municipality 
and industry 
14 Grid extension in German 
backyards: a game-theory 
rationale [35] 
Grid extension Multiple, communities 
paying for grid extension 
and use  
15 Multi-objective game-theory 
models for conflict analysis in 
reservoir watershed management 
[36] 
Economic and environmental 
concerns in reservoir watershed 
management 
Two levels, 




16 An adjustment in regulation 
policies and its effects on market 
supply: Game analysis for China’s 
rare earths [37] 
Government policy on rare earth 
extraction 
Two firms acting on rare 
earth business 
17 Consensual decision-making 
model based on game theory for 
LNG processes [38] 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
processes 
Three levels, one leader 
(liquefaction process) and 
two followers (the 
compressor and the main 
heat exchanger) 
18 A software based simulation for 
cleaner production: A game 
between manufacturers and 
government [39] 
Cleaner production policy Two levels, government 
and manufacturers 
19 Game modeling and policy 
research on the system dynamics-







enterprises, and society 
20 Game model to optimally combine 
electric vehicles with green and 
non-green sources into an end-to-
end smart grid architecture [41] 
Combine electric vehicles into a 
smart grid 
Two levels, smart grid 
and electric vehicle 
21 An inexact bilevel simulation–
optimization model for 
conjunctive regional renewable 
energy planning and air pollution 
control for electric power 
generation systems [42] 
Renewable energy planning and 
air pollution control 
Two levels, 
environmental sector and 
energy sector 
22 Determining tax credits for 
converting non-food crops to 
biofuels: an application of bilevel 
programming [43] 
Design of tax credits for the 
production of biofuels 
Two levels, government 
and 




As can be seen in Table 2-1, game theory is a useful concept to address emerging energy and 
environment issues when multiple stakeholders are engaged. The most important problem in the 
design of renewable energy incentives is the willingness of governments for implementing new 
and clean technologies and the resistance of investors and customers in using them because of the 
high cost and uncertainty in the profitability. This is the context of our work, and as a result, we 
have aimed at addressing such challenges using the game theory concept and multilevel 
optimization.  
Similarly, we have used a bilevel model for analyzing the interaction of the heat and electricity 
sectors. 
The reason for using a multilevel programming approach rather than a single level approach is 
the existence of different stakeholders in the system which may have conflicting objects. 
Conflicting objects means that an increase in the benefit of one stakeholder leads to a decrease in 
the benefit of others. Hence, it is more reasonable to model the stakeholders at different levels. 
Additionally, literature review shows that bilevel programming approaches lead to results with 
more realistic patterns in comparison to single-level models since in bilevel programming 
approaches all objectives are taken into account. 
Table 2-1 and the literature review in the previous section also show that most of the game theory 
applications have been formulated with a bilevel optimization problem. The complexity of solving 
problems with more than two players (stakeholders) have made the researchers limit their 
problems to two stakeholders where different solving methods have been suggested. However, a 
few papers have expanded their work to systems with more than two stakeholders and have 
molded systems with three stakeholders.  
2.4 Conclusion 
Reviewing the literature focused on the incentives for the development of renewable energy 
capacity shows that different government incentives will lead to different results both in energy 
capacity development and objectives of different stakeholders. As a result, analyzing the 
interaction of different stakeholders in a microgrid is of importance when government incentives 
are to be designed. Additionally, it was found out that energy storage technologies are effective 
options for reducing GHG emissions, especially when surplus clean electricity is available. 
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Finally, game theory was recognized as a powerful concept for modeling the interaction of 
different stakeholders. Game theory has been used in many areas where independent decision 

























3 Investigating the effect of renewable energy incentives and 
hydrogen storage on advantages of stakeholders in a microgrid 
The following section is based on work by Haghi et.al [11], published in the Energy Policy journal. 
Contribution of authors is detailed in the Statement of Contributions section.   
3.1 Introduction 
The growth in the level of CO2 emissions has been a challenge worldwide. CO2 emissions from 
energy consumption accounted for 60% of global GHG emissions in 2010. [44]. World’s energy 
consumption and CO2 emissions are expected to increase by 56% and 46% between 2010 and 
2040, respectively [45]. Despite the importance of renewable energy technologies in overcoming 
this challenge, successful integration of such technologies can only be achieved after overcoming 
varied obstacles. One important obstacle is the need for investment capital. Investment in 
renewable energy projects requires financial incentives as such projects typically have higher 
capital costs than the conventional energy generation systems and are in some cases considered 
to be riskier due to technology and resource uncertainties. Renewable energy projects are 
generally of a smaller scale in comparison with the conventional energy production projects and 
consequently could not benefit from economies of scale [14].  
The objective of this research is to determine how different incentives contribute to the perceived 
viability of a microgrid project from the perspective of different stakeholders, i.e., the government, 
the energy hub operator and the energy consumer and also to examine the potential for hydrogen 
energy storage within a microgrid. Previous studies have examined the implementation of new 
distributed energy technologies confounding the objectives of all stakeholders.  However, in an 
energy system the entity that will invest in and implement a new distributed energy generation 
and transformation technology is a commercial firm with their own motivations independent of 
other stakeholders. Unique to this work, is the analysis of motivations of each stakeholder 
independently, which will allow for better policy development and increased implementation of 
distributed energy technologies.    
To overcome the problem of higher investment capital for renewable energy projects, many 
countries have started incentive programs and policies. Some of the common policies which aim 
to expand renewable energy infrastructure include carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs (FITs), premium 
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payments, quota systems, cap and trade systems, and capital grants. Different policies have 
contributed to reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions through incentives provided to 
renewable energies; however, the remaining question is how to define, combine and use incentives 
in the most profitable manner to face the new challenges in the development of renewable energy 
technologies.  The importance of this question emerges from the fact that there are several 
renewable energy technologies developed with different characteristics such as efficiency, cost, 
capacity factor, and availability. At the same time, there are several programs to incentivize 
renewable energy technologies and each of these incentives may benefit certain technologies or 
stakeholders in an energy system. Although some research has been dedicated to development of 
renewable energy technologies, finding the most efficient policies and methods for increasing the 
penetration of renewable energies into national energy systems considering the objectives of all 
stakeholders has attracted less attention and has yet to be further investigated [15]. 
This research aims to develop a simulation model of a microgrid in which hydrogen and wind 
power are produced in different operational scenarios. This simulation model is used to investigate 
the cost-efficiency and effect of renewable energy incentive schemes on the advantages of 
different stakeholders interacting in the microgrid. The analysis is done in the context of 
distributed generation. Such context was chosen for the analysis because of an increase in the 
penetration of distributed generation in developed countries and the significant role distributed 
generation is expected to play in future electricity supply. Distributed generation can substantially 
reduce carbon emissions, thereby contributing to the commitments of most developed countries 
to meet their GHG emission reduction targets. Most of the targets are typically set based on the 
Paris Climate Accord within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Also, the presence of energy generation and storage close to the energy demand may 
increase the power quality and the reliability of electricity delivered to sensitive end users. An 
important factor in increasing the penetration of distributed generation has been the restructuring 
of power markets [46]. 
While the application of distributed generation can potentially reduce the need for traditional 
electrical transmission system expansion, managing a potentially huge number of distributed 
generation facilities creates a new challenge for operating and controlling the network safely and 
efficiently. Note that offsetting transmission system expansion benefits the government, but does 
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not specifically benefit the end user. This challenge can be partially addressed by microgrids [47]. 
Microgrids are low voltage distribution networks comprising various distributed generators, 
storage devices and controllable loads that can operate interconnected or isolated from the main 
distribution grid, as a controlled entity [46]. Microgrids coordinate distributed generation facilities 
in a consistently more decentralized way, thereby reducing the control burden on the grid and 
allowing them to provide their full benefits [47]. 
In the microgrid proposed in this study, hydrogen is produced via electrolysis using grid electricity 
and/or wind power. Wind power has been considered a promising substitute for conventional 
sources of electricity because of its abundance, adaptability to the existing land use, 
nonpolluting character, and increasing cost-effectiveness [48]. Additionally, among all 
hydrogen production pathways, electrolytic hydrogen production via wind power is considered to 
have the lowest GHG emissions. Moreover, wind energy has the lowest levelized cost of 
electricity among renewable energy sources after hydropower [49]. As a result, production of 
electrolytic hydrogen via wind power seems to be of noticeable potential.   
Using hydrogen energy for storing and transporting energy has attracted great attention in recent 
years. For instance, the European Union launched a joint technology initiative to spend almost 
one billion Euros over six years for hydrogen and fuel cell technologies [50], [51]. Electrolytic 
hydrogen not only can replace fossil fuels in both industrial and mobility demands but also can 
be used as a practical option for storing large amounts of power for long durations of time [16]. 
The use of electrolytic hydrogen production as energy storage that uses the existing natural gas 
distribution system is defined in the concept of ‘Power-to-Gas. The Power-to-Gas concept 
proposes to convert the surplus electrical energy to chemical energy by producing hydrogen which 
can then be directed in multiple application pathways [52]. The block diagram of the Power-to-





Figure 3-1. Power-to-Gas concept block diagram 
Figure 3-2 shows the Ontario’s electricity supply mix for 2015. As can be seen, about 90% of 
Ontario’s electricity supply is generated from fossil-free resources. Hydrogen generation provides 
energy storage benefits to make maximum use of the clean energy in the electrical grid. 
 
 Figure 3-2. Ontario’s electricity supply for total delivered energy 2015 [53] 
The research focused on analyzing the cost-effectiveness of different renewable energy policies 
is abundant in the literature. de Arce et al. [54] for instance, compared different incentive policies 
Hydropower
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(carbon tax, FIT, premium payment and quota system) for the development of renewable energy 
in a modeled simplified radial power network, using price-responsive demand. The incentive 
schemes were compared at different congestion levels in terms of energy prices, renewable energy 
generation, CO2 emissions, and social welfare. The authors in [54], found that subsidy policies 
(FIT and premium payments) are more cost-effective in reducing CO2 emissions compared to 
policies that apply penalties or taxes when assuming oligopoly competition and policies in which 
customers do not directly pay back for the subsidies. Kitzing [55], used variance portfolio analysis 
to identify the risk implications of FITs and feed-in premiums (FIPs). Using cash flow analysis, 
Monte Carlo simulations and mean–variance, Kitzing [55] analyzed the inherent relationship of 
risk and return for renewable energy under different incentive policies. An offshore wind project 
was used to show the impact of policies on both the private investor, defined as the attractiveness 
of investment, and society, defined as required support to be paid. The results showed that while 
FITs provide the same attractiveness for investment, they systematically require lower levels of 
direct support than FIPs since they expose investors to less market risk. 
Among all methods for investigating the profitability of renewable incentive schemes, calculating 
the net present value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR) and payback period (PBP) of renewable 
energy projects has been the most prevalent method. This method has been used for different 
incentive schemes as well as different renewable energy technologies. Falconett et al. [56], for 
instance, evaluated the NPV of renewable energy projects under different support mechanisms 
and calculated how much the different policies increased the NPV of the project. The authors in 
[56], investigated the effect of FITs, net metering (NM), renewable energy certificates (RECs) 
and governmental grants as well as the economic effect of carbon credits on small-scale 
hydroelectric, wind energy and solar PV technologies. They concluded that FITs are the best 
mechanisms for increasing the profitability of solar PV systems and wind energy projects. In 
addition, they also showed that the government grants and carbon credits are secondary support 
mechanisms compared to FIT and RECs. Campoccia et al. [57], analyzed FIT support 
mechanisms for promoting PV systems using profitability measures of discounted cash flows 
(DCF), PBP, NPV, and IRR, for different sizes of PV systems. The result of their study showed 
that a specific FIT can sometimes be inconvenient for the producer and that different ways of 
implementing FIT support policies in various countries can lead to significantly different results. 
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de Arce et al. [58], evaluated the effect of UK FIT on decentralized small wind-energy 
installations at the household and building level in urban areas using NPV criteria for assessing 
commercial purchases of small wind systems by building owners. The authors concluded that the 
proposed tariff amount in the UK will not significantly boost the economic attractiveness of 
investigated sites. Coffman et al. [59], assessed the impact of Hawaii's solar PV tax credit policy 
for the development of household PV systems with different levels of generated electricity fed to 
the grid. The authors in [59], estimated the effect of tax credit incentive for households to install 
PV by calculating PBP and IRR for PV installation. The results showed that IRR for a typical 
Hawaii household is 25% and 16% with and without the state tax credit, respectively. It was also 
estimated that the PBP for investing in PV with and without the state tax credit was 3.3 and 6 
years (statewide average), respectively. Zhao et al. [60], calculated appropriate FIT values on the 
basis of different financing scenarios of a solar–coal hybrid power plant. The FIT was calculated 
so that the investment could earn a rate of return to offset the inflation of approximately 8% for 
the investors to allow profitability.  Ramírez et al. [61], analyzed the cost-efficiency of using FIT 
and net metering schemes on the profitability of PV projects. The analysis was done to show the 
minimum levels of tariff values and the specific combination of support schemes that should be 
promoted. Results showed that in most cases, PV systems are not profitable without the support 
of an electricity compensation scheme. However, it was concluded that a combination of FITs 
and net metering schemes is a viable option for PV development in most of the countries 
considered (European countries) using the PV systems studied and adopting suitable levels of 
tariff prices. Mir-Artigues et al. [62], developed a financial model to investigate combining FITs 
with investment subsidies and soft loans. The results showed that the policy costs of combinations 
were the same as for the FITs-only option. Therefore, combining deployment instruments is not 
a cost-containment strategy. However, combinations may lead to different inter-temporal 
distributions of the same amount of policy costs, and thus, affect the social acceptability and 
political feasibility of renewable energy support differently. 
From the literature review the following points can be concluded:   




2. Investigating the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the capital grant scheme has been the 
focus of much less attention than other renewable energy incentive schemes, especially FITs; 
3. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness of a combination of schemes due to its potential and the 
effect of different schemes which are implemented at the same time are important topics to 
consider; 
4. Most of the research in the efficiency of renewable energy schemes has been dedicated to the 
effect of the scheme on promoting investment in renewable energy. Most studies have used NPV 
criteria for analyzing the efficiency of a certain scheme or to find the value of an incentive scheme. 
However, this is only in favor of one of the stakeholders in an energy system (the investors in 
renewable energy technologies); and 
5. Renewable energy technologies on which the effect of incentive schemes have been 
investigated the most extensively are firstly solar systems like the ones used by Dusonchet and 
Telaretti [63], to compare NPV and IRR for different sized PV systems, and in Dusonchet and 
Telaretti [64], to perform a comparative economic analysis among FITs and tradable green 
certificates (TGC) implemented in western European countries. The reason for the attention 
toward solar systems is the possibility of using solar systems at rooftops which facilitates their 
use in residential buildings. However, the technology application and financial incentives have 
not been well considered from the perspective of different stakeholders and energy storage 
technologies, and thus there are still challenges for commercialization of technologies such as of 
Power-to-Gas.  
3.2 Methodology 
In this study, three stakeholders in the microgrid, each seeking their own objectives will be 
considered. These three stakeholders are the government, the energy hub investor (the energy hub 
operator), and the energy consumer. Traditionally, the consumer would purchase energy (i.e., 
electricity, natural gas, or transportation fuel) from a large, and often regulated energy hub 
operator. Previous studies have examined the implementation of new distributed energy 
technologies confounding the objectives of all the stakeholders.  Unique to this work, is the 
analysis of the motivations of each stakeholder independently, which will allow for better policy 
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development and increased implementation of distributed energy technologies. Considering the 
modeled microgrid, the advantage of each stakeholder is defined as follows: 
Energy consumer: The energy consumer seeks the objective of minimizing the cost. In this study, 
the cost for the energy consumer is defined as the sum of the energy consumer’s payment to the 
energy hub operator and the government. The energy consumer in this microgrid has two options: 
buying the relatively less expensive natural gas fuel and paying more emission cost, or buying the 
relatively more expensive hydrogen fuel and paying less emission cost. The energy consumer 
pays the emission cost to the government and the price of hydrogen to the energy hub operator. 
Energy hub operator:  The energy hub operator seeks the objective of maximizing the net 
present value (NPV) from investment in renewable energy and energy storage technologies. The 
energy hub operator gains revenue from selling hydrogen to the energy consumers, and/or selling 
renewable power (wind, in this case) to the grid.  However, in the transition toward a cleaner 
economy an energy hub operator also benefits from incentives paid by the government to promote 
clean energy infrastructure. In a more complicated simulation, the energy hub operator may also 
be able to sell natural gas and electricity to the consumer. However, this case is not considered in 
this study. 
Government: The government seeks to spend the minimum amount of money in incentives 
contributed, or minimize the net amount of money required to decrease one kg of CO2 emission. 
The government seeks to reduce GHG emissions and urban air pollution emissions in two ways: 
by incentivizing the generation of renewable energy, and by taxing CO2 emission via carbon price. 
As a result, the government interacts with the energy hub operator via paying incentives (this 
incentive may be paid through different programs as explained later on) and interacts with the 
energy consumer via taxing its CO2 emission with carbon price. 
Wind power is an energy source while hydrogen is an energy vector (i.e., a medium to store and 
transport energy), therefore, they can’t be compared via direct metrics. However, investing in 
wind power for reducing CO2 emissions and investing in hydrogen infrastructure for energy 
storage achieve the same outcome of reducing GHG emissions, and thus can be considered as 
alternative policies in competition for government funding and investor support, all while 





Figure 3-3. Stakeholders’ interaction 
For each scenario, different incentive programs are investigated and compared with each other 
using the following criteria: 
Annual payment by the government (CAD per year): The total amount of money in 2015 
Canadian Dollars (CAD) paid by the government to the energy hub operator through a FIT 
program to incentivize renewable energy generation. 2015 was selected for two reasons: 1. A full 
year hourly electricity price is available for 2015, and 2. In 2015 Ontario grid did not have any 
coal energy production.     
Capital grant paid by the government (CAD): The amount of money paid by the government 
to the energy hub operator in form of a capital grant in the first year of the project to offset part 
of the capital investment cost. 
Government’s revenue per kg of CO2 (CAD per kg): As outlined earlier, the government seeks 
to increase the penetration of renewable energy in the system in two ways: 
1.Taxing CO2 emitted from conventional fuel using a carbon price. The government makes money 
from this channel. 
2.Incentivizing the generation of renewable energy. Here, the government pays money. 
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Note that consumer acceptability is not specifically considered in this study beyond carbon pricing; 
however, it will be the subject of future studies. Consumer acceptability metrics are confounded 
with government objectives but will primarily be net energy cost (i.e., cost of electricity, natural 
gas, and hydrogen, as well as carbon pricing, to meet all their energy requirements). Other 
consumer acceptability metrics include issues such as safety, reliability, technology readiness, 
reduction in local air pollution, and local job creation. 
The government’s revenue per kg of CO2 emission equals the amount of money the government 
awards minus the amount of money it collects from carbon tax per kg of CO2 emission reduction. 
If this number is positive, it means the government is spending money to reduce each kg of CO2 
emission. If the government’s revenue is negative, it means the government has a net positive 
revenue generation for each kg of CO2 emission reduction. The lifetime of the incentive program, 
as well as the project lifetime, is assumed to be 20 years. The amount of annual incentives awarded 
by the government and the carbon tax received from the energy consumer in 20 years is brought 
back to the first year value and is added to the capital grant awarded by the government to find 
the sum of the money the government pays in 20 years. This amount is divided by the carbon 
emission reduction in 20 years to find the value of government’s net investment. 
Government’s expenditure per kg of CO2 (CAD per kg): The government’s expenditure per 
kg of CO2 is the amount of money the government pays to reduce one kg CO2 emission by 
awarding incentives. This number has always a positive value. The annual amount of money spent 
by the government in 20 years is brought back to the first year value and is added to the capital 
grant paid by the government to find the sum of the money the government spent over 20 years. 
This amount is divided by the carbon emission reduction in 20 years to find the value of the 
government’s expenditure. 
The government’s revenue calculation is used to compare incentive programs in a scenario. The 
government’s expenditure criteria, however, is used to compare programs in different scenarios. 
The reason for the distinction is that the amount of CO2 emission reduction varies in different 
scenarios. As a result, the denominator for calculating government’s revenue will not be the same 
in different scenarios and this leads to misconception when the revenue is a negative number if 
government’s profit is used for comparing scenarios.  
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NPV of the energy hub operator (CAD): Net present value (NPV) of the energy hub operator 
is the net present value of the investment of the energy hub operator in an energy project 
considering the revenue gained from selling renewable products accompanied with incentives. 
The criteria for evaluating the efficiency of an incentive scheme for promoting a certain renewable 
infrastructure will be the NPV of the energy hub operator. 
Additional cost of the consumer (CAD): Based on different carbon prices, energy consumer 
should either pay carbon price imposed on emission from conventional fuel consumption or buy 
emission-free hydrogen to replace fossil fuel consumption. The consumer has to pay this amount 
as long as there is a carbon price in place and is the additional cost of the consumer compared to 
the case where there is no carbon price. 
Amount of CO2 prevented to be emitted annually (kg CO2 per year): Government policies in 
incentivizing renewable energy and imposing carbon prices prevent the emission of a certain 
amount of CO2 annually. 
3.2.1 Microgrid description 
The microgrid simulated in this study includes three levels of supply, conversion and storage, and 
primary end user. In the supply level, water, electricity from the grid, electricity from the wind 
farm and natural gas from natural gas pipeline enter the microgrid.  The generated wind power 
can also be sold to the grid. In the conversion and storage level, hydrogen is produced via the 
water electrolysis process with an alkaline electrolyzer using the electricity from the grid and/or 
the wind farm. The produced hydrogen may be directed in two ways: hydrogen may be blended 
with natural gas and the mixture is used as Hydrogen-Enriched Natural Gas (HENG) in two 
generator sets internal combustion engines (ICEs) and a drying furnace in primary end user, or it 
may be stored (aboveground or underground) for later use. Figure 3-4 shows an overview of the 





Figure 3-4. Overview of the microgrid considered in this study 
The electrolyzer used in the microgrid is an alkaline electrolyzer with maximum and minimum 
hydrogen production rate of 150 m3 per hr and 25 m3 per hr, respectively. It is assumed that 5.9 
kWh of electricity is used to produce each m3 of hydrogen and the hydrogen leaves the 
electrolyzer at a pressure of 30 bars.  
Hydrogen in gaseous form is generally stored in two ways: aboveground storage (as a compressed 
gas in a tank) and underground storage. For aboveground storage, hydrogen is stored in a tank 
and is used for both pressure regulation and short term buffer or staging storage of hydrogen. 
Underground storage is used for bulk hydrogen storage. Underground storage is less expensive 
than the aboveground storage on a per kWh basis; however, it is only reasonable to develop 
underground storage for large scale hydrogen storage [65]. Four types of geological storage 
options have been examined for hydrogen storage in the literature. These four types include salt 
caverns, depleted oil & gas reservoirs, aquifers, and hard rock caverns [66]. In the proposed 
microgrid, hydrogen is stored underground in a fully depleted natural gas production reservoir 
which acts as a seasonal storage. For model simplicity, hydrogen is only added to the underground 
storage reservoir in the first 6 months of the year (from January to June) and is only extracted 
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from the underground storage reservoir in the last 6 months of the year (from July to December) 
to meet the demand.  In reality, the interaction with the reservoir can be much more dynamic.  
1.25 kWh of electricity is needed to compress hydrogen to 170 bars (aboveground storage tank 
pressure) and 0.78 kWh of electricity is needed to compress hydrogen to 138 bars (underground 
storage operation pressure). It is assumed that hydrogen needs no compression if it is going to be 
delivered to the consumer without any storage. 
An 18 MW wind farm will constitute the baseline of this study. The turbines used in the model 
are V90 1.8 MW Vestas wind turbines. Knowing the hourly wind speed for the region, we 
investigated the capacity factor of different wind turbines and “Vestas V90 1.8 MW” had the 
highest capacity factor among all models/brands investigated. As a result, this wind turbine model 
was used in our modeling. The wind turbine characteristic curve is from the manufacturer catalog 
and shown in Table 3-1.  







The hourly wind speed for the region of Sarnia, where the microgrid is considered to be, is known 
for a typical year. The original measurements were conducted at 10 m above the ground level. 
The measured values were adjusted to match the height of the nacelle at 80 m above the ground 
level using a Hellman exponent of 0.14 for the region.  
The energy consumer is assumed to be a factory using two internal combustion engines and an 
agricultural product drying furnace. Fuel input for gas spark ignition engine CHP from the Catalog 
of CHP Technologies [68] (typical performance parameters) and the natural gas consumption for 







Cut-in wind speed 4 meters per second 
Rated wind speed 12  meters per second 
Cut-out wind speed 25  meters per second 
Hub height 80 meters  
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Considering the technical and operational constraints and knowing natural gas consumption, a 
hydrogen consumption of 8.22 kg per hr is calculated for replacing 4% of fuel consumption by 
volume. The assumption in the microgrid is that the energy hub operator signs a contract that 
guarantees to supply the required amount of hydrogen to the consumer in each hour of the year at 
a certain price. 
The consumer price for hydrogen is assumed to be the price for hydrogen that makes it ‘break 
even’ for the natural gas consumer to replace the natural gas consumption with hydrogen 
considering the natural gas price and the carbon tax imposed on the consumer while accounting 
for the energy content of the two fuels in the blend. As a result, the sum of fuel cost (𝐹𝐶) and 
carbon cost (𝐶𝐶) in both cases should be equal as shown in Equation  3-1.  
𝐹𝐶1 + 𝐶𝐶1 = 𝐹𝐶2 + 𝐶𝐶2  3-1 
In which 
𝐹𝐶 = 𝐻𝑐 × 𝐻𝑝 + 𝑁𝐺𝑐 × 𝑁𝐺𝑝 3-2 
In Equation 3-2, 𝐻𝑐 is hydrogen consumption in kg per hr, 𝑁𝐺𝑐 is natural gas consumption in 
MMBtu per hour, 𝐻𝑝 is hydrogen price in CAD per kg and 𝑁𝐺𝑝 is natural gas price calculated 
based on 2015 average Henry Hub natural gas spot price. The prices consumer willing to pay for 
hydrogen at different carbon prices are shown in Table 3-3.  






Device Fuel input  
(MMBtu per hr), HHV 
Natural Gas input 
(m3 per hr) 
ICE 1 (System 5 engine in the catalog) 76.66 1638 
ICE 2 (System 4 engine  in the catalog) 28.12 600 
Drying Furnace NA 150 
Total NA 2388 






The reasons for the relatively low consumer hydrogen price are 1. Low price of natural gas and 2. 
Low carbon emission price. In other words, as both the price for primary fuel (natural gas) and 
emission tax imposed on it are low, the energy consumer is willing to pay a low price for hydrogen 
energy. This issue shows the importance of implementing policies toward the support of hydrogen 
infrastructure either in increasing the price of hydrogen energy competitor (natural gas) or bolding 
advantage of hydrogen (lower emission) by increasing carbon price.  
The consumer price for wind power is assumed to be equal to Hourly Ontario Electricity Price 
(HOEP) at the hour the power is sold to the grid. The energy hub operator’s profit, however, 
doesn’t come from the consumer payment only; energy hub operator also receives incentives from 
the government. It is also assumed that the energy hub operator can sell wind power to the grid at 
any time; however, the selling price differs considering different policies. 
The characteristics of components of the microgrid used in the economic analysis are shown in 
Table 3-4. All values are in 2015 CAD. The values from different references were adjusted to 
2015 values using the “chemical engineering plant cost index” and the exchange rate of one US 
dollar equal to 1.31 CAD. The values for electrolyzer stack replacement are from consulting with 
industrial partners.  









CO2 emission from the grid is calculated based on the share of each source in the grid mix with 
specific emission factors presented in Table 3-5.  
Component Capital cost Annual operation and 
maintenance cost 
Lifetime (years) 
Wind turbine [69] CAD 2165 per kW 3% of capital cost [69] 20 
Electrolyser [70] CAD 1050 per kW 4% of capital cost 20 
Electrolyser stack 
replacement 
30% of electrolyzer 
capital cost 
 
Already included in 
electrolyzer operation and 
maintenance cost 
10 
Compressor [71] CAD 5300*(storage 
size(kW))+ 24,000 
4% of capital cost 20 
Storage tank [71] CAD 1410 per kg of 
hydrogen storage 
capacity 
0.5%  of capital cost 20 
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Table 3-5. Assumed electricity source emission factors [72] 








All scenarios are modeled hourly using MATLAB/SIMULINK. The modeling period is one year 
(8760 hours).  
3.2.2 Scenarios 
The following six scenarios for energy hub operation are investigated in this study.  
Scenario 1:  The energy hub operator is a renewable energy hub operator that generates only wind 
power and is able to sell the generated power to the grid at any time. The price for selling wind 
power is determined via a FIT program (Wind generation only). 
Scenario 2: Hydrogen is produced using grid electricity only. Electricity is bought from the grid 
at the HOEP to fill the aboveground storage tank when the price of electricity is lower than a 
certain low set price (LSP) limit which is assumed to be 23 CAD per MWh. When the price of 
grid electricity is higher than a certain high set price (HSP) limit which is assumed to be 30 CAD 
per MWh, the electrolyzer is shut down and the hydrogen stored in the storage tank is used to 
meet the hydrogen demand. When the price of grid electricity is between LSP and HSP, the 
electrolyzer is used to produce hydrogen to meet the immediate demand (no adding to or 
extracting from storage in this case). If there is no stored hydrogen in the tank, electricity is bought 
from the grid at any price to produce hydrogen in order to meet the immediate demand. The 
storage tank considered in this scenario is small (capacity of storing 50 kg of hydrogen) and as a 
result, the system is buying electricity from the grid at almost every hour of the year.  The 















Figure 3-5. The simulation logic flowchart of Scenario 2 -  Hydrogen with grid/ no underground storage, and 
Scenario 3 -  Hydrogen with grid/ with underground storage 
GEP= Grid Electricity Price, LSP= Low Set Price, HSP= High Set Price,   PDE= power needed for electrolyzer to 
meet hydrogen demand, PST= power needed for electrolyzer to fill the storage tank, PEL= power fed to the electrolyzer, 
Pneeded= power bought from the grid, ɳE= electrolyzer efficiency, Hproduced= Hydrogen produced by electrolyzer, Hrated= 
Maximum hydrogen production of electrolyzer, Hdemand=Hydrogen demand, Hextra=Hydrogen sent to the storage tank, 
Hneeded =Hydrogen from the storage tank 
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Scenario 3:  Hydrogen is produced using grid electricity only, with the option of storing hydrogen 
underground. The difference between this scenario and the second scenario is that the hydrogen 
produced when the grid electricity price is lower than 23 CAD per MWh (total accumulated time 
of about  6 months of the year) is stored in underground storage to be used at times when the price 
is over 30 CAD per MWh. As a result, the system benefits from a seasonal storage option which 
enables it to use relatively low cost grid electricity to produce hydrogen that can be used when 
the grid electricity price is high. This scenario is modeled in two seasons: storing season (shown 
in Figure 3-6) and non-storing season (shown in Figure 3-7) (Hydrogen with grid/ with 
underground storage). 
In the next 3 scenarios, wind power is used to run the electrolyzer and produce hydrogen. The 
surplus wind power not used for hydrogen production is sold to the grid. The challenge in using 
wind power for producing hydrogen is the intermittent nature of wind power while there is a 
constant demand for hydrogen that needs to be met.  To overcome this problem, two solutions are 
proposed: using large scale storage (explained in scenarios 4 and 5) or using a blend of wind 
power and grid electricity to produce hydrogen (explained in Scenario 6).  These scenarios are 
appropriate for locations where there is a very large fraction of power is generated from wind 
power generation capacity.  
Scenario 4: An aboveground storage tank is used to supply hydrogen when there is no wind power 
to produce hydrogen. The minimum size of the storage tank that allows the hub operator to meet 
the demand can store 2700 kg of hydrogen and is able to provide backup hydrogen for about 14 
days. The simulation logic flowchart for this scenario is shown in Figure 3-6. (Hydrogen with 









Figure 3-6. The simulation logic flowchart of Scenario 4 -  Hydrogen with wind/ no 
underground storage, and Scenario 5 -  Hydrogen with wind/ with underground storage  
Scenario 5: An underground storage reservoir is used to supply hydrogen when there is no wind 
power. Hydrogen is produced in the first 6 months of the year as much as possible using wind 
PWF=Power generated by wind farm, PME=Minimum power of electrolyzer, PDE= power needed for electrolyzer to meet hydrogen 
demand, PST= power needed for electrolyzer to fill the storage tank, PEL= power fed to the electrolyzer, Pextra = power sold to the 
grid, ɳE= electrolyzer efficiency, Hproduced= Hydrogen produced by electrolyzer, Hrated= Maximum hydrogen production of 
electrolyzer, Hdemand=Hydrogen demand, Hextra=Hydrogen sent to the storage tank, Hneeded =Hydrogen from the storage tank 
37 
 
power and is used in the second 6 months of the year to meet the hydrogen demand when there is 
no wind power in this period. Although there is a large scale underground hydrogen storage option 
available in this scenario, an aboveground storage tank with 500 kg hydrogen storage capacity is 
still needed since the underground storage is only used in the second 6 months of the year. This 
scenario is modeled in two seasons: storing season and non-storing season shown in Figure 3-6.  
(Hydrogen with wind/ with underground storage). 
Scenario 6: Grid electricity is used to produce hydrogen when there is no wind power available. 
This system doesn’t have any type of storage and electricity is bought from the grid when the 
wind power is not enough to supply the hydrogen demand. The flowchart for this scenario is 
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PWF=Power generated by wind farm, PME=Minimum power of electrolyzer, PDE= power needed for electrolyzer to meet hydrogen 
demand, PST= power needed for electrolyzer to fill the storage tank, PEL= power fed to the electrolyzer, Pextra = power sold to the 
grid, Pneeded = power needed to produce hydrogen when there is not enough wind power,  ɳE= electrolyzer efficiency, Hproduced= 
Hydrogen produced by electrolyzer, Hrated= Maximum hydrogen production of electrolyzer, Hdemand=Hydrogen demand, 
Hextra=Hydrogen sent to the storage tank, Hneeded =Hydrogen from the storage tank 
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The specifications for each scenario are summarized in Table 3-6.  
Table 3-6. Scenarios’ specifications 
 
All models are simulated in a way that all storage elements are empty at the end of the modeling 
period (one year). In other words, no hydrogen is kept for use in the next year.  
3.2.3 Energy hub incentive policies 
As mentioned earlier, the government seeks to reduce CO2 emission: by 1. Incentivizing the 
generation of renewable energy, and 2. Taxing CO2 emission via carbon price. A carbon cost (tax 
or fee associated with a ‘cap and trade’ program) is defined as the additional cost to firms for CO2 
emissions associated with fossil fuel consumption [58]. This is an indirect method of promoting 
renewable energy as it doesn’t directly allocate subsidies to renewable products, rather it taxes 
conventional fuels which makes renewable products more competitive. However, there are 
incentives that directly promote renewable products. These incentives are paid to the renewable 
energy hub operator in several ways including feed-in tariff (FIT) programs, tax incentives for 
investments, tradable green certificates (TGC) and capital grants, to name a few.  
























Scenario 1 -  Wind 
generation only 
18 27 NA 65 NA NA NA NA 
Scenario 2 -  Hydrogen 
with grid/ no underground 
storage 
0 NA 885 65 50 0 30 23 
Scenario 3 -  Hydrogen 
with grid/ with 
underground storage 
0 NA 885 65 50 67.3 × 106 30 23 
Scenario 4 -  Hydrogen 
with wind/ no underground 
storage 
18 27 885 65 2700 0 NA NA 
Scenario 5 -  Hydrogen 
with wind/ with 
underground storage 
18 27 885 65 500 67.3 × 106 NA NA 
Scenario 6 -  Hydrogen 
with wind and grid blend 
18 27 885 65 0 0 NA NA 
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FIT is a renewable energy incentive policy defined as a payment of a premium price to the 
generation firms for the renewable energy product generated independently of the spot market 
price [58]. Two main characteristics of FIT programs are stable, long-term purchase agreements 
(20 years in this case) and payment levels based on the costs of renewable energy product 
generation [73].  
The advantages of implementing FITs can be summarized as follows [14]: 
1. Providing a higher price to the generators to stimulate the increased supply of renewable 
energy to the grid; 
2. Having a flexible system that can be designed for different renewable energy technologies, 
market structures, locations, and price adjustments, when it is necessary after a fixed period; and 
3. Having a secured return over years for investors which will reduce financial risks for the 
projects to the energy hub operators, making the building of the technology more desirable. 
A frequent criticism of FIT programs is that they do not generate sufficient competition [56]. 
However, Butler et al. [74] showed stronger competition among turbine producers and 
constructors under FIT than under any other UK renewable energy policies. This is important due 
to the fact that turbine construction is a stage of the renewable energy value chain, and this 
competition may have an effect on the final renewable energy price. 
Capital grant is defined as monetary assistance granted by a government to an eligible recipient 
(here renewable energy hub operator) for specific purposes and it doesn’t have to be repaid.  This 
kind of incentive may be paid in form of research and development (R&D) grants or covering a 
part of capital cost (the latter is considered in this study). Capital grant incentives reduce the 
burden of the initial investment by decreasing equipment costs and addressing market barriers for 
the investor [14]. 
For different scenarios, the effect of different incentive programs and their combination is 
investigated. These programs for different scenarios are as follows. 
3.2.3.1  Scenario 1 - Wind generation only  
Program 1. Incentivizing wind production with FIT: In this program, the government pays a 
certain amount of money to the energy hub operator per kWh of wind power sold to the grid. FIT 
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paid to the energy hub operator is the difference between the HOEP and the wind power price that 
leads to a 7-year payback period for the energy hub operator’s investment. 
Program 2. Capital grant: In this program, the government pays a capital grant to the energy 
hub operator to cover part of the capital investment cost.  This amount is paid in the first year of 
the project to cover part of the capital investment of the energy hub operator, so the payback 
period for the energy hub operator’s investment is 7 years. In this program, the government pays 
no FIT incentive per kWh of wind and the energy hub operator sells wind power to the grid at 
HOEP. 
3.2.3.2 Scenario 2 - Hydrogen with grid/ no underground storage, and Scenario 3 - 
Hydrogen with grid/ with underground storage  
Two incentive programs are investigated in these two scenarios.  
Program 1. FIT for hydrogen: In this program, the government pays a certain amount of money 
to the energy hub operator per kg of hydrogen sold to the consumer. FIT paid to the energy hub 
operator is the difference between the hydrogen price the consumer is willing to pay to substitute 
its natural gas consumption (shown in Table 3-3) and the hydrogen price that leads to a 7-year 
payback period for energy hub operator’s investment. 
Program 2. Capital grant: In this program, the government pays a capital grant to the energy 
hub operator to cover part of the capital investment cost.  This amount is paid in the first year of 
the project to cover part of the capital investment of the hub operator, so the payback period for 
the energy hub operator’s investment is 7 years. In this program, the government pays no FIT 
incentive per kg of hydrogen and the hub operator sells the hydrogen to the consumer at the 
consumer’s desired price (shown in Table 3-3). 
3.2.3.3 Scenario 4 - Hydrogen with wind/ no underground storage, Scenario 5 - 
Hydrogen with wind/ with underground storage, and Scenario 6 - Hydrogen with wind and 
grid blend 
Three incentive programs are investigated in these three scenarios.  
Program 1. FIT for wind power and hydrogen: In this program, the government pays a certain 
amount of money to the energy hub operator for both its products per kg of hydrogen sold to the 
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consumer and per kWh of wind to the grid. The FIT price for each product depends on the FIT 
price of the other product. In other words, the government pays incentive to a product in such a 
way that the total profit of the hub operator from both products leads to a 7-year payback period. 
As a result, if the FIT for one product increases, the FIT for the other product should decrease to 
keep the payback period to 7 years. The FIT value for hydrogen is calculated with the FIT values 
of 12, 16 and 20 cents per kWh for wind. 
Program 2. FIT for wind power and capital grant: In this program, the hub operator can sell 
wind power to the grid at a FIT values of 12, 16 and 20 cents per kWh depending on the case. As 
a result, the government pays an annual amount to the hub operator based on wind power 
generation. However, the hub operator has to sell hydrogen to the consumer at the consumer’s 
desired price and the government pays no FIT for hydrogen. In addition to the FIT incentive for 
wind power, government pays capital grant to the hub operator, so the payback period of the 
investment is 7 years. The amount of the capital grant depends on the FIT value for wind power 
and consumer’s desired hydrogen price. 
Program 3. FIT for hydrogen: In this program, the government pays a certain amount of money 
via a FIT program to the energy hub operator per kg of hydrogen sold to the consumer. The 
incentive paid to the energy hub operator is calculated based on the hub operator’s revenue from 
selling wind power to the grid at HOEP and guaranteeing a 7-year payback period. The amount 
of FIT will be the difference between the hydrogen price required to guarantee a 7-year payback 
period and the consumer’s desired price. 
Scenarios and programs investigated in each scenario are summarized in Table 3-7. 
Table 3-7. Description of the scenarios and the incentive programs in each scenario 
Scenario  Incentive programs 
Scenario 1 -  Wind generation only FIT for wind 
Capital grant 
Scenario 2 -  Hydrogen with grid/ no underground storage FIT for hydrogen 
Capital grant 
Scenario 3 -  Hydrogen with grid/ with underground 
storage 
FIT for hydrogen 
Capital grant 
FIT for wind power  and hydrogen 
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Scenario 4 -  Hydrogen with wind/ no underground 
storage 
FIT for wind and capital grant 
FIT for hydrogen 
Scenario 5 -  Hydrogen with wind/ with underground 
storage 
FIT for wind power  and hydrogen 
FIT for wind and capital grant 
FIT for hydrogen 
Scenario 6 -  Hydrogen with wind and grid blend FIT for wind power  and hydrogen 
FIT for wind and capital grant 
FIT for hydrogen 
3.3 Results and discussion 
3.3.1 Scenario 1 - Wind generation only  
Table 3-8 shows the results for Scenario 1 - wind generation only. In order to have a 7-year 
payback period for the wind project, the wind power selling price is calculated to be 20 cents per 
kWh. It is worth mentioning that the grid electricity is a blend of different sources and the lifecycle 
CO2 emission is calculated for every hour based on the blend as explained earlier.  If the wind 
energy hub operator only receives the Hourly Ontario Electricity Price (HOEP) price for 
electricity, then the capital grant program leads to a negative NPV for the investor in this scenario. 
The negative NPV is due to low selling price of wind power (HOEP) and high annual cost of wind 
power production. This means the annual profit is negative and no matter how much of the capital 
investment is covered by incentive, the investment leads to a negative NPV. 
Table 3-8. Results for Scenario 1 - Wind generation only (costs are shown over a 20-year period) 
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prevented to be 
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2 Capital grant This program is infeasible because the annual profit (revenue-cost) is not positive 
3.3.2 Scenario 2 - Hydrogen with grid/ no underground storage 
Table 3-9 shows the results for Scenario 2 - hydrogen with grid/ no underground storage. In order 
to have a 7-year payback period, the hydrogen selling price is calculated to be 5.16 CAD per kg 
in program 1. The amount of money the government pays to the hub operator annually in the form 
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of FIT incentive decreases as the carbon price increases. The reason for this is that as the carbon 
price increases, energy consumer is willing to pay a higher price for hydrogen. Table 3-9 shows 
that the FIT program can promote investing in hydrogen infrastructure while capital grant program 
leads to negative NPV from the investment.  
Table 3-9. Results for Scenario 2 - Hydrogen with grid/ no underground storage (costs are shown over 20-
year period) 
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1,224,291 1,084,471 0 349,374 




1,224,291 1,084,471 1,193,126 
50 5.13 303,956 0 -2.33 0.42 1,224,291 1,084,471 1,988,543 
2 Capital grant 0 0.49  
This program is infeasible because the annual profit (revenue-cost) is not positive 30 0.74 
50 0.91 
 
3.3.3 Scenario 3 - Hydrogen with grid/ with underground storage 
Table 3-10 shows the results for Scenario 3 - Hydrogen with grid/ with underground storage.                
In order to have a 7-year payback period, the hydrogen selling price is calculated to be 5.02 CAD 
per kg shown in Table 3-10. The FIT program promotes investing in hydrogen infrastructure while 
capital grant program leads to negative NPV from the investment.   
Table 3-10. Results for Scenario 3 - hydrogen with grid/ with underground storage 
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1,224,291 1,084,471 0               
376,016 




1,224,291 1,084,471 1,193,126 





0 0.49  
This case is infeasible because the annual profit (revenue-cost) is not positive 30 0.74 
50 0.91 
 
3.3.4 Scenario 4 - Hydrogen with wind/ no underground storage 
Table 3-11 shows the results for Scenario 4 - Hydrogen with wind/ no underground storage. In 
order to have a 7-year payback period, the hydrogen selling price is calculated based on different 
wind power selling prices in program 1 as shown in Table 3-12.Table 3-11 shows that for a constant 
carbon price, both FIT programs (programs 1 & 3) are more expensive for the government than 
the combination of FIT and capital grant program. The FIT program promotes investment in 
hydrogen infrastructure as it leads to higher NPV for the energy hub operator.  This is because of 
the high capital cost of wind power infrastructure. However, FIT programs are more effective in 
promoting renewable energy infrastructure as they lead to higher NPV in comparison with the 
combination of FIT and capital grant program.  
Table 3-11. Results for Scenario 4 - Hydrogen with wind/ no underground storage (costs are shown over 
20-year life of the infrastructure) 
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43,925,492 38,908,988 1,193,126 
50 8,748,172 0 1.08 1.395 43,925,492 38,908,988 1,988,543 
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50 12 0.49 3,607,378 26,764,873 0.69 1.01 17,160,619 15,200,793 1,988,543 
16 0.74 5,094,073 19,024,591 0.80 1.12 24,900,901 22,057,098 
20 0.91 6,580,768 11,284,309 0.92 1.23 32,641,184 28,913,402 
3 FIT for 
hydrogen 






43,925,492 38,908,988 0 3,078,880 
 






43,925,492 38,908,988 1,193,126 
50 HOEP 122.38 8,748,172 0 1.08 1.395 43,925,492 38,908,988 1,988,543 
 
Table 3-12. Hydrogen selling price for program 1 of Scenario 4 - Hydrogen with wind/ no 
underground storage 





3.3.5 Scenario 5 - Hydrogen with wind/ with underground storage 
 
Table 3-13 shows the results for Scenario 5 - Hydrogen with wind/ with underground storage. In 
order to have a 7-year payback period, the hydrogen selling price is calculated based on different 
wind power selling prices in program 1 as shown in Table 3-14. 
 
Table 3-13 shows that for a constant carbon price, both FIT programs (programs 1 & 3) are more 
expensive for the government than the capital grant program. The FIT programs promote 
investing in hydrogen infrastructure more as it leads to higher NPV for the Energy Hub operator. 
This is similar to the results for Scenario 4. 
Table 3-13. Results for Scenario 5 - Hydrogen with wind/ with underground storage 
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3.3.6 Scenario 6 - Hydrogen with wind and grid blend 
Table 3-15 shows the results for Scenario 6 - Hydrogen with wind and grid blend. In this scenario, 
about 28% of the power needed to produce hydrogen comes from the grid. In order to have a 7-
year payback period, the hydrogen selling price is calculated based on different wind power 
selling prices in program 1 as shown in Table 3-16. 
 Table 3-15 shows that for a constant carbon price, both FIT programs (programs 1 & 3) are more 
expensive for the government than the capital grant program. The FIT programs promote 






investing in hydrogen infrastructure more as it leads to higher NPV for the Energy Hub operator. 
This is similar to the results for Scenarios 4 and 5. 
Table 3-15. Results for Scenario 6 - Hydrogen with Wind Power and Grid Electricity blend 
program Description Carbon 
price (CAD 
per tonne ) 
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40,124,884 35,542,428 1,193,126 
0 8,015,190 0 
0.95 1.264 
40,124,884 35,542,428 1,988,543 
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20 2.48 8,015,190 6,037,153 0.86 0.95 34,087,731 30,194,747 
3 FIT for 
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40,124,884 35,542,428 0 3,113,058 
 






40,124,884 35,542,428 193,126 
50 HOEP 112.57 8,015,190 0 
0.95 1.264 
40,124,884 35,542,428 1,988,543 
 
Table 3-16. Hydrogen selling price for program 1 of Scenario 6 - Hydrogen with wind and 
electrical    grid blend 








The most cost-efficient program for the government in each scenario is shown in Table 3-17. The 
most cost-efficient program in all scenarios is when the carbon price is 50 CAD per tonne of CO2 
emission (except for Scenario 1 - wind generation only where there is no hydrogen production). 
The additional cost of consumer (revenue of the government) is 1,988,543 CAD in this carbon 
price. As can be seen in Table 3-17, the most cost-efficient programs for the government are the 
ones with the capital grant or a combination of FIT and capital grant.  
Table 3-17 .The most cost-efficient program in each Scenarios 
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Scenario 1 -  Wind 
generation only 
FIT for wind 
7,681,674 0 1.343 1.343 2,806,885 
Scenario 2 -  





303,956 0 -2.33 0.42 349,374 
Scenario 3 -  





295,846 0 -2.21 0.39 376,016 
Scenario 4 -  
Hydrogen with wind/ 
no underground 
storage 






0.69 1.01 3,078,880 
Scenario 5 -  
Hydrogen with wind/ 
with underground 
storage 










Table 3-18 shows the results for FIT programs in all Scenarios (program 1 in Scenario 1 - wind 
generation only, Scenario 2 - hydrogen with grid/ no underground storage and Scenario 3 - 
hydrogen with grid/ with underground storage and program 1 and 3 in Scenario 4 - Hydrogen with 
wind/ no underground storage, Scenario 5 - Hydrogen with wind/ with underground storage and 
Scenario 6 - hydrogen with wind and grid blend). 
Table 3-18 . FIT programs for all scenarios 
 
The most profitable program for the hub operator in each scenario is shown in Table 3-19. 
Table 3-19. The best program for energy hub operator in each scenario 
Scenario 6 -  
Hydrogen with wind 
and grid blend 






0.64 0.949 3,113,058 
Scenario Program Annual 









 (CAD per kg) 
Scenario 1 -  Wind generation only FIT for wind 7,681,674 2,806,885 1.343 
Scenario 2 -  Hydrogen with grid/ no 
underground storage 
FIT for hydrogen 303,956 349,374 0.42 
Scenario 3 -  Hydrogen with grid/ 
with underground storage 
FIT for hydrogen 295,846 376,016 0.39 
Scenario 4 -  Hydrogen with wind/ 
no underground storage 
FIT for wind power and 
hydrogen, FIT for 
hydrogen 
8,778,150 3,078,880 1.40 
Scenario 5 -  Hydrogen with wind/ 
with underground storage 
FIT for wind power and 
hydrogen, FIT for 
hydrogen 
8,167,643 3,081,885 1.30 
Scenario 6 -  Hydrogen with wind 
and grid blend 
FIT for wind power and 
hydrogen, FIT for 
hydrogen 




Comparing the results for all scenarios and examining Table 3-17, Table 3-18, and Table 3-19 we 
conclude that: 
1. Incentivizing hydrogen production with grid electricity is a more cost-efficient policy for 
the government than incentivizing wind power alone because of two reasons: 
A. Grid electricity in Ontario is already a relatively green grid in terms of CO2 emission as shown 
in Figure 3-2. Comparing wind power and hydrogen, wind power is incentivized to offset the grid 
electricity while hydrogen is incentivized to replace natural gas on an energy content basis. 
Furthermore, the difference in lifecycle emission is higher in the latter. Lifecycle CO2 emission 
of wind power is 14 gr of CO2 per kWh, while the average CO2 emission for grid electricity in 
Ontario is 77.71 gr of CO2 per kWh. These numbers mean that by offsetting 1 kWh of grid 
electricity with wind power, there is a 63.71 gr of CO2 emission reduction. Lifecycle CO2 
emission per kWh of natural gas, including both burning and emission, is 235 gr of CO2 per kWh 




Scenario Program Hub operator 
Investment  
(CAD) 
NPV of energy hub 
operator  
(CAD) 
Scenario 1 -  Wind generation only FIT for wind 38,970,974 34,520,300 
Scenario 2 -  Hydrogen with grid/ no 
underground storage 
FIT for hydrogen 1,224,291 1,084,471 
Scenario 3 -   Hydrogen  with grid/ 
with underground storage 
FIT for hydrogen 1,224,291 1,084,471 
Scenario 4 -   Hydrogen  with wind/ 
no underground storage 
FIT for hydrogen, FIT for 
wind power and hydrogen 
43,925,492 38,908,988 
Scenario 5 -   Hydrogen  with wind/ 
with underground storage 
FIT for hydrogen, FIT for 
wind power and hydrogen 
40,828,700 36,165,865 
Scenario 6 -   Hydrogen  with wind 
and grid blend 
FIT for hydrogen, FIT for 




Table 3-20. Assumed lifecycle CO2 emission from natural gas combustion  




Lifecycle emission from burning hydrogen is 145 gr of CO2 per kWh of hydrogen when hydrogen 
is produced using grid electricity (using an overall average grid emission factor), and 31 gr of 
CO2 per kWh of hydrogen when wind power is used to produce hydrogen. These values are 
calculated based on 71 kWh of electricity consumption for producing each kg of hydrogen as 
shown in Table 3-21. 






Burning hydrogen has no CO2 emissions. Substituting each kWh of natural gas with hydrogen 
produced by grid electricity reduces 90 gr of CO2 emission which is about 40% higher than the 
value obtained by replacing grid electricity with wind power. Substituting each kWh of natural 
gas with hydrogen produced by wind power reduces 204 gr of CO2 emission which is more than 
3 times higher than the value for replacing grid electricity with wind power. 
B. HOEP is about 21 CAD per MWh of energy. The hydrogen is produced using grid electricity 
has a levelized cost of 0.091 and 0.088 CAD per kWh in Scenario 2 - hydrogen with grid/ no 
underground storage and Scenario 3 - hydrogen with grid/ with underground storage, respectively 






Source Production Burning Sum ( gr of CO2 
emission per MJ) 
Sum ( gr of CO2 
emission per kWh) 
grams of CO2 emission 
per MJ of NG 
13.5 [75] 52.08 65.58 235 
Source Electricity Electrolyzer Storage Sum 
gr of CO2 emission per kg of 
hydrogen using grid electricity 
5517.41 43 [76] 170 [76] 5730.41 
gr of CO2 emission per kg of 
hydrogen using wind power 
994 43 [76] 170 [76] 1207 
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Table 3-22. Levelized cost of hydrogen in different scenarios 
 
Therefore, not only the production cost of each kWh of hydrogen is lower than the production 
cost of each kWh of wind, but also each kWh of hydrogen can reduce more CO2 emission 
compared to each kWh of wind power. As a result, incentivizing hydrogen production with grid 
electricity is a more cost-effective policy for the government than an incentive for wind power. 
The same conclusion, however, can’t be drawn by comparing Scenario 1 (wind generation only) 
with hydrogen production with wind power scenarios (i.e., Scenario 4 - Hydrogen with wind/ no 
underground storage, Scenario 5 - Hydrogen with wind/ with underground storage, Scenario 6 - 
Hydrogen with wind and grid blend). This is due to the higher levelized cost of hydrogen when 
hydrogen is produced using wind power (i.e. cost of the wind power itself). Considering FIT 
program for all scenarios (shown in Table 3-18), it can be seen that Scenario 5- hydrogen with 
wind/ with underground storage, Scenario 6 - hydrogen with wind and grid blend are more cost-
effective for the government than Scenario 1 - wind generation only. However, hydrogen 
production using wind power without underground storage is more expensive than wind 
generation only. 
2. Using underground seasonal storage is advantageous for the government as it leads to 
paying less incentive per kg of CO2 emission reduction because of two main reasons: 
Scenario number Levelized cost of hydrogen (CAD per kg) 
i.e. Operation cost of production 
Levelized cost of hydrogen 
energy (HHV)  
(CAD per kWh) 
Scenario 2 -  Hydrogen with grid/ 
no underground storage 
3.60 0.091 
Scenario 3 -  Hydrogen with grid/ 
with underground storage 
3.48 0.088 
Scenario 4 -  Hydrogen with wind/ 
no underground storage 
16.49 0.417 
Scenario 5 -  Hydrogen with wind/ 
with underground storage 
11.87 0.3 
Scenario 6 -  Hydrogen with wind 




A. Underground storage leads to a lower levelized cost of hydrogen. Underground hydrogen 
storage provides the option of producing hydrogen when there is no demand and saving it for later 
use when there is a demand.  In hydrogen production with grid electricity Scenarios (Scenario 2 - 
hydrogen with grid/ no underground storage, and Scenario 3 - Hydrogen with grid/ with 
underground storage), hydrogen can be produced when the electricity price is low and stored in 
the underground storage reservoir. The stored hydrogen can be used later on to meet the demand 
and to prevent the need to produce hydrogen when the gird electricity price is high. Considering 
the fact that using underground storage only imposes compression operating cost to the system, 
the levelized cost of hydrogen decreases. In hydrogen production with wind power scenarios 
(Scenario 4 - Hydrogen with wind/ no underground storage, Scenario 5 - Hydrogen with wind/ 
with underground storage, and Scenario 6 - Hydrogen with wind and grid blend), there is always 
the issue of wind power intermittency. To address this issue, large storage elements have to be 
added to the system. These storage elements can be aboveground storage tanks or a combination 
of aboveground storage tanks and underground storage reservoirs. The latter, however, has a 
lower capital cost and as a result leads to lower levelized cost of hydrogen. Comparing different 
scenarios under the same FIT incentive scheme shown in Table 3-18 shows that Scenario 1- wind 
generation only is more cost-effective for the government than producing hydrogen using wind 
power without underground storage. This is due to the high levelized cost of hydrogen. Adding 
underground storage to the system makes it more cost-effective than Scenario 1 - wind generation 
only as it reduces levelized cost of hydrogen. 
B. Underground storage leads to higher carbon emission reduction. As mentioned earlier, the 
emission factor of the grid is lower when HOEP is lower than when HOEP is high. Underground 
storage allows using grid electricity when HOEP is low to produce hydrogen. The aforementioned 
leads to lower lifecycle CO2 emission due to using grid electricity which in turn lowers lifecycle 
CO2 emission.  
As a result, it can be concluded that underground hydrogen storage not only decreases incentives 
paid by the government, but is also effective in reducing more CO2 emission. There is however, 
a difference between the effect of underground storage in using grid power for producing 
hydrogen (Scenario 2 - Hydrogen with grid/ no underground storage and Scenario 3 -  Hydrogen 
with grid/ with underground storage) and using wind power for producing hydrogen scenarios 
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(Scenario 4 - Hydrogen with wind/ no underground storage, Scenario 5 - Hydrogen with wind/ 
with underground storage). In grid scenarios, the NPV in both with and without underground 
scenarios was the same because the capital cost was the same in both scenarios and the 
government simply paid more incentive in Scenario 2 - Hydrogen with grid/ no underground 
storage which led to equal cash flow for the hub operator and as a result, equal NPV. However, 
in wind only scenarios, the NPV is different because the aboveground storage size is different and 
this leads to a lower capital cost in Scenario 5 - Hydrogen with wind/ with underground storage). 
As a result, the amount of incentive paid by the government is different in the two scenarios and 
different capital costs and cash flows lead to different NPVs. 
3. A combination of capital grant and FIT is a more cost-efficient incentive program for the 
government than FIT only programs. However, FIT programs are more effective for promoting 
renewable energy in all scenarios as they lead to higher NPVs and are the only programs that lead 
to positive NPV for the hub operator in some scenarios (Scenario 1 - wind generation only, 
Scenario 2 - hydrogen with grid/ no underground storage and Scenario 3 - hydrogen with grid/ 
with underground storage). Capital grant schemes in those scenarios lead to negative NPVs for 
the hub operator. 
4. By increasing the carbon price, the government tends to support renewable energy more, 
however, it should be noted that this increase will affect the operational cost of energy consumers 
such as industries. This not only affects the final product cost, but may also lead the industries to 
leave a province/country, and this, in turn, will affect other areas such as job market. Investigating 
this effect of other difficult to quantify or assess metrics may be the focus for future work. 
5. There is a significant difference between the consumer hydrogen price and hydrogen price 
that leads to a 7 year payback period for the investor when wind power is used to produce 
hydrogen (compare values in Table 3-3 with values in Table 3-12, Table 3-14, and Table 3-16. 
This difference is due to the high capital investment needed for wind infrastructure. As shown in 
Table 3-22, the levelized cost of hydrogen produced with wind power is considerably higher than 
the levelized cost of hydrogen produced with grid power which imposes a challenge in the 




This study focuses on the analysis of the various stakeholders’ (including the government, the 
energy hub operator and the energy consumer) advantages in interaction in the context of a 
microgrid.  For successful implementation of renewable technologies, all stakeholders must 
individually achieve their objectives or some benefit. Unlike previous studies in which the 
advantages of all stakeholders are confounded, this study analyzes the motivations of each 
stakeholder independently. The basis for this innovation is the independence of motivation of each 
stakeholder in an energy system from other stakeholders’ motivations. This study also seeks to 
examine the potential for hydrogen energy storage within a microgrid, as well as examines how 
different incentives contribute to the perceived viability of a microgrid project. 
The results of this study show that for the same incentive policy, incentivizing hydrogen 
production with grid electricity is the most cost-efficient option for government. While hydrogen 
production using grid electricity was shown to be a promising method to reduce emissions, 
hydrogen production using wind power and generating wind power alone are more expensive 
options for the government to promote due to the high capital cost of wind infrastructure.   
From the energy hub operator’s point of view, however, incentivizing wind power is a more 
profitable measure than hydrogen production with grid electricity as it leads to higher NPV. It 
was also shown that a combination of feed-in tariff (FIT) and capital grant is the most cost-
efficient program for the government to pursue from their perspective. FIT programs; however, 
lead to higher NPVs for the hub operator and as a result, are more profitable for them. This finding 
agrees with previous reports in the literature. However, capital grant only programs will not be 
beneficial for the development of renewable energy infrastructure as NPV from the investment is 
negative when the only incentive scheme in place is capital grant. Results also show that adding 
underground hydrogen storage to the system provides advantage for the government as it not only 
reduces levelized cost of hydrogen but also leads to higher CO2 emission reduction.   
In this study, the interaction of three stakeholders in a microgrid was investigated in a 
deterministic approach. Optimization methodologies will be applied to find the optimal incentive 
and policy approaches for society as a whole in order to encourage the implementation of 
distributed energy generation and storage technologies by ensuring that each stakeholder in the 
microgrid experiences some benefit. Considering the current Ontario electricity mix, hydrogen 
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production with an underground storage option provides a viable option to move toward CO2 
emission reduction goals. In future work, other technologies like solar PV will also be investigated 

























4 Co-benefit analysis of incentives for energy generation and 
storage systems; a multi-stakeholder perspective 
The following section is based on work by Haghi et.al [12], published in the International Journal 
of Hydrogen Energy. Contribution of authors is detailed in the Statement of Contributions section.   
4.1 Introduction 
Reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is an important agenda for countries all over the world. 
Incentives and support programs for renewable energy technologies have a common goal of 
reducing GHG emissions and diversifying the energy supply mix. However, the effect of these 
programs are not limited to diversifying supply mix and GHG emission reduction. Local 
economic development, job creation, and reduction in health impacts associated with the energy 
sector are among other motivations for increased support for the development of renewable 
energies [77].  
Ontario pursued a policy toward emission reduction in the electricity sector which included 
phasing out Ontario’s coal power plants and introducing renewable power generation 
technologies to the grid. Emissions from the electricity sector in Ontario dropped from about 35 
Megatonnes of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) in 2004 to 10.9 Megatonnes of CO2e in 2013 as a result of 
those policies [4]. Table 4-1 shows Ontario’s GHG emission by sector in 1990, 2007, and 2013. 
Table 4-1 shows that the emission from the electricity sector has decreased 67% between 2007 
and 2013. 
Table 4-1. Ontario GHG emission by sector in 1990, 2007, and 2013 [4] 
  Year 
  
 
Sector    
GHG   















Transportation 45.9 58.9 60.2 31% 2% 
Industry 64.2 60.3 47.7 -26% -21% 
Buildings 27.9 33.4 32.6 17% -2% 
Electricity 25.8 32.9 10.9 -58% -67% 
Agriculture 11 10.5 10 -9% -5% 
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Waste 7.5 9.6 9 20% -6% 
Total 182 205.5 171 -6% -17% 
 
Although Ontario has been able to reduce emissions from its electricity sector, GHG emission 
from the transportation sector and the building sector has stayed almost the same as shown in 
Table 4-1.  Figure 4-1 shows the GHG emission in Ontario by sector in 2013. As can be seen, 
transportation, industry, and buildings are the top three GHG emitter sectors in Ontario. 
 
Figure 4-1. GHG emissions by sector in Ontario in 2013 [4] 
Figure 4-2 shows the GHG emissions percentage by sector in Ontario in 2013. As can be seen, 
































Figure 4-2. GHG emissions percentage by sector in Ontario in 2013 [4] 
Renewable generation technologies have been recognized as a viable alternative for renewing 
Ontario’s generation capacity [78]. Table 4-2 shows the newly commissioned generation capacity 
of 20 MW or more of wind and solar plants in Ontario from 2009 to 2017. As can be seen in 
Table 4-2, wind and solar generation capacity has increased each year from 2009 to 2017 (except 
for 2012).  
Table 4-2. New commissioned generation capacity of 20 MW or more of wind and solar plants in Ontario 
[79] 
Year New wind power capacity 
(MW) 
New solar power capacity 
(MW) 
Total  new capacity  
(MW) 
2009 380 0 380 
2010 200 0 200 
2011 227 0 227 
2012 0 0 0 
2013 215 0 215 
2014 719 30 749 















2016 199 40 239 
2017 290 100 390 
 
The investment in renewable electricity generation as well as phasing out coal power plants in 
Ontario has led to a 95% emission-free electricity generation mix. Figure 4-3 shows the electricity 
supply mix in Ontario in 2017. 
 
Figure 4-3. 2017 Ontario electricity supply mix [79] 
With increasing renewable power generation and decreasing electricity demand, Ontario is 
experiencing hours with surplus electricity generation. Surplus baseload generation (SBG) in 
Ontario happens when the sum of generation from nuclear plants, baseload hydropower plants, 
and wind and solar plants exceeds the demand in the province [80]. Surplus baseload generation 
in Ontario is managed via export to neighboring jurisdictions or curtailing power [80]. Table 4-3 










Table 4-3. SBG as a percentage of Ontario’s net demand [80] 
Year Surplus baseload generation as a 








The point to note in Table 4-3 is that even in 2030 and 2035 when the SBG is expected to be only 
2% of the demand, it will be around 2.7 TWh in a year (assuming the 2016 demand [81]). In 
addition to the power export, Ontario also curtails power in the forms of solar panel shutoff, wind 
curtailment, nuclear maneuvering, and hydro spill. The curtailment in Ontario was estimated to 
be around 2 TWh in 2016 [82].  
Based on the available data, it can be concluded that Ontario has a noticeable amount of surplus 
power available which can be used for electrifying different energy sectors in the province. As 
95% of the electricity generated in Ontario is generated with emission-free resources, Ontario’s 
electricity has an advantage for reducing emissions in the transportation and industry sectors. 
Power-to-Gas, as well as battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts, are technologies that 
can be utilized in reducing GHG emissions in the industry sector using Ontario’s grid power. 
4.1.1 Power-to-Gas technology 
Electricity grids with low penetration of renewable energies may not need storage technologies 
to meet the demand. At the same time, the balance between electricity supply and demand will 
not be seriously affected by limited renewable energy penetration in the grid. However, power 
curtailment for grid stability will be unavoidable when the penetration of renewable energies 
increases to a point where generation exceeds the demand, and seasonal storage technologies are 
necessary for renewable energy penetration of more than 80% [83]. Storage systems can reduce 
the power curtailed and the need for using peak power plants. Hydrogen energy storage can 
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contribute to the flexibility of the electricity system and control the fluctuation of the intermittent 
energy sources [84]. Hydrogen as an energy carrier can be used for seasonal energy storage to 
store large amounts of power for long durations of time [16]. Hydrogen can be used both as a fuel 
for meeting heat and electricity demands and also as a storage medium for balancing the 
introduction of renewable energy technologies [85]. Hydrogen is also considered as a viable 
option for transportation applications and renewable heating [86], [87]. 
An application of hydrogen is in producing hydrogen-enriched natural gas (HENG) which can be 
used in natural gas applications with lower emissions. While HENG is recognized as an immediate 
way to use hydrogen to reduce emissions, it can also be considered as a mediator for moving 
toward energy systems with pure hydrogen applications [88]. At the same time, hydrogen can act 
as a link between electricity and natural gas sectors. The systems which use this concept to operate 
are called Power-to-Gas systems. Figure 3-1 shows the concept block diagram of a Power-to-Gas 
system. 
Power-to-Gas can be used both as a mid-term and a long-term energy storage option [89]. This 
advantage of Power-to-Gas has been noted in the literature. For instance, Walker et al. [90] stated 
that Power-to-Gas has advantages in criteria such as energy portability, energy density and the 
ability for seasonal storage over other storage technologies when utility-scale storage is 
considered. Another advantage of implementing a Power-to-Gas system is that it enables the 
hydrogen use where we want it, when we want it, and how we want it. For instance, a Power-to-
Gas system can be used to produce synthetic methane. Estermann et al. [91] analyzed the 
feasibility of using Power-to-Gas systems for using excess solar power and CO2 to produce 
synthetic methane in Germany. These advantages have led to an increase in the number of Power-
to-Gas pilot plants that use intermittent power for injecting hydrogen into the natural gas pipelines 
in different countries in recent years [92].  Putting facts together, Power-to-Gas seems a promising 
option for Ontario considering all the emission-free power available and the widespread use of 
natural gas in the province. In this study, we are analyzing the cost-efficiency of investing in 
Power-to-Gas for reducing GHG emissions. We are also comparing that criteria with other 
renewable generation and storage technologies. 
64 
 
4.1.2 Battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts 
Forklifts are classified into LPG, diesel, battery-powered, and fuel cell-powered forklifts based 
on their powertrain system. Traditionally, diesel forklifts have been a favorite choice because of 
their unique characteristics such as durability [93]. However, this favorability has changed over 
the years, and electric forklifts have been chosen more often due to their zero on-site emission 
and low noise pollution [93]. These characteristics are shared between battery-powered forklifts 
and fuel cell-powered forklifts which have been a focus of research and development in recent 
years [94].  
Battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts have a potential for reducing GHG emissions by 
replacing the consumption of fossil fuels with electricity. A report by Toyota [95] claims that 
electric forklifts have a significantly lower level of emissions than internal combustion engine 
forklifts. Elgowainy et al. [96] also stated that replacing internal combustion engine (ICE) forklifts 
with fuel cell-powered forklifts has a great potential in reducing GHG emissions. This potential, 
however, depends on the emissions associated with the electricity generated and the hydrogen 
produced for use in the forklifts. In that sense, Ontario’s emission-free electricity mix and the 
available surplus is a promising option for fueling battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts 
for replacing diesel forklifts.  
Although battery-powered forklifts need less expensive infrastructure to refuel, the lower cost of 
refueling and maintenance of fuel cell-powered forklifts gives them an advantage [97]. Reviewing 
the literature focusing on comparing fuel cell-powered forklifts and battery-powered forklifts 
doesn’t lead to a uniform conclusion. A report by U.S Department of Energy [98], shows that fuel 
cell-powered forklifts have a lower annual cost of ownership compared to battery-powered 
forklifts. Renquist et al. [99]  however, showed that the cost advantage of fuel cell-powered and 
battery-powered forklifts depends on the workload of the forklifts. Battery-powered forklifts have 
lower costs for low workload applications while fuel cell-powered forklifts have an economic 
advantage in higher workload applications. This study aims at comparing the cost-effectiveness 
of battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts in reducing GHG emissions. 
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4.1.3 Literature review of energy incentives 
A gaps in research related to energy incentives is the limited scope of the analysis to some 
stakeholders in an energy system and not all of them. The research in the area of energy policy 
and energy incentives is often limited to two main areas: 
1. How successful the incentive programs are in achieving their designed goals? 
2. How profitable is it to invest in renewable energy technologies under an incentive program? 
Niesten et al. [100], analyzed the types of firms that invest in the production of Dutch onshore 
wind energy under certain policy schemes. The authors argued that policy schemes affect factors 
such as the risk of investment and expected returns on investment which influence the amount 
and type of investments in the wind energy. Chang et al. [101], assessed the efficiency of policies 
in achieving the intended goals using criteria of the market, uncertainty, profitability, technology, 
and financial resources criteria. The authors used the criteria to build an index to evaluate the 
policies. Palmer and Burtraw [102], assessed the cost-efficiency of the renewable portfolio 
standard in increasing the contribution of renewables to the total U.S. electricity supply. Bean et 
al. [103], used a cost-benefit approach to assess the efficiency of wind policy schemes including 
investment credit, feed-in tariffs, and feed-in premiums. Falconett and Nagasaka [56], assessed 
the financial return and profitability of renewable energy projects (small-scale hydroelectric, wind 
energy and solar PV) under different renewable energy support mechanisms. The authors in [56], 
found that feed-in tariff is the most effective policy for reducing the profitability of wind and solar 
projects. However, hydropower was favored under a green certificate program.  
An important factor in the design of renewable energy policies is the effect of those policies and 
subsequent changes to the energy system on energy consumers. In this study, we examine the 
externalities of energy incentives including their health impacts and their effect on economic 
development. We also include the objectives of energy consumers in analyzing the cost-
effectiveness of energy incentives designed by the government. In this study, we are considering 
two types of energy incentives. The first type is focused on incentivizing renewable energy 
generation technologies which will increase the share of renewable energies in the electricity 
system. The second type of energy incentives considered in this study is for technologies and 
systems which use electricity to replace fossil fuels in other sectors of energy systems such as the 
transportation, residential and industrial sectors. The renewable energy technologies considered 
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in this study include wind and solar power technologies, Power-to-Gas system and battery-
powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts. 
Multiple pieces of research have been focused on analyzing the energy incentives for the 
deployment of wind and solar systems, however, the research focusing on the analysis of 
incentives on the development of hydrogen infrastructure is very limited in the literature. 
Incentives and support policies are important for the initial development of hydrogen energy 
systems. This point has been noticed by different researchers. Alanne and Cao [104], stated that 
analyzing business models, incentives, as well as energy policies, are important for the 
development of hydrogen energy systems besides the required technological innovations. 
Similarly, Marino et al. [105], stated that incentives are essential for the development of hydrogen 
energy systems. As mentioned earlier, however, literature in the area of incentives for hydrogen 
systems is limited. For instance, while Perera et al.  [106], stated that hydrogen vehicles and 
hydrogen use in residential applications are promising options in some Canadian provinces such 
as Alberta, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan, their analysis didn’t include such technologies due 
to lack of available data.  Similarly, although Apak et al. [107], pointed to the essential role of 
financial incentives in the development of hydrogen infrastructure, they didn’t do any calculations 
to show the cost-efficiency of such incentives. Olateju et al. [49], also stated that the feed-in tariffs 
for renewable generation power increase the hydrogen cost competitiveness of wind and hydrogen 
hybrid systems. The analysis of incentives, however, was limited to this conclusion. Marino et al. 
[105], investigated the effect of incentives on hybrid energy systems using hydrogen as a storage 
means. Their analysis was limited to solar/hydrogen hybrid and solar/wind/hydrogen hybrid 
systems used in residential applications.   
Based on the literature review and the gaps found in the literature in the area of energy incentives 
and hydrogen energy systems, the contribution of this study can be summarized as the following: 
1. Considering the advantages of all stakeholders in an energy system rather than only one of 
them in analyzing the cost-efficiency of energy incentives; 
2. Considering the externalities of energy incentives in assessing the efficiency of incentives in 
reducing GHG emissions; 
3. Assessing the cost-efficiency of Power-to-Gas, fuel cell-powered forklift, and battery-
powered forklifts in reducing GHG emissions; 
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4. Comparing battery and hydrogen storage technologies as competing as well as complementary 
technologies in reducing GHG emissions in Ontario; and 
5. Comparing the cost-efficiency of energy generation and energy storage technologies in 
reducing GHG emissions. 
The results of the models developed in this study provide a better understating of the effect of 
energy policies not only on the development of renewable infrastructure but also on health impacts 
and profitability of firms investing in or using renewable technologies. 
4.2 Methodology 
In this study, we aim to investigate the objectives of all three stakeholders (the government, the 
energy hub operator, and energy consumers) in an energy system. Figure 4-4 shows the interaction 
of the three stakeholders considered in this study.  
 
Figure 4-4. Interaction of stakeholders in an energy system 
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To better reflect the objectives of all stakeholders, the externalities of energy policy schemes 
including their effect on health impacts and the taxes the government receives are considered in 
this study.  
4.2.1 Health impacts 
Airborne pollutants associated with fossil fuels have great impacts on the health of a 
country/jurisdiction. The health and social costs related to these health impacts can be in the order 
of billions of dollars each year [108]. Carbon monoxide (CO), particulate matter (PMx), nitrogen 
oxide (NOx), or sulfur oxide (SOx) are pollutants with immediate and long-term detrimental 
effects on health which include mortality, hospital admissions, emergency room visits for asthma, 
bronchitis, lung cancer, and heart diseases [108]. Lowering GHG emissions can reduce financial 
costs and disease rates and increase life expectancy and productivity [108].  
Calculating the specific health impacts associated with natural gas and diesel fuel consumption is 
not within the scope of this work. Alternatively, we used values available in the literature to 
estimate the health impacts associated with the use of fossil fuels in our scenarios. The pollutants 
considered in this study are PM2.5, SOx, NOx, and CO. The health impacts costs associated with 
these pollutants are shown in Table 4-4.  
Table 4-4. Unit cost of pollutants [109] 
Pollutant PM2.5 SOx NOx CO 
Unit Costs of pollutants  
(2017 CAD per tonne) 
9244 3572 15126 2017 
4.2.2 Taxes 
Taxes received by the government from the energy hub operator and the energy consumer are 
considered as a scale to measure the effect of the energy incentives schemes on the portability of 
the energy hub operator and the energy consumer. We are assuming that the government taxes the 
businesses (both the energy hub operator and the energy consumer) based on their profit. The tax 
rate considered in this study is 10%. The 10% tax is applied after subtracting the annual cost 
outflow and depreciation cost from the revenue inflow as shown in Equation 4-1. When energy 
consumers go under a renewable energy policy, they have to pay more for their energy 
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consumption. We are assuming that the energy consumer’s revenue doesn’t change which means 
the consumer pays lower taxes because of their increased cost. 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 = 0.1 × (𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 −




The objectives of the government, the energy hub operator and the energy consumer are explained 
in details in the following. 
Government: The government designs energy and emission policies to reduce GHG emissions 
associated with the consumption of fossil fuels. The incentive considered in this study is in the 
form of a capital incentive paid to the energy hub operator (energy investor) at the beginning of 
the projects. We also assume that the government is responsible and pays for health impacts. The 
government also collects profit taxes from both the energy hub operator and the energy consumer. 
The objective of the government is to minimize the amount of money spent per unit of GHG 
emissions reduction considering the externalities of the energy incentive. Equation 4-2 shows the 
government’s objective function.  
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡′𝑠 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒
= 𝑀𝑖𝑛 (𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐻𝐺 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
= (






Energy hub operator (Energy investor): The energy hub operator invests in renewable energy 
infrastructure and operates the system. The revenue for the energy hub operator is the sum of the 
revenue from selling the renewable product to the energy consumer and the incentives received 
from the government. By generating renewable products, the energy hub operator contributes to 
GHG emission and health impact reduction while promoting economic development by paying 
profit taxes to the government. The objective of the energy hub operator is to maximize profit 
from investing in renewable energy infrastructure. Equation 4-3 shows the energy hub operator’s 
objective function.  
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𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ℎ𝑢𝑏 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟′𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑁𝑃𝑉 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
= ∑(




− (𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) 
4-3 
 
In Equation 4-3, NPV of the energy hub operator is a function of the investment cost, incentives 
received from the government, and the annual cash flow from selling the renewable product. In 
the NPV formula, annual revenue is the revenue from selling renewable products to the energy 
consumer, and the annual cost is the operation and maintenance cost of the technologies as well 
as taxes paid to the government. A project lifetime of 20 years (𝑇) and a discount rate (𝑟) of 8% 
is considered for all scenarios.  
Energy consumer: The energy consumer emits GHG emissions by natural gas consumption for 
industrial heating and diesel consumption for diesel forklifts. Energy consumer contributes to the 
economic development by paying profit taxes to the government.  The objective of the energy 
consumer is to minimize the additional cost imposed by buying more expensive renewable 
energies. Equation 4-4 shows the energy hub operator’s objective function. 
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟′𝑠𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡)  4-4 
 
The additional cost is the sum of the cost paid for forklifts purchase, charging/refueling 
infrastructure, and purchasing hydrogen. The cost the energy consumer pays for the energy 
infrastructure development is named “additional cost” since it is additional to what the energy 
consumer is spending in its status quo. The additional cost can also be in the form of global 
adjustment. Electricity consumers in Ontario are charged the hourly Ontario electricity price 
(HOEP) for the energy they consume as well as a Global Adjustment (GA) cost. GA is charged 
for investing in new generation capacity, maintaining current capacity, and developing 
conservation and energy management plans [7]. The GA considered in this study is the difference 
between the HOEP (which is the market clearance price) and feed-in tariff (FIT) price the energy 
consumers pay for the development of a new electricity generation capacity. Equation 4-5 shows 
that the GA at each hour is the FIT price paid by the consumer minus the HOEP. The assumption 
in this study is that the GA is distributed evenly among the consumers. This assumption is not 
necessarily correct for all electricity consumers in Ontario. 
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𝐺𝐴(𝑡) = 𝐹𝐼𝑇(𝑡) − 𝐻𝑂𝐸𝑃(𝑡)  4-5 
 
4.2.4 Scenarios 
In this study, we are comparing two streams of government support policy for renewable and 
clean technologies development: 
1. Incentivizing renewable energy generation technologies for increasing the share of renewable 
energies in the electricity system; and 
2. Incentivizing technologies and systems which use clean electricity to replace fossil fuels in 
other sectors of an energy system such as the transportation, residential and industrial sectors. 
For each of these streams of government support, we analyze different scenarios as explained in 
the following. 
4.2.4.1 Scenario 1: Wind power 
In this scenario, we assume that the government is supporting the development of wind power 
systems to increase the share of renewable energies in the electricity grid. In case 1, we assume 
that the wind power is replacing natural gas plants (which generates power on top of nuclear and 
hydropower plants) while in case 2, the wind farm is replacing current Ontario’s electricity mix. 
The energy hub operators receive a FIT for every kWh of electricity they produce.  A 10 MW 
wind farm consisting of 10 1-MW wind turbines is considered in this scenario. The cut-in wind 
speed, rated wind speed and cut-off wind speed of the turbine are assumed to be 3 meters per 
second, 13 meters per second, and 25 meters per second, respectively. It is also assumed that the 




Figure 4-5. Wind turbine power curve 
A typical wind speed profile was used to calculate the output wind power. The wind farm power 
factor was calculated to be around 30% using that wind profile.  
4.2.4.2 Scenario 2: Solar power 
In this scenario, we are assuming the government is supporting the development of solar power 
capacity to increase the share of renewable energies in the electricity grid. In case 1, we are 
assuming that solar power is replacing natural gas plants (which generates power on top of nuclear 
and hydropower plants). A 9.9 MW wind farm consisting of 55,000 180-Watts solar panels are 
considered in this scenario. The cell efficiency and module efficiency are considered to be 17% 
and 14%, respectively. The solar system doesn’t have a solar tracker system. The energy hub 
operators receive a FIT for every kWh of electricity they produce. In this scenario, the investment 
cost and operation and maintenance cost of the energy hub operator is limited to the solar PV 
panels. In case 2, it is assumed that the solar farm is replacing current Ontario’s electricity mix. 
4.2.4.3 Scenario 3: Power-to-Gas 
In this scenario, we assume that the energy hub operator is investing in hydrogen infrastructure 









































consumer buys the hydrogen for use as HENG and also for refueling fuel cell-powered forklifts. 
Figure 4-6 shows the energy block diagram in scenario 3: Power-to-Gas. 
 
Figure 4-6. The energy block diagram in Scenario 3: Power-to-Gas 
The energy hub operator charges a certain price for each m3 of hydrogen they sell to the 
consumers. This price is determined based on the costs of the energy hub, the incentives paid by 
the government and a guaranteed 7-year payback period. The natural gas is consumed on-site in 
a furnace with a consumption rate of 1500 m3 per hr. For a 5% hydrogen injection to the natural 
gas, 78 m3 of hydrogen is needed each hour. The energy consumer has ten forklifts and wants to 
replace them with fuel cell-powered forklifts. To do that, 108.26 m3 of hydrogen is needed every 
eight hours. The energy hub operator stores hydrogen when the electricity prices are lower than a 
certain limit and uses the stored hydrogen to meet the demand when the electricity prices are 













Figure 4-7. Underground hydrogen storage operation flowchart for Scenario 3, Power-to-Gas 
In this scenario, we are considering two cases of government support for the development of 
Power-to-Gas infrastructure. In the first case, the government pays no capital grant incentive to 
the energy hub operator. However, the government will pay for the fuel cell-powered forklifts 
GEP: Grid Electricity Price, LPL: Lower Price Limit, HPL: Higher Price Limit, HG: Hydrogen Generated, HD: 
Hydrogen Demand, ɳ: Electrolyzer Efficiency, PP: Purchased Power, P
max 
:maximum electrolyzer power input, 
P
hourly
 :power needed to meet the hydrogen demand in an hour  
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purchased by the energy consumer. In the second case, the government pays a capital grant to the 
energy hub operator and pays no incentive to the energy consumer. 
4.2.4.4 Scenario 4: Battery-powered forklifts 
In this scenario, we consider using electricity to charge battery-powered forklifts to replace diesel 
forklifts. Between 11 pm and 7 am the energy hub operator charges three batteries for each forklift 
which will be used in the next three shifts by the consumer. The consumer pays the energy hub 
operator for charging the batteries they use. The energy block diagram for this scenario is shown 
in Figure 4-8. 
 
Figure 4-8. Energy block diagram for Scenario 4: Battery-powered forklifts 
Two cases of government incentives for the energy hub operator and incentive for the energy 
consumer are considered in this scenario. 
For each of these scenarios, we aim to investigate: 
1. How much is the reduced health impacts? 
2. How much GHG emission reduction is achieved? 
3. How profitable is the investment for the energy hub operator? 
4. How high is the extra cost to the energy consumer? 
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In this study, two types of GHG emission reduction are analyzed. The first type is GHG emission 
reduced at the energy consumer’s site. The second type is the lifecycle GHG emission. Figure 4-9 
shows the difference between the on-site and lifecycle emissions considered in this study. 
 
Figure 4-9. On-site and lifecycle emissions 
As can be seen in Figure 4-9, on-site and lifecycle emissions are different in each scenario.  
4.2.5 Input data 
The cost of technologies considered in this study is shown in Table 4-5. All values are converted 





Table 4-5. Assumed cost of energy conversion and storage technologies 
Technology Capital cost (2017 CAD) Annual O&M cost 
Alkaline Electrolyzer 
(CAD per kW) 
1076 [70] Assumed to be 4% of the capital cost 
Wind turbine  
(CAD per kW) 
1475 [110] 95 CAD per kW [110] 
Solar panel 
 (CAD per Wac) 
1.74 [111] 24 CAD per kW [111] 
Electrolyzer stack 
replacement 
30% of electrolyzer capital 
cost 
Already included in the electrolyzer 
operation and maintenance cost 
Battery (CAD per  kWh) 723 [112] Assumed to be 1% of the capital cost 
Underground storage 
preparation cost  
(CAD per m3 Hydrogen) 
0.38 [70] 0 
 
The costs of fuel cell-powered, battery-powered, and diesel forklift are shown in Table 4-6. All 
values are converted to 2017 CAD.  
Table 4-6. Assumed associated costs of fuel cell-powered, battery-powered and diesel forklift  





Purchase cost per forklift 
(CAD) 
48,000 [113] 34,500 [113] NA 
Refueling/charging 
infrastructure capital cost 




1200 CAD per charger NA 
Annual O&M cost of 
refueling/charging 
infrastructure 
4% of capital cost 4% of capital cost NA 
Routine Maintenance 
Costs per forklift (CAD 
per year per forklift) 
1090 [113] 5450 [113] 350 [113] 
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Fuel cell/ battery 
maintenance cost (CAD 
per year per forklift) 
2920 [98] 6360 [98] 
(Considering 4 
batteries for each 
forklift) 
NA 
Labor cost of 
refueling/recharging 
(CAD per year per 
forklift) 
1060 [98] 5830 [98] 1060 (Assumed to be equal 
to the cost of hydrogen 
refueling) 
 
For every 24 kWh of electricity (from the wall to power) used in battery-powered forklifts 
(equivalent to 15 kWh to the wheels), 1 kg of hydrogen is needed to power a fuel cell-powered 
forklift [115]. It is also assumed that for every kWh of electricity delivered to a battery-powered 
forklift, 0.16 gallons of diesel is needed to fuel a diesel forklift [115]. In this study, we assume 
that the battery-powered forklift consumes 2.85 kW of power per hour and the battery is charged 
at the same rate [113]. Diesel price is assumed to be 1.075 CAD per liter [116]. 
The electricity used to charge electric forklifts and produce hydrogen is bought from the electricity 
grid. The generation of grid electricity is associated with emissions. Emissions from operation 
and maintenance of electricity generation technologies considered in Ontario are shown in 
Table 4-7.  
Table 4-7. Assumed GHG emission rates of electricity generation technologies [72] 





Natural gas 525 
 
It should be noted that hydropower emissions are not zero for new plants, but it is assumed to be 
zero in Ontario with legacy hydropower generation.  
Natural gas price is assumed to be 19 cents per m3 based on the values available in [117]. It should 
be noted that we used HOEP as the electricity purchase cost. This was done to assess how cost-
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effective it is to use surplus electricity in Ontario to reduce GHG emissions in other sectors of 
energy when the surplus power is sold to the businesses at the HOEP. In Scenario 4: Battery-
powered forklifts, batteries are only charged during off-peak hours in Ontario. Off-peak hours as 
shown in Table 4-8, usually have a 10% lower demand compared to mid-peak and on-peak hours.  




















January 15816 17253 17366 0.92 0.91 
February 15251 16509 16914 0.92 0.90 
March 15210 16095 16682 0.95 0.91 
April 13084 14602 14937 0.90 0.88 
May 12990 14825 14740 0.878 0.88 
June 14064 15838 16210 0.89 0.87 
July 14286 15988 16783 0.89 0.85 
August 14317 16633 17593 0.86 0.81 
September 13713 16834 17416 0.81 0.79 
October 13543 14496 14198 0.93 0.953 
November 14688 16050 16494 0.92 0.89 
December 16051 17431 17623 0.92 0.91 
 
Table 4-9 shows the on-peak, mid-peak, and off-peak hours in winter and summer in Ontario.  
Table 4-9. On-peak, mid-peak, and off-peak hours in Ontario [119] 
 On-peak hours Mid-peak hours Off-peak hours 
Summer 11 AM- 5 PM 5 PM- 7 PM and                                              
7 AM- 11 AM 
7 PM- 7 AM
Winter 5 PM- 7 PM and             
7 AM- 11 AM 




Emission rates of pollutants from a combined cycle power plant, natural gas consumption, and 
diesel consumption are presented in Table 4-10, Table 4-11, and Table 4-12. 
Table 4-10. Assumed emission rates of pollutants from a combined cycle power plant [108] 






Table 4-11. Assumed emission rates for natural gas combustion [120] 











Table 4-12. Assumed emission rates for diesel combustion [121], [122] 
Pollutant Emission rate 
CO   (lb per MMBtu) [121] 0.95 
NO2     (lb per MMBtu) [121] 4.41 
PM2.5 (lb per MMBtu) [121] 0.31 
SO2  (lb per MMBtu) [121] 0.29 
CO2    (kg per gallon) [122] 10.18 
CH4   (g per gallon) [122] 0.42 
N2O (Controlled-low-NOX 





To calculate the CO2e for fossil fuel combustion, coefficients of 25 and 298 were used for CH4 
and N2O, respectively [123]. 
4.3 Results and discussion 
In this section, the results for each scenario and case are presented and compared to each other.  
4.3.1 Scenario 1: Wind power  
4.3.1.1 Scenario 1, Case 1: Wind power replacing natural gas power plants  
In this scenario, the government pays one million CAD in capital grant incentives to the energy 
hub operator and guarantees a 7-year payback period via a fixed feed-in tariff (FIT) for the wind 
power they generate. The energy consumer in this scenario is assumed to be the industrial sector 
in Ontario. In 2015, 137 TWh of electricity was consumed in Ontario [124] of which 41.7 TWh 
was consumed in the industrial sector [125]. As a result, about 30% of the electricity consumption 
in Ontario was consumed in the industrial sector. We are using this percentage for calculating the 
cost of the global adjustment for energy consumers in the province. Table 4-13 shows the 
economic parameters of the energy hub operator in Scenario 1.  
Table 4-13. Economic parameters of the energy hub operator in Scenario 1, Case 1: wind power replacing 
natural gas plants 
Parameter Value  
Investment 14.75 million CAD 
Capital grant received from the 
government 
1 million CAD 
FIT value 12.7 Cents per kWh 
Payback period 7 years 
NPV 11.2 million CAD 
 
Table 4-14 shows the economic parameters for the government in Scenario 1, Case 1: wind power 
replacing natural gas plants for the government. As can be seen in Table 4-14, the emission 
reduction cost, in this case, is a negative value for the government which means that the health 
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impacts avoided and the taxes the government receives surpass the incentives it paid to the energy 
consumer. 
Table 4-14. Economic parameters of the government in Scenario 1, Case 1: wind power replacing natural 
gas plants 
Parameter Value  
Capital grant paid 1 million CAD 
Health impacts avoided 115,515 CAD 
Taxes collected from the energy hub 
operator 
113,870 CAD 
Taxes lost for electricity price increase in 
the industrial  sector 
82,891 CAD 
Total CO2e emissions saved 13872 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost -3.218 CAD per  tonne CO2e 
 
Figure 4-10 shows the components of the emission reduction cost for the government in Scenario 
1, Case 1: wind power replacing natural gas plants. As can be seen in Figure 4-10, health impacts 
avoided and the taxes collected from the energy hub operator cover the incentives paid by the 




Figure 4-10. Annual costs and revenues of government in reducing GHG emissions in Scenario 1, 
Case 1: wind power replacing natural gas plants 
The health impacts avoided in this case are high as wind power is replacing natural gas plant 
which is the only polluting electricity source in Ontario. Due to the high profitability of the 
investment for the energy hub operator, the government receives noticeable taxes from the energy 
hub operator.  
Table 4-15 shows the economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 1, Case 1: wind 
power replacing natural gas plants. The additional cost for the consumer is the global adjustment 
paid because of the FIT received by the energy hub operator. In this case, the energy consumer is 
paying CAD 59.76 per tonne of CO2e reduction in the province. 
Table 4-15. Economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 1, Case 1: wind power replacing 
natural gas plants 
Parameter Value  
Additional cost paid for the energy 
policy 
828,914 CAD 
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electricity price 



























On-site emission reduction cost NA 
Lifecycle emission reduction cost 59.76 CAD per  tonne CO2e 
4.3.1.2 Scenario 1, Case 2: Wind power replacing Ontario’s electricity mix 
In this case, we are assuming that the wind farm is replacing Ontario’s electricity mix. The 
economic parameters for the energy hub operator are the same as the values for scenario 1, Case 
1: wind power replacing natural gas plants shown in Table 4-13. Similar to case 1, the energy hub 
operators receive a FIT of 12.7 Cents for every kWh of electricity they generate. Similarly, the 
investment cost and operation and maintenance cost of the energy hub operator is limited to the 
wind turbines. Table 4-16 shows the economic parameters of the government in Scenario 1, Case 
2: Wind power replacing Ontario’s electricity mix. As can be seen in Table 4-16, the emission 
reduction cost has increased drastically for the government compared to case 1. 
Table 4-16. Economic parameters of the government in Scenario 1, Case 2: Wind power replacing 
Ontario’s electricity mix 
Parameter Value  
Capital grant paid 1 million CAD 
Health impacts avoided 4771 CAD 
Taxes collected from the 
energy hub operator 
113,870 CAD 
Taxes lost for electricity 
price increase in the 
industrial sector 
82,891 CAD 
Total CO2e emissions saved 560.31 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost 117.98 CAD per tonne CO2e 
 
Figure 4-11 better reflects the reason behind this increase. Figure 4-11 shows the annual costs and 
revenues of the government in reducing GHG emissions in Scenario 1, Case 2: Wind power 
replacing Ontario’s.  As can be seen in Figure 4-11, in this case only the taxes collected from the 
energy hub operator reduce the costs for the government and the avoided health impacts are 
negligible compared to the grants paid and lost taxes. The reason for reduced health impacts is 
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the 95% emission-free electricity mix in Ontario. This leads to low health impacts avoided when 
the grid power is replaced with wind power. 
 
Figure 4-11. Annual costs and revenues of government in reducing GHG emissions in Scenario 1, 
Case 2: Wind power replacing Ontario’s electricity mix 
The lifecycle emission reduction cost for the energy consumer is 1479.39 CAD per tonne of CO2e. 
Comparing Scenario 1, Case 1: Wind power replacing natural gas plants and Scenario 1, Case 2: 
Wind power replacing Ontario’s electricity mix shows that when the grid electricity mix moves 
from 100% natural gas to current Ontario electricity grid mix (Figure 4-3) the cost of GHG 
emission reduction by replacing the current technology mix with wind power increases more than 
24 times for the energy consumer. 
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4.3.2 Scenario 2: Solar power  
4.3.2.1 Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar power replacing natural gas power plants  
Similar to Scenario 1: Wind power, in this scenario the government pays 1 million CAD in the 
capital grant to the energy hub operator and guarantees a fixed FIT. The energy consumer pays 
the GA for the new renewable generation capacity. 
Table 4-17 shows the economic parameters of the energy hub operator in Scenario 2, Case 1: 
Solar power replacing natural gas power plants. 
Table 4-17. Economic parameters of the energy hub operator in Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar power replacing 
natural gas power plants 
Parameter Value  
Investment 13.27  million CAD 
Capital grant received from 
the government 
1 million CAD 
FIT value 18.45 Cents per kWh 
Payback period 7 years 
NPV 9.87 million CAD 
 
Table 4-18 shows the economic parameters of the government in Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar power 
replacing natural gas power plants. As can be seen in Table 4-18, the emission reduction cost for 
the government is lower than one CAD per tonne of CO2e.  
Table 4-18. Economic parameters of the government in Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar power replacing natural 
gas power plants 
Parameter Value  
Capital grant paid 1 million CAD 
Health impacts avoided 68,293 CAD 
Taxes collected from the 
energy hub operator 
100,480 CAD 
Taxes lost for electricity 





Total CO2e emissions saved 8,116 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost 0.97 CAD per tonne CO2e 
 
Figure 4-12 shows the annual costs and revenues of the government in reducing GHG emissions 
in Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar power replacing natural gas power. As can be seen in Figure 4-12, 
the avoided health impacts and taxes collected from the energy hub operator almost fully cover 
the capital grant and the lost taxes for the government. 
 
Figure 4-12. Annual costs and revenues of government in reducing GHG emissions in Scenario 2, 
Case 1: Solar power replacing natural gas power 
Table 4-19 shows the Economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar 
power replacing natural gas power. As can be seen in Table 4-19, the energy consumer is paying 
92.18 CAD per tonne of CO2e emission reduction. 
Table 4-19. Economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar power replacing 
natural gas power 
Parameter Value  
Extra cost paid for the energy 
policy 
748,190 CAD 
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the energy hub 
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Taxes lost for 
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On-site emission reduction cost NA 
Lifecycle emission reduction 
cost 
92.18 CAD per tonne CO2e 
 
Comparing the results in Scenario 2, Case 1 (Solar power replacing natural gas power plants) and 
Scenario 1, Case 1: Wind power replacing natural gas power plants) shows that reducing 
emissions from the electricity grid is more cost-effective with wind power technology compared 
to solar power technology in Ontario. The two reasons for this advantage are lower investment 
cost for wind power technology and higher capacity factor of wind power (about 30%) compared 
to solar power (about 16%).  
4.3.2.2 Scenario 2, Case 2: Solar power replacing Ontario’s electricity mix 
In this case, we are assuming that the solar farm is replacing Ontario’s electricity grid mix. The 
economic parameters for the energy hub operator are the same as those in Scenario 2, Case 1: 
Solar power replacing natural gas power as shown in Table 4-17.  
Table 4-20 shows the economic parameters of the government in Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar power 
replacing Ontario’s electricity mix. 
Table 4-20. Economic parameters of the government in Scenario 2, Case 2: Solar power replacing 
Ontario’s electricity mix 
Parameter Value  
Capital grant paid 1 million CAD 
Health impacts avoided 3,335 CAD 
Taxes collected from the energy 
hub operator 
100,479 CAD 
Taxes lost for electricity price 
increase in the industrial sector 
74,819  CAD 
Total CO2e emissions saved 309.37 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost 239.94 CAD per  tonne CO2e 
 
As can be seen in Table 4-20, the cost of emission reduction for the government, in this case, has 
increased from 0.97 to 239.94 CAD per tonne CO2e compared to Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar power 
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replacing natural gas power plants. The reason for this increase can be seen in Figure 4-13. 
Figure 4-13 shows the annual costs and revenues of the government in reducing GHG emissions 
in Scenario 2, Case 1 (Solar power replacing Ontario’s electricity mix). As shown in Figure 4-13, 
health impacts have a negligible effect on the cost of emission reduction for the government. In 
Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar power replacing natural gas power plants, however, the avoided health 




Figure 4-13. Annual costs and revenues of government in reducing GHG emissions in Scenario 2, 
Case 2: Solar power replacing Ontario’s electricity mix 
Lifecycle emission reduction cost for the energy consumer is 2418 CAD per tonne CO2e in this 
case. Similar to what was observed in Scenario 1: Wind power, the cost of GHG emission 
reduction increases significantly for the consumer (an increase of more than 26 times) when solar 
power replaces the current Ontario’s electricity mix instead of natural gas plants. 
4.3.3 Scenario 3: Power-to-Gas  
In this scenario, the development of Power-to-Gas system is investigated.  
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In the first case, the government pays no capital grant incentive to the energy hub operator. 
However, the government will pay for the fuel cell-powered forklifts purchased by the energy 
consumer. Table 4-21 shows the economic parameters for the energy hub operator. As can be seen 
in Table 4-21, the energy hub operator receives no capital grant from the government, but its 
hydrogen selling price of 5.55 CAD per kg of hydrogen is guaranteed. This price is calculated 
based on a 7-year payback period for the energy hub operator. The capital cost for the energy hub 
operator consists of the electrolyzer and hydrogen refueling infrastructure cost.  
Table 4-21. Economic parameters of the energy hub operator in Scenario 3, Case 1: Government incentive 
for the energy consumer 
Parameter Value  
Investment 1.74 million CAD 
Capital grant received from 
the government 
0 
Hydrogen price 5.55 CAD per kg of H2 
Payback period 7 years 
NPV 1.54 million CAD 
 
Table 4-22 shows the economic parameters of the government in Scenario 3, Case 1: Government 
incentive for the energy consumer. As can be seen in Table 4-22, the avoided health impacts and 
collected taxes are large enough to cover the government’s incentives and lost taxes. As a result, 
the government has a negative cost for emission reduction (makes money for each tonne of CO2e 
emission reduction). This issue is better reflected in Figure 4-14. 
Table 4-22. Economic parameters of the government in Scenario 3, Case 1: Government incentive for the 
energy consumer 
Parameter Value  
Incentives paid 483,492 CAD 
Health impacts avoided 118,683 CAD 
Taxes collected from the 




Taxes lost for electricity 
price increase in the 
industrial sector 
29,854 CAD 
Total CO2e emissions saved 537.47 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost -122.55 CAD per tonne CO2e 
 
Figure 4-14 shows the components of the annual costs and revenues of government in reducing 
GHG emissions in Scenario 3, Case 1: Government incentive for the energy consumer. As can be 
seen in Figure 4-14, health impacts play an important role in reducing emission reduction cost for 
the government. The health impacts have been avoided to a great extent due to replacing diesel 
fuel with hydrogen in the forklifts. 
 
Figure 4-14. Annual costs and revenues of government in reducing GHG emissions in 
Scenario 3, Case 1: Government incentive for the energy consumer 
Figure 4-15 shows that emission reduction from replacing diesel fuels in forklifts is about 60% of 
the emission reduction for replacing natural gas with HENG. However, the hydrogen consumption 
for forklifts is about 17% of the hydrogen consumed for HENG. The higher potential for reducing 
emissions by replacing diesel with hydrogen compared to replacing natural gas with HENG is due 
to the higher emission factors of diesel compared to natural gas. The important point to notice is 
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GHG emissions from power generation that is used to produce hydrogen. If the emissions from 
the grid are considered, the total GHG emission reduction will drop 22%. 
 
Figure 4-15. Comparing emission reduction from HENG, fuel cell-powered forklifts, and emission 
from the grid in Scenario 3, Power-to-Gas 
Table 4-23 shows the economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 3, Case 1: 
Government incentive for energy consumer.  
Table 4-23. Economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 3, Case 1: Government incentive 
for the energy consumer 
Parameter Value (CAD) 
Extra annual cost paid for the 
energy policy 
298,539 CAD 
On-site saved CO2e emissions 691.44 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost (based on 
on-site emission) 
431.76 CAD per tonne CO2e 
4.3.3.2 Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-to-Gas with government incentive for the energy hub 
operator 
In this case, the government pays no incentives to the energy consumer, however, pays one million 
CAD to the energy hub operator in the form of a capital grant for the development of hydrogen 
production and storage infrastructure. Table 4-24 shows the economic parameters of the energy 



































operator. As can be seen in Table 4-24, the guaranteed hydrogen purchase price for the energy 
consumer is lower compared to Scenario 3, Case 1: Power-to-Gas with government incentive for 
the energy consumer. The capital cost for the energy hub operator consists of the electrolyzer and 
hydrogen refueling infrastructure cost.  
Table 4-24. Economic parameters of the energy hub operator in Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-to-Gas with 
government incentive for the energy hub operator 
Parameter Value  
Investment 1.64 million CAD 
Capital grant received from 
the government 
1 million CAD 
Hydrogen price 3.00 CAD per kg 
Payback period 7 years 
NPV 655,779 CAD 
Table 4-25 shows the economic parameters of the government in Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-to-
Gas with government incentive for the energy hub operator. Similar to Scenario 3, Case 1: Power-
to-Gas with government incentive for the energy consumer, the government, makes money for 
each tonne of CO2e emission reduction.  
Table 4-25. Economic parameters of the government in Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-to-Gas with government 
incentive for the energy hub operator 
Parameter Value  
Capital grant paid 1 million CAD 
Health impacts avoided 118,683 CAD 
Taxes collected from the 
energy hub operator 
14,220 CAD 
Taxes lost for electricity 
price increase in the 
industrial sector 
15,571 CAD 
Total CO2e emissions saved 537.47 tonne CO2e 




Figure 4-16 shows the annual costs and revenues of government in reducing GHG emissions in 
Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-to-Gas with government incentive for the energy hub operator. Similar 
to the cases where wind and solar power replaced the natural gas plants, health impacts have a 
significant role in reducing the cost of emission reduction for the government when natural gas 
and diesel fuel are replaced by hydrogen.  
 
Figure 4-16. Annual costs and revenues of government in reducing GHG emissions in Scenario 3, 
Case 2: Power-to-Gas with government incentive for the energy hub operator 
Table 4-26 shows the economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-
to-Gas with government incentive for the energy hub operator. The emission reduction cost, in 
this case, is lower for the energy consumer compared to Case 1: Power-to-Gas with government 
incentive for the energy consumer, although the energy hub operator doesn’t receive direct 
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Table 4-26. Economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-to-Gas with 
government incentive for the energy hub operator 
Parameter Value  
Extra cost paid for the energy 
policy 
155,712 CAD 
On-site saved CO2e emissions 691.44 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost (based on 
on-site emission) 
225.20  CAD per tonne CO2e 
Table 4-27 compares emission reduction cost for replacing natural gas with HENG and replacing 
diesel forklifts with fuel cell-powered forklifts. The emission reduction per m3 of hydrogen 
consumption is higher when diesel is replaced by hydrogen. The emission reduction cost in this 
application of hydrogen is also about half of the cost of HENG. The values in Table 4-27 are 
calculated based on the capital and operation and maintenance cost of the technologies only.  
Table 4-27. HENG and fuel cell-powered forklift emission reduction pathways comparison in Scenario 3: 
Power-to-Gas 
Hydrogen application Hydrogen 
consumption 
(m3 per year) 
Emission reduction         
(kg of CO2e) per m3 of 
hydrogen consumption 
Emission reduction cost  








118,550 2.2 160.52 
 
Power-to-Gas average 








Figure 4-17 shows the share of annual costs for hydrogen generation for reducing emissions in 
Scenario 3: Power-to-Gas. Figure 4-17 shows that the electrolyzer cost (capital and O&M) with 
a share of 60%, has the highest share of the cost in Scenario 3: Power-to-Gas. The forklift cost 
purchase and maintenance) has a 27% share while the refueling infrastructure consists of 8% of 
the cost.  
 
Figure 4-17. The annual cost of hydrogen generation for reducing emissions in Scenario 3: Power-to-
Gas 
Figure 4-18 shows the divided cost of the energy consumer in Scenario 3, Case 1: Power-to-Gas 































consumer is for the hydrogen and the highest cost-saving the energy consumer achieves is from 
the diesel cost.  
 
Figure 4-18. Scenario 3, Case 1: Power-to-Gas with government incentive for the energy consumer 
Figure 4-19 shows the divided cost of the energy consumer in Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-to-Gas 
with government incentive for the energy hub operator. Similar to Figure 4-18, Figure 4-19 shows 
that the highest cost paid for the energy consumer is for the hydrogen and the highest cost-saving 
the energy consumer achieves is from the diesel cost. However, the costs in Scenario 3, Case 2: 
Power-to-Gas with government incentive for the energy hub operator is lower compared to the 































Figure 4-19. Costs paid and avoided by the energy consumer in Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-to-Gas 
with government incentive for the energy hub operator 
Although in Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-to-Gas with government incentive for the energy hub 
operator, the energy consumer is paying for the fuel cell-powered forklifts, the hydrogen cost is 
four times higher than the annual cost of fuel cell-powered forklifts. This means that by 
incentivizing hydrogen production (incentivizing the energy hub operator), the government can 
reduce the cost of GHG emission reduction more for the energy consumer compared to 
incentivizing hydrogen primary end use (such as a subsidy for forklifts). This statement can also 
be verified by looking at Figure 4-17. As it can be seen in Figure 4-17, about 60% of the cost of 
reducing GHG emissions by hydrogen is for the electrolyzer while about 35% of the cost is 
attributable to fuel cell-powered forklifts and refueling infrastructure investment and operation. 
This shows that a decrease in the cost of electrolyzer will have a significant effect on the hydrogen 
pathway for reducing GHG emissions.  
In this analysis, electricity purchase accounted for only 3% of the cost. However, if GA is added 
to the electricity price, this percentage would have been higher.  IESO data shows that in 2017, 
the average weighted Ontario electricity price was between 1 and 2 cents per kWh while GA 
mounted up to about 10 cents per kWh on average [7]. 
Comparing the results from Scenario 3: Power-to-Gas with Scenario 1: Wind power and Scenario 
2: Solar power shows that the cost of GHG emission reduction for both the government and the 
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consumer is lower when natural gas power plants are replaced by wind and solar power 
technologies. However, when we have a 95% emission-free electricity mix available, using clean 
power to reduce emissions through using hydrogen is more cost-effective in reducing GHG 
emissions for both the government and the energy consumer than replacing the grid mix with 
wind and solar power technologies. 
4.3.4 Scenario 4: Battery-powered forklifts 
In this scenario, the deployment of battery-powered forklifts is investigated.  
4.3.4.1 Scenario 4, Case 1: Battery-powered forklifts with an incentive for the energy 
hub operator  
In this case, the government pays 50% of the recharging infrastructure cost to the energy hub 
operator and pays no incentive to the energy consumer. Table 4-28 shows the economic 
parameters of the energy hub operator in Scenario 4, Case 1: Battery-powered forklifts with an 
incentive for infrastructure. The energy hub operator has a guaranteed electricity purchase price 
calculated based on having a 7-year payback period. It should be noted that in reality, the energy 
hub operator sells a “forklift charging service” to the energy consumer rather than “electricity.” 
However, for simplicity, we are assuming that the energy consumer buys the electricity stored in 
batteries from the energy consumer at a certain price. 
Table 4-28. Economic parameters of the energy hub operator in Scenario 4, Case 1: Battery-powered 
forklifts with an incentive for the energy hub operator 
Parameter Value  
Investment 6,000 CAD 
Capital grant received from 
the government 
6,000  CAD 
Electricity selling price 35 Cents per kWh 
Payback period 7 years 
NPV 5,315 CAD 
 
Table 4-29 shows the economic parameters of the government in Scenario 4, Case 1: Battery-
powered forklifts with an incentive for the energy hub operator. As can be seen in Table 4-29, the 
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avoided health impacts are significantly higher than the incentives the government pays and the 
taxes it is losing. This significance is clearly shown in Figure 4-20, as well. 
Table 4-29. Economic parameters of the government in Scenario 4, Case 1: Battery-powered forklifts with 
an incentive for the energy hub operator 
Parameter Value  
Capital grant paid 6,000  CAD 
Health impacts avoided 112,499 CAD 
Taxes collected from the 
energy hub operator 
11,705 CAD 
Taxes lost for electricity 
price increase in the 
industrial sector 
45 CAD 
Total CO2e emissions saved 253.34 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost -395.64 CAD per tonne CO2e 
 
Figure 4-20 shows the annual costs and revenues of the government in reducing GHG emissions 
in Scenario 4, Case 1. Figure 4-20 shows that both the incentive paid by the government and taxes 
lost from the energy consumer is negligible in comparison with the health impacts avoided. That 




Figure 4-20. Annual costs and revenues of government in reducing GHG emissions in Scenario 4, 
Case 1: Battery-powered forklifts with an incentive for the energy hub operator 
Table 4-30 shows the economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 4, Case 1: Battery-
powered forklifts with an incentive for the energy hub operator. The emission reduction cost for 
the energy consumer is 447.52 CA per tonne of CO2e emission reduction which is comparable to 
the results in Scenario 3, Case 1: Power-to-Gas with government incentive for the energy 
consumer. 
Table 4-30. Economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 4, Case 1: Battery-powered forklifts 
with an incentive for the energy hub operator 
Parameter Value 
Extra cost paid for the 
energy policy 
117,049 CAD 
On-site saved CO2e 
emissions 
261.55 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost 
(based on on-site emission) 
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4.3.4.2 Scenario 4, Case 2: Battery-powered forklifts with an incentive for the energy 
consumer  
In this case, the government supports the replacement of diesel forklifts with battery-powered 
forklifts by providing an incentive equal to the price of the battery-powered forklifts to the energy 
consumer.  Table 4-31 shows the economic parameters of the energy hub operator in Scenario 4, 
Case 2: Battery-powered forklifts with an incentive for the energy consumer. The capital cost for 
the energy hub operators consists of the battery recharging infrastructure in this case.  
Table 4-31. Economic parameters of the energy hub operator in Scenario 4, Case 2: Battery-powered 
forklifts with an incentive for the energy consumer 
Parameter Value  
Investment 12,000 CAD 
Capital grant received from 
the government 
0 
Electricity selling price 36 Cents per kWh 
Payback period 7 years 
NPV 10630 CAD 
 
Table 4-32 shows the economic parameters of the government in Scenario 4, Case 2. As 
mentioned earlier, the incentive paid by the government, in this case, is equal to the price of 
battery-powered forklifts. Table 4-32 shows that the emission reduction cost for the energy 
consumer is negative similar to Scenario 4, Case 1: Battery-powered forklifts with an incentive 
for the energy hub operator. Figure 4-21 reflects this issue, as well.  
Table 4-32. Economic parameters of the government in Scenario 4, Case 2: Battery-powered forklifts with 
an incentive for the energy consumer 
Parameter Value  
Capital grant paid 345,351 CAD 
Health impacts avoided 124,989 CAD 
Taxes collected from the 




Taxes lost for electricity 
price increase in the 
industrial sector 
8,303 CAD 
Total CO2e emissions saved 253.34 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost -272.87 CAD per tonne CO2e 
 
Figure 4-21 shows the annual costs and revenues of government in reducing GHG emissions in 
Scenario 4, Case 2: Battery-powered forklifts with an incentive for the energy consumer. Unlike 
Scenario 4, Case 1, i.e., Battery-powered forklifts with an incentive for the energy hub operator, 
where the health impacts were the dominant factors in the cost of emission reduction for the 
government, in Scenario 4, Case 2 the incentive paid by the government is the most significant 




Figure 4-21. Annual costs and revenues of government in reducing GHG emissions in Scenario 4, 
Case 2: Battery-powered forklifts with an incentive for the energy consumer 
Table 4-33 shows the economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 4, Case 2: Battery-
powered forklifts with an incentive for the energy consumer. The on-site emission reduction cost, 
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an incentive for the energy hub operator. This is contrary to the results of Scenario 3: Power-to-
Gas where the emission reduction cost for the energy consumer decreased when the energy 
consumer was not receiving direct incentives from the government. 
Table 4-33. Economic parameters of the energy consumer in Scenario 4, Case 2: Battery-powered forklifts 
with an incentive for the energy consumer 
Parameter Value (CAD) 
Extra cost paid for the energy 
policy 
83,027 CAD 
On-site saved CO2e emissions 261.55 tonne CO2e 
Emission reduction cost 
(based on on-site emission) 
317.44  CAD per tonne CO2e 
 
Table 4-34 shows the cost of emission reduction by replacing diesel forklifts with battery-powered 
forklifts. Similar to Table 4-27, the values in Table 4-34 have been calculated based on investment 
and operation and maintenance cost of the technologies. Table 4-34 shows that the emission 
reduction cost with the battery-powered forklift is higher than the value for the Power-to-Gas 
scenario shown in Table 4-27. However, if we consider the forklift working with two batteries, 
the electric pathway may have equal or lower emission reduction cost compared to hydrogen 
technologies. In that case, the labor cost of recharging and the cost of battery maintenance will be 
limited to two batteries, and the cost of emission reduction will drop by about 60% (177.42 CAD 
per tonne CO2e). This value is well below the HENG and Power-to-Gas emission reduction cost 
and is comparable to the fuel cell-powered forklift value reported in Table 4-27. 





(kWh per year) 
Emission reduction           
(kg of CO2e) per kWh of 
electricity consumption 
Emission reduction cost 
(CAD per tonne of CO2e 
emission reduction) 
Electric forklift 249,660 1.05 447.79 
 
Figure 4-22 shows the annual costs of emission reduction by battery-powered forklifts in Scenario 
4: Battery-powered forklifts. It can be seen in Figure 4-22 that the forklift cost (purchase, 
operation, and maintenance) accounts for 65% of the total cost. This high percentage shows why 
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direct incentives for the energy consumer for purchasing forklifts lowers the cost of emission 
reduction for the energy consumer. 
 
 
Figure 4-22. The annual costs for emission reduction by battery-powered forklifts in Scenario 4: 
Battery-powered forklifts 
Figure 4-23 and Figure 4-24 show the costs paid and avoided by the energy consumer in 
Scenario 4, Case 1(Battery-powered forklifts with an incentive for infrastructure) and Case 2 
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Figure 4-23. Costs paid and avoided by the energy consumer in Scenario 4, Case 1: Battery-powered 
forklifts with an incentive for infrastructure 
 
 
Figure 4-24. Costs paid and avoided by the energy consumer in Scenario 4, Case 2: Battery-powered 
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Electricity cost is a significant factor in the total cost of the energy consumer as shown in 
Figure 4-23 and Figure 4-24. It should be noted that it is assumed that the consumer is not buying 
electricity from the energy hub operator, and is purchasing the battery-charging service from them. 
The battery-charging service cost is reflected in the ‘electricity purchase’ cost. GHG emission 
reduction in the first case is more expensive for the energy consumer although the consumer 
receives direct incentives from the government. Similar to Scenario 3 where incentivizing 
hydrogen production made it more cost-effective for the consumer to reduce emissions, in 
Scenario 4 incentivizing the charging infrastructure leads to a lower emission reduction cost for 
the energy consumer compared to the direct incentive for battery-powered forklift purchase.  
As can be seen in Figure 4-22, recharging infrastructure has a negligible effect on the total cost 
(less than 2%) while electricity purchase accounts for 10% of the cost. The rest of the cost is 
attributable to forklift purchase, recharging, and maintenance. Figure 4-22 also shows that battery 
maintenance and labor cost of recharging account for about 40% of the emission reduction cost. 
The high labor cost of recharging is due to the frequent need for replacing batteries which is a 
result of long charging time. As a result, battery charging time and capacity are the main areas 
that need development to reduce the cost of replacing diesel forklifts with battery-powered 
forklifts.  
4.4 Discussion  
Table 4-35 compares the cost of emission reduction for the energy consumer in all scenarios and 
cases. Values in Table 4-35 show that the least expensive ways to reduce emissions considering 
the cost burden for the consumer are first: replacing natural gas plants with wind and solar, second: 
using current surplus power for Power-to-Gas and battery-powered forklifts, and third: replacing 
current grid mix with wind and solar. These values suggest that in a region where electricity is 
supplied with fossil fuel-based generation capacity, the most cost-effective way to reduce GHG 
emissions is to replace fossil fuel plants with renewable technologies rather than reducing 
emissions in the transportation sector, for instance. However, after the penetration of emission-
free electricity reaches a certain percentage, alternative methods of reducing emissions by using 
clean surplus power should be taken into account. These alternative methods include short-term 
energy storage in batteries and short-term and seasonal energy storage via hydrogen. 
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Table 4-35. Cost of emission reduction for the energy consumer in all scenarios and cases  
Scenario and Case Cost of emission reduction for the energy consumer  
(CAD per  tonne CO2e) 
Scenario 1, Case 1: Wind power replacing 
natural gas power plants 
59.76 
Scenario 1, Case 2: Wind power replacing 
Ontario’s electricity mix 
1479.39 
Scenario 2, Case 1: Solar power replacing 
natural gas power plants 
92.18 
Scenario 2, Case 2: Solar power replacing 
Ontario’s electricity mix 
2418 
Scenario 3, Case 1: Power-to-Gas with 
government incentive for the energy hub 
operator 
431.76 
Scenario 3, Case 2: Power-to-Gas with 
government incentive for the energy 
consumer 
225.20 
Scenario 4, Case 1: Battery-powered 
forklifts with an incentive for infrastructure 
447.52 
Scenario 4, Case 2: Battery-powered 




As already mentioned, in this study we consider two ways of using surplus electricity in Ontario: 
1. Using surplus electricity to generate hydrogen (Power-to-Gas); and 
2. Using surplus electricity to charge battery-powered forklifts. 
Surplus electricity is generated in Ontario in two different methods: 
1. The difference between supply in off-peak and on-peak hours mostly from nuclear and 
hydro generation, and; 
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2. The difference between electricity supplies in different seasons due to wind generation 
variation. 
The results of this study show that using surplus electricity to charge forklifts and using surplus 
electricity to produce hydrogen may each have unique advantages depending on the assumptions 
made.  
The three advantages of using direct surplus electricity over producing hydrogen are: 
1. Higher efficiency; 
2. Lower upfront cost; and 
3. Compatibility with the surplus electricity currently available in Ontario. 
Higher efficiency: Using direct surplus electricity is more efficient than using hydrogen. The 
lower efficiency of using hydrogen is due to the electrolyzer efficiency and fuel cell efficiency (if 
used). Surplus electricity has to go through a conversion process of about 60-70% efficiency in 
the electrolyzer to be converted to hydrogen. If that hydrogen is being used as a fuel for 
transportation, it has to go through the efficiency of a fuel cell to generate electricity which is 
about 60% [126]. Using direct surplus electricity is more efficient as electricity is used directly to 
fuel the vehicle. Therefore, only battery efficiency is applicable here (except for the electric motor 
efficiency which is common in both technologies). The efficiency of a Li-ion battery is about 85% 
[112].   
Lower cost: Using direct surplus electricity is also less expensive than using hydrogen. Using 
direct electricity doesn’t need conversion technologies (unlike hydrogen that needs electrolyzer 
and fuel cell). Additionally, the charging infrastructure for charging electric vehicles is less 
expensive than hydrogen refueling infrastructure (shown in Table 4-6). The cost associated with 
batteries (maintenance, replacement, labor cost) in battery-powered electric forklifts is higher than 
hydrogen forklifts. 
Types of surplus electricity available in Ontario: The difference in electricity supply between 
off-peak and on-peak hours each day is because of the nuclear and hydropower generation in 
Ontario. Nuclear and hydro plants are baseload generating units that operate in a limited range of 
capacity factor in a year (compare Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26 for nuclear and hydropower to 




Figure 4-25. Variation of nuclear electricity output in Ontario in 2017 (data from [118]) 
 
 








































































Figure 4-27. Variation of wind electricity output in Ontario in 2017 (data from [118]) 
 
 
Figure 4-28. Variation of solar electricity output in Ontario in 2017 (data from [118]) 
The variations in generation output of nuclear and hydropower technologies are due to seasonal 
demands (compare Figure 4-25 and Figure 4-26 to Figure 4-29 which shows the hourly electricity 










































































Figure 4-29. Hourly Ontario hourly electricity demand (data from [118]) 
Both nuclear and hydro generation capacity have a stable capacity factor during a season. 
However, off-peak electricity demand is significantly lower than on-peak and mi-peak demand in 
Ontario. Table 4-36 shows the difference between nuclear, hydro, and gas electricity generation 
and demand in off-peak, mid-peak, and on-peak hours in Ontario. Table 4-36 shows that in off-
peak hours, nuclear, hydro, and natural gas capacity create a surplus in Ontario in all months 
except February and March. Note that in February and March, wind power is at its highest 
generation output in Ontario as shown in Figure 4-27. 
This surplus is available overnight and not seasonally. Nuclear generation capacity is needed to 
supply the mid-peak and off-peak demand. However, these units have low flexibility and have to 
operate at their mid-peak, and on-peak hours level in their off-peak hours too. The difference in 









































































































































































Table 4-36. Average nuclear, hydro, and gas electricity generation minus average demand in off-peak, 
mid-peak, and on-peak hours in Ontario in 2017 (data from [118]) 
Month  Average nuclear, hydro, and 
gas electricity generation 
minus average demand in off-
peak hours (MWh) 
Average nuclear, hydro, and 
gas electricity generation 
minus average demand in 
mid-peak hours (MWh) 
Average nuclear, hydro, and 
gas electricity generation 
minus average demand in 
on-peak hours (MWh) 
January 131 -609 -609 
February -488 -902 -902 
March -593 -1017 -1017 
April 880 -66 -66 
May 925 -15 -15 
June 937 211 211 
July  746 -72 -72 
August 503 -4423 -443 
September 293 -477 -477 
October 555 -552 -552 
November 109 -188 -188 
December 323 -194 -194 
  
Off-peak, mid-peak, and on-peak hours have been determined using Table 4-9. 
When wind power is added to the nuclear, hydro, and gas power values, Ontario has surplus 
electricity at all hours. However, the surplus at off-peak hours is always (in all months) greater 
than the surplus in mid-peak and off-peak hours. Table 4-37 shows that the summed up generation 
of nuclear, hydro, wind, and gas capacity creates a surplus in all hours and seasons in Ontario. As 
Table 4-37 shows, surplus power in April, May, and June is higher than in August, September, 
and October at all hours. This difference is due to the demand variation as well as intermittent 
power generation in Ontario which provides seasonal surplus power in the province.  
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Table 4-37. Average nuclear, hydro, gas, and wind electricity generation minus average demand in off-
peak, mid-peak, and on-peak hours in Ontario in 2017 (data from [118]) 
Month  The average sum of nuclear, 
hydro, gas, and wind 
electricity generation minus 
average demand in off-peak 
hours (MWh) 
The average sum of 
nuclear, hydro, gas, and 
wind electricity generation 
minus average demand in 
mid-peak hours (MWh) 
The average sum of 
nuclear, hydro, gas, 
and wind electricity 
generation minus 
average demand in 
on-peak hours (MWh) 
January 1508 851 1023 
February 1328 922 670 
March 882 802 658 
April 1721 1183 1021 
May 1596 818 969 
June 1672 918 827 
July 1250 396 221 
August 1149 222 82 
September 806 101 38 
October 1504 670 680 
November 1312 1122 973 
December 1506 1343 1323 
 
When surplus electricity is always available at off-peak hours, it can be used to charge battery-
powered vehicles that can operate on the next day without a need for charging. This was our 
assumption for modeling the use of surplus electricity to run battery-powered forklifts. We 
assumed enough electricity is stored overnight to operate the forklift during the day. This solution 
seems very promising in Ontario because of the nuclear power generated in the province. 
Currently more than 60% of electricity in Ontario is supplied by nuclear power, which has a much 
more stable capacity factor compared to other generation technologies in the province. In other 
words, the lower hanging fruit for using Ontario’s surplus electricity is using it at off-peak surplus 
power to run vehicles on mid-peak and on-peak hours. 
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Although the discussed arguments were in favor of the direct use of surplus electricity, there are 
arguments which show the necessity of investing in hydrogen infrastructure for using surplus 
electricity and address the limits of off-peak battery energy storage. These arguments are: 
1. The type of available surplus electricity in Ontario may change:  Currently, surplus 
electricity in Ontario is dominated by nuclear and hydro generation technologies. However, with 
the shutting down of nuclear generation units, wind power will play a more important role in 
providing electricity in Ontario. This means that the surplus will lose its off-peak and on-peak 
characteristic and will change more seasonally. Taking advantage of seasonal variation in clean 
electricity generation is possible with a technology that is capable of storing large amounts of 
power for long durations of time. As a result, hydrogen will gain an advantage over batteries since 
batteries are not able to store seasonal surplus electricity. 
2. Multiple applications of a Power-to-Gas system gives it more flexibility over battery 
storage: The only well-established application of stored surplus electricity is in electric 
transportation. However, the transportation sector is not the only sector in Ontario with GHG 
emissions. Figure 4-2 shows the industry and building account for considerable shares of 
Ontario’s total GHG emission in 2013. Natural gas is a widely-used energy carrier in these sectors. 
Natural gas accounted for 58.6% of energy consumption in the residential sector in 2013, and this 
percentage increased to 61.3% in 2015 [127]. Ontario’s long-term energy plan also recognizes 
natural gas as a major source for space and water heating applications [128]. Hydrogen can be 
used as HENG to reduce GHG emissions in natural gas applications. Although technologies such 
as air-source heat pumps are also able to reduce emissions in the natural gas application, HENG 
seems a promising option considering the natural gas infrastructure in Ontario. Hydrogen can also 
be used in the transportation sector as well as electricity generation.  
3. The mismatch between the surplus electricity and gasoline consumption profile in 
Ontario is a drawback for battery energy storage for use in the transportation sector: 
Replacing an electricity mix with natural gas power plants with renewable sources is considerably 
less expensive than replacing the current electricity mix. The same argument is valid for electric 
vehicle deployment. Using off-peak surplus electricity to charge electric vehicles is limited by 
both surplus electricity available and infrastructure needs. In other words, when current off-peak 
available surplus electricity is utilized for charging vehicles, new electric vehicle fleet will need 
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more generation capacity and probably upgraded infrastructure. As a result, hydrogen is more 
beneficial than battery electricity storage since using hydrogen energy doesn’t need additional 
generation capacity, upgraded infrastructure, and the application is not limited to one sector. 
Figure 4-30 shows the monthly gasoline consumption in Ontario. As can be seen in Figure 4-30, 
the months with high gasoline demand are May, June, July, and August.  
 
Figure 4-30. Ontario motor gasoline domestic sales in 2017[129]  
Figure 4-31 shows surplus electricity in Ontario at off-peak, on-peak, and mid-peak hours as well 
as the average of all time periods. As can be seen, surplus electricity is lowest during July, August, 




















Figure 4-31. Surplus electricity in Ontario in 2017 (data from [118]) 
As can be seen, surplus electricity and transportation fuel demand curves do not match. High 
surplus electricity is not necessarily available at times of high transportation fuel demand. This 
mismatch underlines the importance of seasonal storage of energy in the transportation sector. 
Hydrogen, however, can match the supply and demand patterns. Figure 4-32 shows the 


































Figure 4-32. Underground hydrogen storage level in Scenario 3: Power-to-Gas 
Comparing Figure 4-32 and Figure 4-29 shows that hydrogen storage is controlled via electricity 
price signal and it matches the trend of the electricity demand. When the electricity demand in 
Ontario is low, hydrogen is stored underground and is used at times of high electricity demand to 
avoid electricity purchase. 
In the short term, using surplus electricity to charge electric vehicles seems to be the easiest and 
most feasible method for reducing emissions in Ontario. However, in mid-term and long-term, 
when the number of electric vehicles increases and the need for reduction of emissions from 
natural gas use becomes more important, the role of hydrogen and Power-to-Gas systems becomes 
more important. Although battery storage and electric vehicle are good matches for surplus 
nuclear and hydropower, Power-to-Gas can be used to control the variations of wind and solar 
energy. That is why Ontario needs investment in Power-to-Gas systems right now to be able to 
manage surplus wind power generation in the future.  
Considering the advantages of both direct uses of surplus power and hydrogen production, the 
research question is not “which technology is better” anymore. The research question is “what 
combination of direct use and hydrogen production technologies is optimum for development in 
















































This study aims at addressing the gaps in the energy incentives literature. In this study, we 
investigate the interaction of all stakeholders in an energy system considering the externalities of 
energy incentives allocated by the government including their health impacts and their effects on 
the economic performance of the energy hub operators and consumers as reflected in their taxes. 
The effect of incentives on the cost-efficiency of energy generation and energy storage is analyzed 
and compared. Subsequently, a comparison of battery storage and hydrogen storage in Ontario is 
presented.  
Two streams of energy incentives are considered in this study: incentives for the development of 
renewable power technologies (wind and solar) and energy incentives for technologies using 
surplus and clean energy in Ontario to reduce GHG emissions (Power-to-Gas and battery-powered 
forklifts). The results show that when there is an electricity grid with fossil fuel-based electricity 
generation technologies (natural gas plants were considered here), replacing the grid with wind 
and solar technologies is the most cost-effective way to reduce GHG emissions. However, 
considering the current Ontario’s electricity mix, incentives for the Power-to-Gas and battery-
powered technologies are more cost-effective ways to reduce emissions compared to replacing 
the grid with wind and solar power technologies. The health impacts associated with natural gas 
consumption and diesel fuel have a significant effect on reducing the cost of GHG emission 
reduction for the government. The analysis in this study shows that direct use of electricity and 
using surplus electricity to produce hydrogen are both important for reducing emissions as each 
of these methods has their unique advantages. The remaining question to be investigated in the 
future is what combination of these methods is optimum for reducing GHG emissions in Ontario 





5 Assessing the potential of surplus clean power in reducing GHG 
emissions; a game theory approach 
The following section is based on work, by Haghi, E., Shamsi, H., Dimitrov, S., Fowler, M., 
Raahemifar, K., accepted for publication in the International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, and 
work by Haghi et.al [130], published in IET Energy Systems Integration. Contribution of authors 
is detailed in the Statement of Contributions section.   
5.1 Assessing the potential of fuel cell-powered and battery-powered forklifts for 
reducing GHG emissions using clean surplus power 
The following section is based on work, by Haghi, E., Shamsi, H., Dimitrov, S., Fowler, M., 
Raahemifar, K., accepted for publication in the International Journal of Hydrogen Energy. 
5.1.1 Introduction  
5.1.1.1 Application of hydrogen for energy storage 
Hydrogen as an energy carrier can provide large-scale seasonal storage which makes it a 
noticeable storage medium for the introduction of renewable power generation technologies into 
energy systems [131].  Ehret and Bonhoff [132], stated that hydrogen production by renewable 
energy could be a primary contributor to Germany’s Energiewende for the transition to a 
renewable energy supply system. Analyzing the application of hydrogen in energy storage 
systems and comparing its effectiveness with other storage technologies such as batteries is an 
area of interest in the literature. Shamsi et al. [133], for instance, developed a model for 
minimizing the cost of emission reduction in an industrial facility using wind, solar, fuel cell, 
hydrogen storage, and battery technologies. Authors in [133] stated that a wind/fuel cell/hydrogen 
storage/battery hybrid system is more cost-effective in reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 
emissions compared to a wind-alone or solar-alone system. Colbertaldo et al. [134], developed a 
model for simulating power systems to assess the effectiveness of hydrogen in balancing supply 
and demand in systems with high penetration of renewable technologies. Authors in [134] 
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compared the cost-effectiveness of hydrogen and battery storage systems and concluded that 
hydrogen systems are more cost-effective storage technologies compared to batteries. Reviewing 
the research on comparison of energy storage technologies shows that each storage technology 
has unique characteristics which makes them suitable for different applications [135][136][137].   
5.1.1.2 Application of hydrogen in replacing fossil fuels in internal combustion engines 
An advantage of hydrogen energy storage systems is that stored electricity in the form of hydrogen 
can be used for replacing fossil fuel consumption in different applications. One of the most noted 
of these applications is replacing fossil fuels in internal combustion engines (ICEs). The 
application of hydrogen in fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) for replacing ICEs has been suggested as a 
promising pathway in reducing GHG emissions [138][139][140]. Paster et al. [141], even 
suggested that FCVs have the potential to be as cost-effective as gasoline vehicles. Liu et al. [138], 
assessed the impact of using FCVs on GHG emissions from road transport in China and suggested 
FCVs should be considered as a viable option alongside battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-
in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) for reducing GHG emissions in the transportation sector. An 
analysis by Michalski et al. [142], showed that a mix of BEVs and FCVs is the optimal solution 
for reducing GHG emissions in the transportations sector and both these technologies are effective 
when planning for future transportation systems. A significant increase in the number of hydrogen 
refueling stations and infrastructure in recent years has also been reported in the literature [143]. 
From their foresee review of hydrogen transportation systems, Tanç et al. [144], stated that the 
demand for hydrogen-based transportation technologies would increase in the 2030-2050 period 
due to continuous progress in cost decrease, efficiency improvement and the development of 
refueling infrastructure. 
Fuel cell-powered forklift is another technology by which fuel cells can replace ICEs in a Power-
to-Mobility framework [145][146]. Fuel cell-powered forklifts are recognized as the most 
successful application of hydrogen-based technologies in the transportation sector [147]. 
Distinguished by their powertrain, forklifts are divided into different categories including but not 
limited to: liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) forklifts, diesel forklifts, battery-powered forklifts, and 
fuel cell-powered forklifts. Diesel forklifts are a popular option among industries due to their 
specifications such as durability [93].  However, characteristics such as zero on-site emission and 
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low noise pollution have made battery-powered forklifts a popular choice [93]. Fuel cell-powered 
forklifts share these characteristics with battery-powered forklifts [94]. Lower refueling time 
(which leads to less idle time), constant power generation, and potential of fuel cell-powered 
forklifts for reducing GHG emissions are other advantages of fuel cell-powered forklifts 
[148][95][96]. The short refueling time not only reduces the need for energy storage but also 
decreases the labor cost associated with operating fuel cell-powered forklifts compared to other 
technologies [149].  
 Fuel cell-powered forklifts are more developed hydrogen-based technologies compared to 
hydrogen buses and trucks, and it is predicted that their market may grow significantly due to 
their advantages such as short refueling time [150]. Developing hydrogen forklift demonstration 
projects is considered as a measure for large-scale deployment of hydrogen infrastructure in 
Europe [151]. Demonstration and research projects focused on fuel cell-powered forklifts 
operation and technology have also been done in other countries such as Turkey and South Africa 
[152][153]. These advantages and prospects have attracted attention toward research on fuel cell-
powered forklifts in recent years and operation of fuel cell-powered forklifts have been studied in 
the literature from different aspects. Houf et al. [154], and Ekoto et al. [155], for instance, studied 
hydrogen release in a warehouse where fuel cell-powered forklifts are operated based on a safety 
point of view. Hosseinzadeh et al. [156], on the other hand, studied the operation of a fuel 
cell/battery hybrid forklift by analyzing different system configurations to find the most 
economical system for a hybrid forklift based. Analyzing fuel cell-powered forklifts from another 
aspect, Liso et al. [157], studied temperature variation in a fuel cell system used in a forklift. 
Domínguez et al. [158], studied the dynamic behavior of fuel cell-powered material handling and 
transportation fleet in a company in Madrid, Spain. The authors in [158] used TRNSYS to analyze 
the flow of energy and operation of energy conversion and storage technologies in the case study. 
Fuel cell-powered forklifts are also among promising hydrogen-based technologies that are 
studied in literature focused on the analysis of hydrogen-powered communities such as the work 
done in [159][160][161]. 
Despite all the research backing the advantages of fuel cell-powered technologies, assessing the 
profitability of such systems for end users is still a knowledge gap in the literature and the work 
done in this area is very limited. An analysis by Renquist et al. [99], for instance, showed that 
123 
 
depending on the type of facilities and workloads, fuel cell-powered and battery-powered forklifts 
can provide advantages and fuel cell-powered forklifts are suitable for applications with high 
workloads. Similar work, however, is rare in the literature. At the same time, while there is a 
consensus in the literature on the role of hydrogen in future energy systems, deployment of 
hydrogen energy systems and the potential of hydrogen in reducing GHG emissions in different 
energy sectors depend on multiple factors including hydrogen production method, hydrogen 
storage and fuel cell cost, and role of stakeholders in a hydrogen supply chain which have to be 
further investigated. Acar and Dincer [162], for instance, stated that the production of hydrogen 
from renewable sources is essential to the effectiveness of hydrogen as a clean fuel. Ren et al. 
[163] analyzed different hydrogen pathways against criteria such as availability, accessibility, 
affordability, and energy security. By comparing different hydrogen pathways, Ren et al. [163], 
stated that the hydrogen production method affects cost-effectiveness and energy security of a 
country.  Producing hydrogen via electrolysis using wind and solar power, for instance, is more 
preferable compared to nuclear-based hydrogen production and fuel-based hydrogen generation 
when evaluated against the considered criteria [163].  
5.1.1.3 Game theory and multi-stakeholder analysis of hydrogen energy systems 
As already stated, multi-stakeholder analysis and high cost are crucial factors in the development 
of hydrogen energy systems. Ren et al. [164], stated that the role of different stakeholders and 
decision-makers is a critical aspect for the development of a hydrogen supply chain. Providing 
tools for stakeholders to better understand and assess different aspects of a hydrogen supply chain 
system is then vital for the deployment of such systems [165]. However, the literature focused on 
assessing the role of different stakeholders and modeling their interaction in the hydrogen supply 
chain is limited [166], and includes mostly qualitative methods. In one study in this area, Ren et 
al. [167], developed a multi-stakeholder qualitative model for assessing the sustainability of 
hydrogen production via biomass-based technologies in their work. Criteria authors used in [167] 
included economic, environmental, technological and social-political aspects of hydrogen 
production.  
To fill the gap in this area, modeling the interaction of stakeholders active in an energy system 
and engaged in hydrogen energy projects is a necessity. Analyzing the interaction of stakeholders 
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for developing a hydrogen-based energy system can also help better address the higher cost of 
such systems compared to conventional systems. In that sense, game theory is a suitable modeling 
concept for addressing the challenge of modeling stakeholder interaction in an energy system. 
Game theory deals with the interaction of two or more decision-makers who act rationally while 
their actions affect each other [168]. Game theory has been used widely in three main areas of 
research in energy systems including electricity dispatch problems, demand-side management 
problems, and electric vehicle (EV) charging problems. In the electricity dispatch area, Kou and 
Park [169], developed a game theory model to analyze the interaction of microgrids and a utility 
for energy trading. The authors in [169], used a two-layer approach including a Nash game to 
formulate the non-cooperative interaction of microgrids and a Stackelberg game for determining 
the energy price by the utility and the microgrids. In the demand-side management area, 
Mohsenian-Rad et al. [170], developed a game theory formulation to model the interaction of 
users for energy scheduling to minimize the energy costs where energy consumers were the 
players in the game. In electric vehicle (EV) charging area, Wu et al. [171], developed a game 
theory model for analyzing the behavior of EVs in interaction with aggregator in providing 
frequency regulation service to the electricity grid. Aghajani and Kalantar [172], used game theory 
to model the interaction of electric utility and parking lot operator. The developed model in [172] 
was a cooperative game model in which the utility aimed at maximizing profit while the parking 
lot operator’s objective was minimizing cost. Zhao et al. [173], used Stackelberg game concept 
for modeling the interaction of an EV charging facility and EV owner with EV charging facility 
as the leader and EV owner as the follower.  
Application of game theory, however, has not been limited to the three mentioned areas. Game 
theory has been a popular concept in recent literature and has been used in different forms to 
address the challenges of energy systems. Budi and Hadi [174], for instance, used game theory 
for optimal generation expansion planning in deregulated markets. Chen et al. [175], used game 
theory to analyze the effect of government subsidies on the deployment of energy storage 
technologies in microgrids. Han et al. [176], used game theory for assessing the economic 
operation of wind/energy storage systems. Contreras-Ocaña et al. [177] developed a multi-
follower Stackelberg game model to analyze the interaction of energy storage operators and 
energy aggregator in an energy market. Michalski [178], used a Cournot game model to assess 
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the effect of hydrogen storage on the decisions made in the electricity market. Miralinaghi et al. 
[179], used a bi-level model for optimal location planning of hydrogen refueling stations.   
The review of literature in the application of game theory in energy system shows that while 
different forms of game theory has been used to address some challenges of energy systems such 
as EV charging and microgrid market participation, it has rarely been used in comparing the cost-
effectiveness of battery and hydrogen storage systems and has also not been used in analyzing the 
cost-effectiveness of fuel cell-powered and battery-powered forklifts.   
5.1.1.4 Ontario’s energy system 
In this study, we are using game theory in analyzing the effect of government policies on reducing 
CO2 emissions in Ontario using battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts. Province of 
Ontario, Canada is the case study of our assessment due to the noticeable share of industry and 
transportation sectors in GHG emissions in the province. Additionally, Ontario’s supply mix, as 
well as its supply and demand characteristics, show great potential for the deployment of hydrogen 
storage and fuel cell technologies [11][12][133]. As Figure 4-3 shows, more than 95% of 
Ontario’s electricity mix had a fossil-free source in 2017. 
Table 5-1 shows the electricity demand, supply, and surplus data in Ontario in 2017. As can be 
seen in Table 5-1, Ontario’s surplus power in 2017 was more than the transmission-connected 
power generated from wind, solar, and biofuel plants, combined.  
Table 5-1. Electricity demand, transmission-connected supply, and surplus data in Ontario in 2017 (data 
from [180]) 
Electricity data Quantity  (TWh) 
Total demand in 2017 132.1 
Electricity supplied by nuclear 90.6 
Electricity supplied by hydro 37.7 
Electricity supplied by oil/gas 5.9 
Electricity supplied by wind 9.2 
Electricity supplied by biofuel 0.4 
Electricity supplied by solar 0.5 




Market electricity price in Ontario is known as hourly Ontario electricity price (HOEP) which is 
determined by electricity market clearance. The cost of electricity for consumers in Ontario, 
however, is not limited to the HOEP.  Global adjustment (GA) is another component of the price 
that energy consumers have to pay and is charged to cover the cost of building new electricity 
infrastructure in the province, maintaining existing resources, as well as providing conservation 
and demand management programs [7]. Although the HOEP has generally decreased in recent 
years in Ontario, GA has increased significantly which has led to a noticeable increase in overall 
electricity price in the province. At the same time, a significant amount of power is curtailed in 
Ontario as shown in Table 5-1 or is exported at low prices. In that sense, developing energy 
storage technologies is recognized as an effective policy for reducing renewable power 
curtailment [181]. One of the ways government can encourage consumers in using electricity-
based technologies instead of fossil fuel-based technologies is totally exempting them from 
paying GA or in hours of a day when surplus power is available. This policy has been 
recommended in technical and policy literature. For instance, a report by the Ontario society of 
professional engineers suggested that surplus power should be made available for energy 
consumers at wholesale prices [182]. Additionally, a report by the Ontario chamber of commerce, 
also suggests that surplus power to become available to businesses at export or better than 
exported prices [183]. In this way, energy consumers can purchase power at lower prices in some 
hours which reduces the operation cost of electricity-based technologies for them. A lower 
renewable power curtailment will also reduce GA for energy consumers in Ontario. Additionally, 
the use of these technologies by energy consumers can lead to GHG emission reduction in Ontario.  
In this study, we are also analyzing whether battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts are 
cost-effectiveness technologies for reducing GHG emissions in Ontario. Another objective of this 
study is assessing if hydrogen and battery storage technologies can benefit all stakeholders in an 
energy system. There are two stakeholders in our model: government and energy consumer, which 
is assumed to be an industrial facility. The government can adopt policies that encourage the 
replacement of diesel forklifts with battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts by the energy 
consumer. This policy is considered to be in the form of surplus power made available to the 
energy consumer at a discounted price. The energy consumer is an industrial facility which uses 
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150 diesel forklifts in their warehouse. The energy consumer, however, may replace diesel 
forklifts with battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts if it leads to a lower cost.  
5.1.2 Methodology  
In this study, we are using game theory to assess the cost-effectiveness of battery-powered and 
fuel cell-powered forklifts in reducing GHG emissions in Ontario.  We are considering two 
stakeholders in our model: the government and the energy consumer, which interact with each 
other in the energy system. Figure 5-1 shows the system configuration for the energy consumer. 
 
Figure 5-1. The system configuration of the energy consumer 
The energy consumer has the options of purchasing electricity from the grid to operate battery-
powered forklifts or fuel cell-powered forklifts (to store power in a battery or to produce hydrogen 
via electrolysis) and using diesel forklifts or a combination of these technologies. The policy the 
government can pursue is allowing energy consumer to purchase a percentage of Ontario’s surplus 
power at a discounted price which does not include the global adjustment (GA). In other words, 
the government makes the power available to the energy consumer at the hourly Ontario 
electricity price (HOEP). In this approach, the government pays two cents per kWh of surplus 
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power the energy consumer purchases to electricity utility companies for covering transmission 
and distribution cost of the power purchased by the energy consumer. The government has an 
incentive to adopt this policy as replacement of diesel forklifts with battery-powered and fuel cell-
powered forklifts reduces GHG emissions in Ontario which is beneficial to the government as it 
reduces the social cost of carbon (SCC). The social cost of carbon is used for monetizing the 
economic cost of a tonne of CO2e emitted to the atmosphere [184]. Effects of an additional tonne 
of CO2 emission on different factors including but not limited to agricultural efficiency, floods, 
human health, ecosystem, and forests are summed up to monetize the SCC [185].  
Although calculating SCC bears uncertainty due to the different effects of carbon emissions on 
human health, agricultural lands, water resources, and coastal zones over an extended period, it is 
a valuable indicator which can be used by governments and policy-makers to assess the cost-
efficiency of their GHG emission reduction programs [185].  Environment and Climate Change 
Canada has published a document reporting the SCC for Canada which can be found in [186]. In 
this study, SCC is used in the government’s objective as a criterion for assessing the cost-
efficiency of government’s GHG emission reduction policy. 
5.1.2.1 Model description 
As already stated, there are two players (stakeholders) interacting with each other in the model: 
the government and the energy consumer. The government’s decision variable is the amount of 
Ontario’s surplus power it makes available to the energy consumer at the hourly Ontario 
electricity price (HOEP), and the energy consumer’s decision variables are the number of diesel 
forklifts, battery-powered forklifts, and fuel cell-powered forklifts it operates. Figure 5-2 shows 








Figure 5-2. Interaction of the government and the energy consumer 
As can be seen in Figure 5-2, the government makes a percentage of Ontario’s surplus power 
available to the energy consumer at HOEP to encourage the deployment of alternative forklift 
technologies. The energy consumer can take advantage of low electricity price that is allocated to 
them at HOEP to store it in batteries or produce hydrogen and store in hydrogen storage tanks. 
Stored electricity in batteries or hydrogen in hydrogen storage tank can be used later for operating 
forklifts when electricity prices are higher. The energy consumer has to pay both HOEP and global 
adjustment (GA) in other hours of a year when power is not discounted. If diesel forklifts are 
replaced with battery-powered or fuel cell-powered forklifts, carbon emissions of the industrial 
facility will reduce which leads to a subsequent decrease in the social cost of carbon for the 
government. 
The government is the leader in this game which moves first and decides about the amount of 
discounted power that will be made available to the energy consumer at HOEP to minimize its 
objective function. Knowing the decision of the leader, the energy consumer (the follower) then 
makes its decision of what type of forklifts to operate in order to minimize its objective function. 
A bilevel formulation is used in this study to analyze the problem as shown in Equations 5-1 to 5-4.  
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3) 5-1 
 





𝑥 = 0.2𝑎 + 0.3𝑏 + 0.4𝑐 + 0.5𝑑 + 0.6𝑒 + 0.7𝑓 + 0.8𝑔 
𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐 + 𝑑 + 𝑒 + 𝑓 + 𝑔 = 1 
5-3 
 
  𝑦1 + 𝑦2 + 𝑦3 = 150 5-4 
 
In Equation 5-1 and Equation 5-2, 𝑓 and 𝑧 show the objective functions of the government and 
the energy consumer as defined in Equation 5-5 and Equation 5-6, respectively. Equation 5-3 and 
Equation 5-4 represent the set of constraints for the optimization problem. The government’s 
optimization problem is constrained by the value of 𝑥 the government can choose. Equation 5-3 
shows that the government can only choose one of the values of 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, and 
0.8 for 𝑥.  In Equation 5-4, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, and 𝑦3 are the energy consumer’s decision variables and show 
the number of battery-powered forklifts, fuel cell-powered forklifts, and diesel forklifts the energy 
consumer chooses to operate, respectively. The energy consumer has the constraint of operating 
150 forklifts all the time as shown in Equation 5-4. 
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑥 × (𝑂𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜′𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟) × (𝑇𝐷𝐶) − 𝛼 × 𝑒(𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3) 5-5 
 
𝑧(𝑥, 𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3) = 𝑦1 × (𝐴𝐶𝐿1 + 𝐶𝑅𝐼 + 𝐿𝐶1 + 𝐶𝐼𝑊𝑆1 +  𝐹𝐿𝑀𝐶1 + 𝐵𝑀𝐶 +
𝐸𝐶)+   𝑦2 × (𝐴𝐶𝐿2 + 𝐶𝐹𝐼2 + 𝐿𝐶2 + 𝐶𝐼𝑊𝑆2 + 𝐹𝐿𝑀𝐶2 + 𝐹𝐶𝑀𝐶 +




In Equation 5-5, 𝑥 is the percentage of Ontario’s surplus power at each hour that is made available 
to the energy consumer at HOEP by the government, 𝑇𝐷𝐶 is the amount of charges paid by the 
government to cover transmission and distribution charges of discounted power in CAD per kWh 
(assumed to be two cents per kWh in our model), 𝛼 is the social cost of carbon in CAD per tonne 
of CO2, and 𝑒 is the emission reduction in tonnes of CO2. In the optimization formulation shown 
in Equation 5-1 to Equation 5-6, the percentage of Ontario’s surplus power allocated to the energy 
consumer at the discounted rate (HOEP) is an endogenous parameter of the problem and will be 
determined when the optimization problem is solved. Amount of emission reduction (𝑒) is a 
function of the number of battery-powered, fuel cell-powered, and diesel forklifts the energy 
consumer uses and is calculated based on the mix of forklifts the energy consumer operates.  
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 In Equation 5-6, 𝑧 is the objective function of the energy consumer defined as the annualized cost 
of the industrial facility for operating the forklifts in CAD, 𝐴𝐶𝐿 is the amortized cost of lift in 
CAD per forklift per year, 𝐶𝑅𝐼 is the cost of recharging infrastructure of battery-powered forklifts 
in CAD per forklift per year, 𝐶𝐹𝐼 is the cost of fueling infrastructure for fuel cell-powered and 
diesel forklifts in CAD per forklift per year, 𝐿𝐶 is the labor cost for battery-powered, fuel cell-
powered, and diesel forklifts per forklift per year,  𝐶𝐼𝑊𝑆 is the cost of infrastructure warehouse 
space for battery-powered, fuel cell-powered and diesel forklifts in CAD per forklift per year, 
𝐹𝐿𝑀𝐶 is forklift maintenance cost for battery-powered, fuel cell-powered and diesel forklifts in 
CAD per forklift per year, 𝐵𝑀𝐶 is battery maintenance cost for battery-powered forklifts in CAD 
per forklift per year, 𝐹𝐶𝑀𝐶 is fuel cell maintenance cost for fuel cell-powered forklifts in CAD 
per forklift per year, 𝐸𝐶  is electricity cost for charging battery-powered forklift in CAD per 
forklift per year, 𝐻𝐶 is hydrogen cost for refueling fuel cell-powered forklift in CAD per forklift 
per year, and 𝐷𝐶 is diesel cost for refueling diesel forklift in CAD per forklift per year. The 
assumed values for the parameters in Equation 5-6 are reported in Table 5-2. 
𝐸𝐶 used in the formulation for the battery-powered forklift is the sum of electricity purchase cost 
at both discounted and not discounted hours. 𝐻𝐶 for fuel cell-powered forklift includes the cost 
of electricity purchased for producing hydrogen, annualized electrolyzer cost, annualized 
hydrogen storage tank cost, and annualized compressor cost. The optimum size of the electrolyzer, 
hydrogen storage tank, compressor, and batteries the energy consumer uses are determined by 
solving the energy consumer’s optimization problem. However, the optimum sizes of those 
technologies are not reported in this study as the results section is focused on the number for 
forklifts the energy consumer operates. Cost assumptions for electrolyzer, hydrogen storage tank, 
compressor, and battery technologies are reported in Table 5-3. 
Figure 5-3 shows the algorithm used in this study for finding the Nash equilibrium in the game 
theory problem. Nash equilibrium is a state in a game where none of the players (stakeholders) 
has an incentive to deviate from. The critical point in this game is that the government has to pay 
two cents per kWh for covering transmission and distribution charges of discounted power 
allocated to the energy consumer. In the Nash equilibrium state in this game, the government will 
allocate the optimum amount of surplus power at HOEP to the energy consumer. With a lower 
amount of discounted power, the energy consumer will not reduce emissions at the government’s 
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desired level while with a higher amount, the government has to pay more transmission and 
distribution charges that it gains from reduced emissions. As the equilibrium state, the energy 
consumer will also operate a mix of forklifts that has the lowest cost considering the amount of 
discounted power they are allowed to purchase. As can be seen in Figure 5-4, the algorithm starts 
with 𝑖 = 1 representing the lowest 𝑥 value the leader (the government) can allocate to the energy 
consumer. 𝑓𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 (the minimum value for the leader’s objective function) is considered to be “big 
M” which represents a large positive number at the beginning of the algorithm. The follower’s 
objective function for each i  (𝑧𝑖 ) is minimized knowing the value of 𝑥  (the government’s 
decision variable). After solving the follower’s problem, the government’s objective function (𝑓𝑖) 
is calculated. 𝑓𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 is updated if a lower value for government’s objective function is found. The 
algorithm ends when all the possible values of 𝑥 have been used for calculating the government’s 
objective function. The index 𝑛 represents the highest value of 𝑥 the government can take.  
In the algorithm shown in Figure 5-3, 𝑥 (the percentage of surplus power that is allocated to 






Figure 5-3. Algorithm for solving the game theory model 
 
Mixed Integer Program (MIP) solver in General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) is used for 
solving the optimization problem. MIP was used in this study as the number of battery-powered, 
fuel cell-powered, and diesel forklifts are integer values.  
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5.1.2.2 Model inputs 
In this section, input data to the model including different forklift characteristics, fuel cost, and 
electricity and hydrogen storage technology characteristics are presented. Table 5-2 shows the 
cost of fuel cell-powered, battery-powered, and diesel forklift used in the model and used in 
Equation 5-6. 
Table 5-2. Assumed fuel cell-powered, and battery-powered and diesel forklift associated costs (All values 
2011 USD except stated otherwise) [187] 





Amortized cost of lift 
(𝐴𝐶𝐿) in 2011 USD 
per forklift per year 
2800 2800 Not applicable as the 
energy consumer has 
already paid for the 
diesel forklifts 
Cost of fuel/recharge 
infrastructure 
(𝐶𝑅𝐼, 𝐶𝐹𝐼) 
in 2011 USD per 
forklift per year 
3700 1400 Assumed to be 2000 
CAD per lift. 
Labor cost (𝐿𝐶) for 
battery charging/H2 
refueling in 2011 
USD per forklift per 
year 
800 4400 800 (Same as the cost for 
fuel cell-powered 
forklifts) 
Cost of infrastructure 
warehouse space 
(𝐶𝐼𝑊𝑆) in 2011 USD 
per forklift per year 





(𝐹𝐿𝑀𝐶) in 2011 USD 
per forklift per year 







cost )𝐵𝑀𝐶, 𝐹𝐶𝑀𝐶) in 
2011 USD per forklift 
per year 
2200 3600 Not applicable 
 
One kg of hydrogen is assumed to be used to power a fuel cell-powered forklift for every 15 kWh 
of power to battery-powered forklift wheels. 15 kWh to the wheels is equivalent to 24 kWh of 
electricity from the wall for powering a battery-powered forklift [115]. Another assumption is 
that 0.16 gallon of diesel is needed to operate a diesel forklift for every kWh of electricity 
delivered to a battery-powered forklift [115]. The power consumption rate of battery-powered 
forklift is assumed to be 2.85 kW per hour [113]. The battery charge rate is from values reported 
in [113]. The total purchased electricity from the industrial facility equals the sum of power 
purchased for producing hydrogen and the power purchased for charging battery-powered 
forklifts’ batteries. HOEP values for the year 2017 is taken from [188], and GA is assumed to be 
10 cents per kWh.  
Table 5-3 shows the assumed cost of the electrolyzer, compressor, hydrogen storage tank, and 
battery technologies considered in this study. All values are in 2017 CAD. 
Table 5-3. Assumed cost of electrolyzer, compressor, and hydrogen storage tank technologies 
Technology Capital cost (2017 CAD) Annual O&M cost 
Alkaline 
Electrolyzer  
1076 (CAD per kW) [70] Assumed to be 4% of the capital 
cost (CAD per kW per year) 
Electrolyzer stack 
replacement 









Assumed to be 4% of the capital 
cost (CAD per year) 
Hydrogen storage 
tank 
1200 CAD per kg of H2 [71] Assumed to be 4% of the capital 
cost (CAD per kg of H2 per year) 
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Battery  723 (CAD per kWh) [112] Assumed to be 1% of capital 
cost (CA per kWh per year) 
 
Diesel price is assumed to be 1.075 CAD per liter in this study based on values taken from [116]. 
CO2 emission from diesel combustion is assumed to be 10.18 kg of CO2 per gallon of diesel [122].   
5.1.3 Results and discussion 
In this section of the study, the results of the game theory optimization model are presented. 
Table 5-4 shows the results of the optimization problem for the different social cost of carbon 
(SCC) values. The government’s and energy consumer’s objective function, the value of 𝑥, and 
the number of diesel, battery-powered, and fuel cell-powered forklifts energy consumer operates 
are reported in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4. Optimization results for different SCCs 































0 0 0 3,857,724 0 0 150 
10 0 0 3,857,724 0 0 150 
20 -3,396 0.1 3,842,398 31 0 119 
30 -46,208 0.6 3,752,954 91 54 5 
40 -105,661 0.6 3,752,954 91 54 5 
50 -165,114 0.6 3,752,954 91 54 5 
60 -224,567 0.6 3,752,954 91 54 5 
70 -284,020 0.6 3,752,954 91 54 5 
80 -343,473 0.6 3,752,954 91 54 5 
90 -402,926 0.6 3,752,954 91 54 5 
100 -462,379 0.6 3,752,954 91 54 5 
110 -522,358 0.7 3,736,715 68 82 0 
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120 -583,861 0.7 3,736,715 68 82 0 
130 -645,364 0.7 3,736,715 68 82 0 
140 -706,867 0.7 3,736,715 68 82 0 
150 -768,370 0.7 3,736,715 68 82 0 
 
As can be seen in Table 5-4, the government’s objective function has a value of zero for SCC of 
zero and 10 CAD per tonne of CO2. The Nash equilibrium state for games with those SCC values 
is where the government allocates no discounted power to the energy consumer, and the energy 
consumer does not reduce emissions and keeps using its 150 diesel forklifts. SCC value of lower 
than 10 CAD per tonne of CO2 is not high enough for the government incentivize them to pay 
two cents per kWh for discounted power that is used by the energy consumer to reduce CO2 
emissions. Without the discounted power, the energy consumer is also not willing to invest in 
replacing diesel forklifts with battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts. As already stated, 
neither of the players have an incentive to change their current action at the Nash equilibrium 
point. However, when the SCC increases to 20 CAD per tonne of CO2, the government will 
change action and allocates discounted power to the energy consumer. In other words, the benefit 
of reducing CO2 emissions for the government is high enough to encourage discounting power 
for the energy consumer and paying two cents per kWh of discounted power the energy consumer 
uses. For a SCC value of 20 CAD per tonne of CO2, the government provides 0.1% of Ontario’s 
surplus power at each hour to the energy consumer at HOEP. Being able to buy power at this 
price, the energy consumer replaces 31 diesel forklifts with battery-powered forklifts.  
When SCC value is increased to 30 CAD per tonne of CO2, the optimum value of 𝑥 increases to 
0.6 for the government. However, the optimum value of 𝑥 for the government remains constant 
for SCC values of 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100 CAD per tonne of CO2. When the percentage of 
discounted surplus power is 0.6% of Ontario’s surplus power at each hour, the energy consumer 
replaces 91 diesel forklifts with battery-powered forklifts and 54 diesel forklifts with fuel cell-
powered forklifts. As the value of SCC increases to 110 CAD per tonne of CO2, the optimum 
value of 𝑥 for the government increases to 0.7 and remains the same for SCC values of 110, 120, 
130, 140, and 150 CAD per tonne of CO2. For SCC values of 110, 120, 130, 140, and 150 CAD 
per tonne of CO2, the energy consumer is able to purchase 0.7% of Ontario’s surplus power at 
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each hour at HOEP, the energy consumer replaces 68 of its diesel forklifts with battery-powered 
forklifts and 82 of its diesel forklifts with fuel cell-powered forklifts. 
Figure 5-4 shows the sensitivity of the number of diesel forklifts, battery-powered forklifts, and 
fuel cell-powered forklifts the energy consumer operates with respect to different SCC values. As 
can be seen in Figure 5-4, at lower levels of SCC for the government (which leads to lower levels 
of subsidized power for the energy consumer), battery-powered forklifts are a more cost-effective 
option.  However, with an increase in the value of 𝑥, fuel cell-powered forklifts become a more 
cost-effective option and the energy consumer will operate more fuel cell-powered forklifts 
compared to battery-powered forklifts for SCC of higher or equal to 100 CAD per tonne of CO2.  
 
Figure 5-4. The sensitivity of the number of diesel forklifts, battery-powered forklifts, and fuel cell-
powered forklifts to different SCC values 
Battery-powered forklifts have an advantage over fuel cell-powered forklifts in lower levels of 
subsidized power due to their lower cost of charging infrastructure. While a battery-powered 
forklift only needs a battery and a charger to operate, a fuel cell-powered forklift requires 
electrolyzer, compressor, storage tank, and refueling infrastructure for refueling. Low levels of 
available subsidized power do not justify the investment in such infrastructure. As a result, the 






















SCC (2017 CAD per tonne of CO2)
Number of diesel forklifts Number of battery powered forklifts Number of fuel cell forklifts
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However, with an increase in the levels of SCC for the government (which leads to higher levels 
of discounted power for the energy consumer), fuel cell-powered forklifts gain an advantage over 
battery-powered forklifts. There are two reasons behind this advantage: the lower operating cost 
of fuel cell-powered forklifts, and the fluctuation in available surplus power in Ontario. As 
Table 5-2 shows, the operating cost of fuel cell-powered forklifts is lower than that of battery-
powered forklifts. Fuel cell-powered forklifts are more expensive to purchase; however, the 
higher purchase cost is spread over the lifetime of the forklift. The annualized cost of purchasing 
and operating fuel cell-powered forklifts are, then, lower than battery-powered forklifts if the cost 
of electricity/hydrogen is not taken into account. The other reason for the preference of fuel cell-
powered forklifts over battery-powered forklifts by the energy consumer is the variations in 
surplus power available in Ontario. Table 4-37 shows the average electricity generation minus 
average demand in different hours and months in Ontario. As can be seen in Table 4-37, there is 
an electricity surplus in all hours and months in a year in Ontario. On-peak, mid-peak, and off-
peak hours in Ontario are shown in Table 4-9. Figure 4-31 shows surplus electricity in different 
hours in Ontario in 2017.  
As Table 4-37 and Figure 4-31 show, surplus power in July, August, September, and October is 
significantly lower than other months of the year while surplus power is higher in April and 
December than other months of the year. The difference in surplus power in different months in 
Ontario is caused by demand variation and also the variability of intermittent power generation in 
the province. Fluctuation in surplus power and the assumption in our model that only a specific 
parentage of surplus power is allocated to energy consumer at each hour, make energy storage a 
necessary element of the system. In other words, the energy consumer has to invest in some energy 
storage capacity (whether it is battery or hydrogen) to be able to operate battery-powered and fuel 
cell-powered forklifts. However, the same amount of surplus power is not available in all months, 
and also, the electricity price is different in a year. As a result, the energy consumer has to invest 
in seasonal storage to be able to store power in periods with low electricity prices and use it when 
power is expensive. Lower cost of hydrogen storage compared to battery storage then gives fuel 




Comparing costs and operating characteristics of battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts 
shows that when low-cost clean power is available at all times, deploying battery-based 
technologies is a more cost-effective measure that deploying hydrogen-based technologies. 
However, when the amount of available low-cost power fluctuates during the year and seasonal 
storage is needed, hydrogen-based technologies (fuel cell-powered forklifts in this study) become 
a more cost-effective option compared to battery-powered technologies due to their lower 
operation and maintenance cost as well as lower hydrogen storage cost compared to battery 
storage cost. Our analysis shows that replacing diesel forklifts with battery-powered and fuel cell-
powered forklifts can be beneficial for both the government and the energy consumer stakeholders 
in the energy system. Battery-powered forklifts and fuel cell-forklifts were both found to be cost-
effective technologies for reducing GHG emissions in Ontario when low-cost surplus power is 
available for their operation. Replacement of diesel forklifts with battery-powered and fuel cell-
powered forklifts is also beneficial for the government as it reduces GHG emissions and 
subsequently, the social cost of carbon (SCC). 
5.1.4 Conclusion 
In this study, a game theory model is developed to analyze the interaction of government and an 
industrial facility (energy consumer) for reducing CO2 emissions in Ontario by replacing diesel 
forklifts with battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts. The objective function of the 
government is defined as the transmission and distribution charge paid for the surplus power made 
available to energy consumer at discounted price minus avoided social cost of carbon in the case 
of CO2 emission reduction by the energy consumer. The objective function of the energy 
consumer is the annualized cost of operating 150 forklifts. The government’s decision variable in 
our model is the percentage of Ontario’s surplus power that is made available to the energy 
consumer at a discounted price. The government, however, pays two cents per kWh of the energy 
that is provided to energy consumer at HOEP to cover transmission and distribution costs. The 
energy consumer (industrial facility) has to operate 150 forklifts (all diesel forklifts in the base 
case) and has the option to replace them with battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts if it 
leads to a lower cost for it.  
141 
 
The results of the model developed in this study show that in the equilibrium point, the value of 
𝑥 is equal to zero for SCC equal to or less than 10 CAD per tonne of CO2. When the value of SCC 
increases to 20 CAD per tonne of CO2, the value of 𝑥 increases to 0.1, meaning the government 
allocates 0.1% of Ontario’s surplus power at each hour to the energy consumer at HOEP and the 
energy consumer replaces 31 of diesel forklifts with battery-powered forklifts. When SCC value 
is increased to 30 CAD per tonne of CO2, the optimum value of 𝑥 increases to 0.6 and remains 
the same for SCC values of 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100 CAD per tonne of CO2. When the 
percentage of subsidized surplus power is 0.6% at each hour, the energy consumer replaces 91 
and 54 of diesel forklifts with battery-powered forklifts and fuel cell-powered forklifts, 
respectively. As the value of SCC increases to 110 CAD per tonne of CO2, the optimum value of 
𝑥 for the government increases to 0.7. For SCC values of 110, 120, 130, 140, and 150 CAD per 
tonne of CO2, the energy consumer replaces 68 and 82 of diesel forklifts with battery-powered 
and fuel cell-powered forklifts, respectively. 
The analysis in this study also shows that battery-powered forklifts are more cost-effective 
compared to fuel cell-powered forklifts when lower levels of discounted power are available. 
However, with an increase in SCC and discounted power available, fuel cell-powered forklifts 
become more cost-effective. The advantage of fuel cell-powered forklifts over battery-powered 
forklifts in higher levels of available discounted power is due to lower operation and maintenance 
cost of fuel cell-forklifts compared to battery-powered forklifts and lower seasonal storage cost 
of hydrogen compared to batteries. The results of the modeling in this study, however, show that 
battery-based and hydrogen-based technologies are both effective in reducing GHG emissions in 
Ontario when surplus renewable power is available. In that sense, battery and hydrogen 
technologies can act as complementary rather than competing technologies for reducing GHG 





5.2 Assessing the potential of surplus clean power in reducing GHG emissions in the 
building sector using game theory; a case study of Ontario, Canada 
Using the same methodology previously discussed in the section of the thesis, this work assesses 
the potential of surplus electricity in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the building 
sector. The assessment is done by modelling the interaction of government and energy consumer 
using game theory. The government can provide discounted power to energy consumer by 
covering a fraction of the off-peak price to encourage the replacement of natural gas consumption 
with electricity. This replacement reduces GHG emissions from the building sector. Energy 
consumer adopts electricity-based technologies only if it leads to a lower heat and electricity 
supply cost. Cost-effectiveness of solid oxide fuel cell, air–source heat pump (ASHP), and battery 
and hydrogen storage are assessed as alternatives to natural gas combined heat and power (CHP) 
and boiler technologies. The modelling results show that ASHP is the only technology that can 
compete with natural gas CHP and boiler. ASHP is chosen by the energy consumer when 
discounts of 4.5 cents per kWh or more for off-peak electricity are available. The analysis also 
showed that CHP could be completely replaced by grid power at discount value of 4.5 cents per 
kWh and up. Natural gas boilers continue playing a role in building heating supply even under 












6 An iterative approach for optimal decarbonization of electricity 
and heat supply systems 
The following section is based on work, by Haghi, E., Qadrdan, M., Wu, J., Jenkins, N., Fowler, 
M., Raahemifar, K., and is currently under review at the Energy journal. Contribution of authors 
is detailed in the Statement of Contributions section.   
6.1 Introduction  
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission reduction has become a major worldwide challenge in recent 
years. Many governments all over the world have introduced programs and set targets to reduce 
GHG emissions from different energy systems. The United Kingdom (UK) government, for 
instance, is committed to at least 80% GHG emission reduction in 2050 compared to 1990 levels 
[189].  
6.1.1 Energy consumption and GHG emission from the heating sector 
The building sector accounted for 28% of global energy-related CO2 emissions in 2018 [190]. 
Domestic buildings with 14% of GHG emissions in 2016 is among the top four contributing 
sectors to the UK GHG emissions [191].  In 2017, the domestic sector accounted for 28% of final 
energy consumption in the UK [192] from which two-third was supplied by natural gas, primarily 
for heating [193]. The significant contribution of the domestic sector to GHG emission and fossil 
fuel consumption in the UK has made heat electrification an issue of interest in both research and 
government policies. Electrifying the residential heating systems and replacing natural gas-based 
heating technologies with electricity-based technologies is recognized as one of the most common 
strategies suggested for reducing GHG emissions in the residential sector in the UK 
[194][195][196][197].  
6.1.2 Decarbonizing the heat sector 
Assessing the potential of using low-carbon technologies in the domestic sector has been analyzed 
widely in the literature for different case studies in different countries. Modeling tools were 
developed for investigating the most cost-effective energy efficiency measures and mix of 
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technologies for supplying heat demand for case studies at different scales from a single building 
to a country. 
Literature focused on small scale and single building applications usually aim at assessing 
technologies (including electricity and heat generation, and storage technologies) and systems that 
are useful in reducing energy consumption and GHG emission for a building. Lindberg et al. [198], 
for instance, developed a model for optimal design and operation of technologies for a zero energy 
building. The developed model in [198], was used to minimize the cost of energy supply for a 
case study of a school building where different technologies including boilers, combined heat and 
power (CHP), PV, solar thermal collector, heat storage, air-source heat pump (ASHP), and 
ground-source heat pump (GSHP) were considered. Using the developed model, authors were 
able to analyze how policy incentives affect technology selection by end users.  
Developing optimization models for finding the most cost-effective combination of technologies 
and systems for supplying heat and electricity demand at a national or regional scale has also been 
an area of interest in the literature. Fehrenbach et al. [199], used TIMES (The Integrated 
MARKAL-EFOM System) modeling framework for system-wide optimization of residential heat 
and electricity supply in Germany. Authors in [199] considered both heat and electricity supply 
and demands as well as the transport sector. The objective function considered in [199] is 
minimizing total discounted system expenditures. Hedegaard and Balyk [200], proposed a 
mathematical model for finding the optimal investment and operation of energy systems 
considering residential heat for a case study of the Danish energy system in 2030 with 60% wind 
power penetration. The proposed model in [200] included heat and electricity supply technologies 
as well as storage technologies and electricity transmission. The objective of the proposed model 
in [200] was minimizing the total cost of the system in a year, and it was used to analyze the 
benefit of the flexible operation of heat pumps. Henning and Palzer [201], proposed a 
mathematical model to investigate the optimal mix of electricity and heat supply technologies in 
Germany. Kiviluoma and Meibom [202], used an expansion planning model for minimizing the 
total cost of the energy system (including investment cost, operation and maintenance cost, and 
fuel cost of energy conversion technologies) for supplying electricity and heat demand in Finland. 
The proposed model in [202] was used to investigate the effect of wind power penetration, electric 
vehicles, and heat storage technologies on power system investments. Jalil-Vega and Hawkes 
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[203], developed an optimization model for assessing the role of hydrogen in decarbonizing the 
energy system in the UK from 2015 to 2050. An optimization problem was developed in [203] to 
find the optimum investment decisions (including size, type, and location of energy conversion 
technologies) and operation of the system for supplying heat and electricity demand with 
minimum cost. Zhang et al. [204], developed a mathematical model for minimizing total energy 
system cost, including investment and operation cost of technologies for supplying heat and 
electricity demands. Authors in [204], used heat and electricity demands as inputs to the model to 
find the optimum capacity mix and operation of electricity and heat generation technologies that 
can be used to supply demand at the lowest cost in a case study of the UK. Heinen et al. [205], 
proposed an optimization model to find the optimal capacity and dispatch of electricity generation, 
heat supply, and thermal storage technologies in the Republic of Ireland as their case study. 
Authors in [205], used a capacity expansion planning methodology with the objection function of 
minimizing total system cost in their work. Leibowicz et al. [206], developed an optimization 
model to find the most cost-effective method of reducing GHG emissions in the residential sector 
for a case study of buildings sector of Austin, Texas, USA. Authors in [206], considered using 
less carbon-intensive fuels, using more energy-efficient and electrical appliances, and increasing 
thermal performance of buildings as viable options. Results of the modeling by authors in [206] 
showed that electrifying end use appliances and decarbonizing electricity supply are the most 
cost-effective pathway for the case study of Austin, Texas. Ehrlich et al. [207], proposed an 
optimization model for assessing the potential of power-to-heat for providing flexibility for the 
German electricity system. Authors in [207], first used a stochastic model to estimate electricity 
prices in 2020. Electricity prices were then used as input to the optimization model in which heat 
supply cost for a household was the objective function during 2020. 
 National and regional heat and electricity supply models, give an understanding of the nation-
wide effect of decarbonization policies in both electricity and heat supply sectors and include 
some supply chain constraints which are applicable at a large scale only. Heat electrification and 
decarbonization, however, has many aspects that require detailed investigation but are not 
adequately discussed in the related literature yet. One of these aspects is the increased electricity 
demand due to heat electrification. Replacing the consumption of natural gas with electricity for 
heating applications in the residential sector will increase electricity demand. This increase is 
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estimated to be as high as 25% of the daily demand in days of high demand with electrifying only 
30% of the heating demand with heat pumps in the UK [208]. Using resistive heating may double 
daily electricity demand in winter days with high heating requirements [208]. Cooper et al. [209], 
calculated the effect of heat electrification on the UK’s peak electricity demand in different 
scenarios. Analysis by Cooper et al. [209], also showed that peak demand in the UK might 
increase up to 100% if the heat pump is used in 80% of UK dwellings.  Supplying this increased 
electricity demand caused by heat electrification requires planning and consideration.   
Additionally, the source of electricity used for heating is a crucial point to consider when assessing 
the potential of heat electrification in reducing GHG emissions. Using wind power for heating 
homes achieves more GHG emission reduction compared to electrifying heating with power 
generated in a natural gas power plant. Gas and electricity supply systems also have different 
variability and uncertainty characteristics. Due to the use of natural gas for heating applications, 
natural gas demand has a more significant variability compared to energy demand in a year in 
Great Britain (GB) when compared based on energy values [208]. Electrifying heat will transfer 
the variability of natural gas demand to electricity demand at least to some extent [208]. As a 
result, it is crucial to develop electricity supply and demand models that enable us to capture that 
variability.  
6.1.3 Analyzing the UK’s decarbonization pathways 
As already stated, heat decarbonization in the UK is an area of interest for both academics and 
policymakers. The interaction of gas and electricity networks in the UK and Great Britain have 
been investigated in the literature from different aspects. Clegg and Mancarella [210] for instance, 
developed an integrated gas and electricity model to investigate the effect of heat supply scenarios 
on the operation and performance gas and electricity networks in the Great Britain. Li and 
Trutnevyte [211], analyzed the UK electricity sector transition pathways for 2050. The method 
authors in [211] used was linking the results of a whole energy economy model with a cost-
optimization electricity generation planning model. The authors in [211], generated 800 different 
pathways to include the uncertainties in the electricity generation planning. The results of 
pathways produced in [211] showed that electricity generation planning under emission reduction 
limits leads to a higher generation capacity compared to no climate policy scenarios. Quiggin and 
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Buswell [194], proposed a model for calculating electricity supply deficit in the UK when heat 
electrification policies are pursued using hourly supply and demand data, The author’s modeling 
presented in [194] showed the importance of hourly modeling of the energy system and the 
significant effect of heat electrification on electricity supply planning. Clegg and Mancarella 
[212], developed an integrated gas and electricity network to assess the impact of heat 
decarbonization on gas and electricity transmission systems in Great Britain. The author’s goal in 
[212] was to develop a model that helps in assessing the infrastructure update requirements under 
a heat decarbonization policy. Different pathways for 2050 UK’s energy system show different 
shares for heating and electricity generation technologies [213]. At the same time, decarbonizing 
the electricity sector is recognized as one of the uncertainties in heat decarbonization in the UK 
[195]. In that sense, developing a framework that helps in identifying the most cost-effective 
pathways for decarbonizing heat, assessing the effect of policies such as carbon pricing on 
decarbonization, and analyzing the impact of this decarbonization on the electricity sector is 
essential. 
A literature review of the works done on heat decarbonization at local and regional/national scales 
in the UK and other countries shows that the proposed models are aimed at minimizing total 
system cost to determine the size and type of heat and electricity supply technologies. The gap in 
the literature is considering the role of different stakeholders in the energy system. Research works 
focusing on multi-stakeholder modeling of heat and electricity sectors to assess the effect of 
changes made in each of these sectors by rational decision-makers on the other sector are limited. 
Bauermann et al. [214], presented a coupled model for heat system choice and electricity markets. 
Authors in [214] used different scenarios distinguished by criteria such as renewable energy 
penetration and CO2 emission target to analyze the effect of heating equipment selection by 
homeowners on electricity supply cost. Technology selection on the supply side and finding the 
optimum mix of electricity generation technologies was not discussed in [214], and the results 
presented were focused on heat supply technologies only. In that sense, this study aims at 
developing a planning model for heat and electricity systems considering their hourly operations. 
The hourly time resolution of the model helps capture the variation in both supply (renewable 
energy generation) and demand (heat and electricity). The electricity system problem is solved at 
the higher level with the objective function of minimizing the cost of electricity supply. Decision 
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variables in the electricity system problem are the size and type of electricity generation 
technologies. The heat system problem is at the lower level with the objective of minimizing the 
cost of heat supply. Decision variables of the heat system problem are the share of heating 
technologies for supplying the heat demand.  
An iterative solution algorithm is used in this study for solving the optimization problem. Iterative 
solutions have been shown to be useful in solving equilibrium problems. Chu et al. [215], for 
instance, used an iterative method for solving a planning (higher level) and scheduling (lower 
level) problem. In the method proposed in [215], results from solving the planning (higher level) 
problem are inserted to the scheduling (lower level) problem. When the scheduling problem is 
solved and in the case that all constraints are not satisfied, new constraints are generated by the 
scheduling model and are appended to the higher problem and the higher level problem is solved 
again. This process continues until all the constraints of the problem are satisfied. The bilevel 
problem proposed by Bauermann et al. [214], was also solved using an iterative approach to find 
the system state where electricity price and heat system selection in two levels of the problem 
converge.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 6.2 describes the methodology used 
in this study and the input data. Section 6.3 presents the results from solving the equilibrium 
(iterative optimization of heat and electricity systems) and centralized problems in different cases 
and discusses the results. Section 6.5 concludes the study with a summary of the key findings. 
6.2 Methodology 
An iterative approach is proposed in this study to investigate the optimal decarbonization 
pathways for electricity and heat systems while taking into account their interactions and 
fragmented decision-making processes. In this approach, the planning problems for electricity 
generation and heat supply are solved iteratively to take into account the feedback between heat 
and electricity caused by the electricity demand for heating. The iterative approach will help to 
find the equilibrium state in the problem which shows the optimum mix of electricity generation 
capacity for the electricity system and optimum size and type of heating system for the heating 
system when the interaction of systems is taken into account. To compare the results of the 
iterative approach with the case in which both heat and electricity system problems are solved 
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simultaneously, a centralized formulation of the problem is also developed in this study, and the 
results of the two different formulations are presented and compared. 
6.2.1 Iterative approach for optimizing heat and electricity supply 
In the model developed in this study, one optimization problem is planning and operating the 
electricity system for supplying the electricity demand with the lowest cost. The other 
optimization problem, on the other hand, is supplying heat demand with the lowest cost. 
Figure 6-1 shows the structure of the iterative approach used in this study. 
 
Figure 6-1. Structure of the iterative approach for solving equilibrium problem of heat and electricity 
supply optimization 
As can be seen in Figure 6-1, electricity and heating supply technologies’ characteristics, 
electricity demand, heat demand, and carbon price are inputs to the model. The iterative approach 
solves the equilibrium problem that concerns optimizing electricity generation and heat supply 
mix in 2050. 
The problem is solved for different carbon cost values. Carbon cost is included in both the 
levelized cost of energy and levelized cost of heat calculation. 
6.2.2 Heat system optimization problem 
Heat system problem’s objective is minimizing heat supply cost. The heating supply technologies 
considered in the heat supply problem in this study are:  
1. Individual Natural gas boiler 
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2. Individual biomass boiler 
3. Individual Fuel cell (FC) micro-CHP 
4. Stirling micro-CHP 
5. Community Biomass combined heat and power (CHP) 
6. Electric resistive heating 
7. Ground source heat pump (GSHP) 
8. Air source heat pump (ASHP) 
The heat system optimization problem’s mathematical formulation is shown in Equation 6-1 to 
Equation 6-5. Equation 6-1 shows the heat supply problem’s objective function. 
𝐻𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐹 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 (∑ 𝐻𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1



















× 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)  
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In Equation  6-1, 𝐻𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐹 is the heat system problem’s objective function in £, 𝐻𝑇_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 is the 
amount of heating supplied by technology 𝑖 in unit of heat supply, 𝐻𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖 is the annualized capital 
cost of heating technology 𝑖 in £ per unit of heat supply per year, 𝐻𝑇𝑂&𝑀𝐶𝑖 is the operation and 
maintenance cost of heating technology 𝑖 in £ per unit of heat supply per year, 𝐸𝐼𝐶𝑘,𝑖(𝑡) is fuel 
input 𝑘  (electricity, biomass, biogas and natural gas) cost of technology  𝑖  at hour 𝑡  in £ , 
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘,𝑖(𝑡) is the fuel input 𝑘 to heating technology 𝑖 at hour 𝑡 in kWh of fuel, 𝐸𝑚𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑘 is the 
emission factor of fuel input 𝑘 in gram (or tonne) of CO2 per kWh of fuel, and 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 is 
carbon price in £ per tonne CO2. 















𝐻𝑇_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 ≤ 𝐻𝑇_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖 6-4 
 







In Equations 6-2 to 6-5, 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖(𝑡) is the heating output of the heating technology 𝑖 at 
hour 𝑡  in kWhth, 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑡)  is heat demand at hour 𝑡  in kWhth, 𝐻𝑇_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖 is 
heating technology 𝑖 limit in heating supply share in % of heat supply, 𝐹𝑃𝑘 is the price of fuel 𝑘 
in £ per kWh, and 𝜂ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔,𝑖 is the heating efficiency (or COP) of heating technology 𝑖.   
6-2 shows that the sum of the share of all heating technologies should equal 100%. Equation 6-3 
shows that the sum of the heat output of all technologies should be enough to supply heat demand 
at each hour 𝑡. 6-4 limits the share of each heating technology 𝑖 in total heating supply mix to a 
percentage. Each heating technology has a limited potential for supplying energy consumer’s heat 
demand. In other words, energy consumer cannot supply all its heat demand with a single 
technology. This constraint is included due to the limited potential of some heating technologies 
(such as ground source heat pumps), technology supply chain challenges, and availability of some 
input fuels (such as biomass). Equation 6-5 shows that the input of each heating technology at 
each hour 𝑡 equals the heating output of technology at that hour divided by the technology heating 
efficiency. In the heat system modeling, it is assumed that the electricity output of CHP 
technologies used for heating supply can only be used for supplying the electricity demand for 
technologies used in the heating system. In other words, electricity generated by CHP 
technologies in the heating system may replace electricity purchases from the grid but cannot be 
sold to the grid. 
6.2.3 Electricity system optimization problem 
The electricity system problem’s objective is minimizing the electricity supply cost. The 
electricity supply technologies considered in this study are:  
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1. Solar PV  
2. Offshore wind  
3. Onshore wind  
4. Nuclear  
5. Open-cycle gas turbine (OCGT) 
6. Combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) 
7. Coal power with CCS 
8. Hydropower 
9. Pumped hydro storage 
The electricity system problem is shown in Equation 6-6 to 6-15. 6-6 shows the objective function 
of the energy system problem. 
𝐸𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐹 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 (∑ 𝑇𝐶𝑗 × (𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑗 + 𝐹𝑂&𝑀𝐶𝑗)
𝑚
𝑗=1























In Equation 6-6, 𝐸𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐹 is the electricity system problem’s objective function in £,  𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑗 is the 
annualized capital cost of electricity generation technology 𝑗 in £ per kW, 𝑇𝐶𝑗 is the capacity of  
electricity generation technology 𝑗 in kW, 𝐹𝑂&𝑀𝐶𝑗 is the fixed operation and maintenance cost 
of electricity generation technology 𝑗  in £ per kW of technology capacity, 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑗(𝑡) is the electricity output of technology 𝑗 at hour 𝑡 in kWh, 𝑉𝑂&𝑀𝐶𝑗 is 
the variable operation and maintenance cost of electricity generation technology 𝑗 in £ per kWh 
of electricity generated,  𝐸𝐼𝐶 𝑘,𝑗 is fuel input 𝑘  cost for electricity generation technology 𝑗 at hour 
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𝑡 in £, and 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑘,𝑗(𝑡) is the input  𝑘 (wind power, solar radiation, natural gas, coal, uranium, 
water power) to electricity technology 𝑗 at hour 𝑡 in kWh of input. 
Constraints of the electricity system operator’s optimization problem are shown in Equations 6-7 
to 6-15. 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑗(𝑡) ≤ 𝑇𝐶𝑗 × 𝑜𝑛𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟 6-7 
 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 _𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘,𝑗(𝑡) × 𝜂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑗 6-8 
 
𝐸𝐼𝐶𝑘,𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘,𝑗(𝑡) × 𝐹𝑃𝑘  6-9 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 ≤ 𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 × 31 6-10 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒_𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗 6-11 
 






𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜(𝑡) =  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜(𝑡) −
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜(𝑡) + 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜(𝑡 − 1)  
6-13 
 
 __ 0Pumped HydroStorage level t     6-14 
 
 __ _ _Pumped HydroStorage level t Pumped Hydro StoreCap   6-15 
 
In Equations 6-7 to 6-15, 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘,𝑗(𝑡)  is the energy carrier input 𝑘  to electricity generation 
technology 𝑗 at hour 𝑡 in kWh, 𝜂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑗 is the electrical efficiency of electricity technology 𝑗, 
𝐹𝑃𝑘 is the price of energy carrier (fuel) k in £ per kWh, 𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 is the build rate for electricity 
technology 𝑗 in kWe per year, 𝑀𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒_𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗  is the minimum capacity for renewable 
electricity technology 𝑗 , 𝜂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑗  is the efficiency of electrical technology 𝑗 , and 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑡) is the electricity demand in hour 𝑡 in kWhe. 
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Constraint shown in Equation 6-8 indicates that electricity generation output of each technology 
at each hour equals input at each hour multiplied by the efficiency of that technology. Equation 6-9 
shows that the electricity output of each technology at each hour cannot exceed the capacity of 
that technology. There is a build rate constraint on electricity generation technologies. This 
constraint means only a maximum amount of capacity for a specific type of electricity generation 
technology can be developed in a year. Equation 6-10 limits the capacity development of each 
electricity generation technology to a build rate limit. Equation 6-10 indicates that the minimum 
capacity of offshore wind, onshore wind, and solar power technologies in 2050 cannot be less 
than their capacity in 2018. This constraint is considered in the model to reflect the government’s 
policy in supporting the development of renewable energy generation capacity. By including this 
constraint, we are assuming that the capacity of renewable energy generation will not decrease 
from 2019 to 2050. No such constraint is considered for nuclear, coal, and gas-based technologies. 
Equation 6-12 shows that the sum of electricity output from all technologies should be enough to 
supply electricity demand at each hour. 6-13, 6-13, and 6-15 are pumped hydro storage technology 
constraints. In Equations 6-13, 6-14, and 6-15, 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜(𝑡)  and 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜(𝑡)  are electricity output and electricity input from pumped 
hydro technology at hour 𝑡 in kWhe and 𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜_𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑝 is the storage capacity of 
pumped hydro storage system in kWhe. 
An iterative approach is used in this study to find the equilibrium. Figure 6-2 shows the solution 





Figure 6-2. Solution algorithm for the equilibrium problem 
In Figure 6-2, 𝐸𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐹ℎ is the electricity system problem’s objective function at step ℎ  in £, 
𝐸𝐷𝐹𝐻ℎ(𝑡) is the electricity demand for heating at hour 𝑡  and step  ℎ in kWhe, 𝐸𝑃ℎ(𝑡)  is the 
electricity price at hour 𝑡 and step ℎ in £ per MWh. Electricity price at each hour is defined as the 
sum of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) at that hour plus transmission and distribution 
charges. In Figure 6-2,  𝑇𝐸𝐷ℎ(𝑡) is the total electricity demand (electricity demand plus electricity 
demand for heating) at hour 𝑡 and step ℎ in kWhe.  
In the start of the algorithm, 𝐸𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐹ℎ  is assumed to have a big positive value (𝑏𝑖𝑔 𝑀). The 
electricity supply problem is then solved to find the size and type of electricity generation 
technologies that are able to supply the electricity demand with the lowest cost. Based on the 




calculated. Knowing the electricity price at each hour, the heat supply problem is solved in order 
to find the mix of heating technologies that are able to supply the heat demand with the lowest 
cost. Electricity demand for heating at each hour 𝑡 (𝐸𝐷𝐹𝐻ℎ(𝑡)) can then be calculated knowing 
the share of each heating technology in the heat supply mix. This demand is added to the primary 
electricity demand and is used as input to the electricity supply problem. The electricity supply 
problem is then solved again using the new electricity demand and the new objective function 
(𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑃𝑂𝐹ℎ+1) and electricity prices (𝐸𝑃ℎ+1(𝑡) ) are calculated. Using the electricity new prices, 
heat supply problem is solved and the new values for electricity demand used for heating 
(𝐸𝐷𝐹𝐻𝑖+1(𝑡)) is found. This process continues until both the electricity system problem and the 
heat system problem converge to an answer. Convergence happens when electricity and heat 
supply mix do not change in two consecutive iterations.  
The equilibrium problem is solved for different cases differentiated base on the carbon price. 
Linear Program (LP) in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) is used for solving the 
electricity and heat system problems. 
6.2.4 Centralized formulation 
This section presents the centralized model used for solving the heat and electricity system 
problem in this study. In the centralized modeling, it is assumed that a single stakeholder makes 
the decisions about the size and type of electricity generation technologies used for supplying 
electricity and the share of different heating technologies for supplying heat demand. As a result, 
the electricity system and the heat system problems are solved at the same time in a centralized 
formulation of the problem. In the centralized formulation, the objective function is minimizing 
the cost of supplying heat and electricity, as shown in Equation 6-16. 
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As Equation 6-16 shows, the centralized optimization problem’s objective function is the sum of 
objective functions for heat and electricity system problems in the iterative approach presented 
before in Equation 6-1 and Equation 6-6, respectively. The constraints of the centralized 
optimization problem are similar to the constraints for heat and electricity system problems in the 
iterative approach presented in Equations 6-2 to 6-5 and Equations 6-7 to 6-15. 
The optimization problem is solved for different cases differentiated base on the carbon price. 
Linear Program (LP) in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) is used for solving the 
centralized optimization problem. 
6.2.5 Input data 
The model and formulation described are applied to Great Britain (GB) to show the application 
of the model in the electricity and heat systems planning. As a result, the data presented in this 
section is related to the Great Britain’s electricity and heat system. However, the presented 
formulation is general and can be applied to other systems. 
Table 6-1 shows the assumed characteristics of heat supply technologies considered in this study. 
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The cost of heating technologies is presented in EUR per unit in Table 6-1. A unit of heating is 
assumed to be 15 MWh of heating demand [216]. The cost of electricity grid expansion for electric 
and heat pump heating systems has been considered in the reported costs [216]. Cost of Stirling 
CHP technology and biomass CHP systems are from comparing the data in [216] and [219]. All 
heating technology costs are in € 2010 values. An efficiency of 90% is applied to calculate 
community scale technologies efficiency from individual technologies.  
Table 6-2 shows the assumed emission factor and cost of fuels in this study. 
Table 6-2. Assumed emission factor and cost of fuels (data from [219][216][220]) 
Fuel Natural gas Biomass Coal Uranium 
Emission  
factor 
143 (g CO2 per 
kWh)   [219] 
37 (g CO2 per 
kWh)  [219] 
Emission from CCS 
coal plant is reported 
in Table 6-3. 
0 
Cost 6.4  (2016 € per 
GJ )  [216] 
8.1 (2016 € per 
GJ )   [216] 
83,253                     
(2013 £ per GWh)  
[220] 





Table 6-3 shows the efficiency, operating period, and assumed cost of electricity generation 
technologies considered in this study. All estimates are in 2014 £ values. 
Table 6-3. Assumed efficiency, operating period, and cost of electricity generation technologies (data 
from [221][222][223][217][224][225][226][227]) 




Nuclear OCGT CCGT Coal CCS Hydropower Pumped hydro 
storage 
Efficiency 
(HHV) %   
[221] 
NA 
NA NA 100 
34 54 





22 24 60 
25 25 
25 35 50 
Pre-
development 
cost (£ per 
kW) [221] 
60 120 110 240 
30 10 
70 0 - 
Construction 
cost (£ per 
kW) [221] 
600 2,100 1,200 4,100 
300 500 
4,200 3300 - 
Infrastructu
re cost (1000 
£ per kW) 
[221] 
50 383 165 3.48 
37.75 12.58 
16 377.4 - 
Fixed O&M 
cost (£ per 
MW per 
year) [221] 
7,500 45,400 22,400 72,900 
5,200 12,200 
78,500 18200 11200 
Variable 
O&M cost 
(£ per MWh)  
0 0 0 3 [221] 
3 [221] 3 [221] 
3 [221] 0 42 [221] 
Connection 
and Use of 
System 
charges 
(£ per MW 
per year) 
[221] 
1,200 47,000 3,000 500 
2,400 3,300 
3,800 0 15800 
Minimum 
load  




30 [222] NA NA 
Ramp rate 
(% full load 
per hour) 
NA NA NA 2 
20 8 





factor  (g 
CO2 per 
kWh) 
0 [223] 0 [223] 0 [223] 0 [223] 
Calculate based 
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Offshore and onshore wind power potential is calculated based on the data available in [225] and 
[228]. Solar power potential is calculated based on the data available in [229]. Hydropower 
potential is calculated from the data available in [225].  
Heat demand in Great Britain in 2050 is assumed similar to the heat demand in 2010. In this study, 
we are assuming that the increase in heat demand due to population increase is compensated with 
better home insulation and heat demand remains constant. Similarly, we are assuming that heat 
demand in 2050 is similar to 2017 in Great Britain (not including electricity demand for heating). 
Electricity demand considered in this study is based on the 2017 electricity data available in [230]. 
Electricity transmission and distribution cost is assumed to be 4 pence per kWh based on the data 
available in [231]. The storage capacity of pumped hydro storage systems is assumed to be 30 
GWh. In this study, it is also assumed that all current electricity generation capacity except for 
hydro and pumped hydro systems will be retired by 2050. As a result, only operation and 
maintenance cost for current hydro and pumped hydro capacity is considered in the model while 
capital cost as well as operation and maintenance cost is considered for new hydro and other 
electricity generation technologies. All values reported in the results section are in 2014 £ values. 
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6.3 Results and discussion 
In this section, the results of the equilibrium and centralized approaches are presented and 
compared. 
6.3.1 Results of the bilevel model 
Cases in the bilevel model are differentiated based on the carbon price input used. The cases 
investigated in this study are: 
1. Case 1; equilibrium, carbon price of £18 per tonne CO2 
2. Case 2; equilibrium, carbon price of £30 per tonne CO2 
3. Case 3; equilibrium, carbon price of £70 per tonne CO2 
4. Case 4; equilibrium, carbon price of £100 per tonne CO2 
5. Case 5; equilibrium, carbon price of £150 per tonne CO2 
6. Case 6; equilibrium, carbon price of £200 per tonne CO2 
7. Case 7; equilibrium, carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2 
Figure 6-3 shows the electricity generation capacity in different cases of the equilibrium problem.  
 
Figure 6-3. Electricity generation capacity in different cases of the equilibrium model 
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As can be seen in Figure 6-3, CCGT has the highest generation capacity in cases with carbon 
prices of £18, £30, £70, and £100 per tonne CO2. Nuclear only becomes the technology with 
dominant generation capacity in carbon price of £150 per tonne CO2 which is the reason for the 
drop in emission reduction in electricity supply for carbon price of £150 per tonne CO2 seen in 
Figure 6-7.  Figure 6-3 also shows that the capacity of renewable generation technologies (solar, 
offshore wind, onshore wind, and hydropower) is constant in all cases. The results of our modeling 
show that increasing carbon prices will lead to the replacement of gas-based technologies with 
nuclear power and not renewable power generation. 
Figure 6-4 shows the share of technologies in supplying electricity demand in different cases of 
the equilibrium model. As can be seen in Figure 6-4, nuclear power supplies about 60% of 
electricity demand in Case 5; equilibrium, carbon price of £150  per tonne CO2 and about 70% of 
the demand in Case 6; equilibrium, carbon price of £200 per tonne CO2. Figure 6-4 shows that 
although the share of CCGT in electricity supply is constantly decreasing with carbon price 
increase from £70 to £200 per tonne CO2, the share of CCGT in supplying electricity increases 
when carbon price increases from £200 to £300 per tonne CO2. In other words, an increase in 
carbon price has caused an increase in GHG emissions from the electricity system as can also be 





Figure 6-4. The share of technologies in supplying electricity demand in different cases of the 
equilibrium model 
Figure 6-5 shows the load duration curve for Case 5; equilibrium, carbon price of £150 per tonne 
CO2, Case 6; equilibrium, carbon price of £200 per tonne CO2, and Case 7; equilibrium, carbon 
price of £300 per tonne CO2. As can be seen in Figure 6-5, peak load in Case 7; equilibrium, 
carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2 increases more than 45 GW compared to Case 6; equilibrium, 
carbon price of £200 per tonne CO2. This increase in peak demand caused by heat system 
electrification is the reason behind the increase in power generation capacity of both CCGT and 
OCGT technologies in Case 7; equilibrium, carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2 seen in Figure 6-3. 
The increased electricity demand in Case 6; equilibrium, carbon price of £200 per tonne CO2 
compared to Case 5; equilibrium, carbon price of £150 per tonne CO2, however, can be supplied 
by nuclear power (nuclear power has not reached its maximum capacity in Case 5) and OCGT. 




Figure 6-5. Load duration curve for Case 5, Case 6, and Case 7 
Figure 6-6 shows the share of technologies in supplying heat demand in different cases of the 
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Figure 6-6. The share of technologies in supplying heat demand in different cases of the equilibrium 
model 
As can be seen in Figure 6-6, natural gas boiler is the dominant heating supply technology in all 
cases except in Case 7; equilibrium, carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2. In other words, 
regardless of how much carbon price increases from £18 to £200 per tonne CO2, natural gas boiler 
supplies 80% of the heating demand. However, when carbon price increases to £300 per tonne 
CO2, it is more cost-effective to use electricity-based technologies such as air-source heat pump 
to supply electricity to avoid paying high carbon prices. In Case 7; equilibrium, carbon price of 
£300 per tonne CO2, ASHP is at its share limit (60%), and the other 40% of the heat is supplied 
by biomass CHP (10%) and natural gas boiler (30%).  
The electrification of heating supply in Case 7; equilibrium, carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2 
is the reason for the increase in CCGT capacity and share in electricity supply shown in Figure 6-3 
and Figure 6-4. Although in carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2, nuclear power is more cost-
effective than CCGT, nuclear has reached its build rate limit (31 GW), and the vast electrification 
in heating supply has to be supplied by electricity generation capacity. While renewables are not 
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able to supply the needed power for heat electrification due to their intermittency, developing 
CCGT (and even OCGT) capacity is the only way to supply the increased electricity demand.  
Figure 6-7 shows GHG emissions from heat and electricity supply in different cases of the 
equilibrium problem.  
 
Figure 6-7. Emission from heat and electricity supply in different cases of the equilibrium model 
As can be seen in Figure 6-7, increasing the carbon price from £18 to £30 and even £70 per tonne 
CO2, does not affect the GHG emission from either of the heat and electricity systems. In other 
words, the carbon prices of up to £70 per tonne CO2 are not high enough to make low-carbon 
technologies more cost effective than fossil fuel-based technologies in heat and electricity systems. 
When carbon price increases to £100 per tonne CO2, however, emission from the electricity 
system decreases. Increase in carbon price to £150 and £200 per tonne CO2, leads to more 
decrease in electricity system emissions, which results in an overall emission reduction. On the 
other hand, emission from the heat system is constant for carbon prices of £100 per tonne CO2 
and below. Emission reduction from the heat system for higher carbon prices is also less 
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significant than emission reduction from electricity supply. Only a carbon price increase from 
£200 to £300 per tonne CO2 can result in a sharp emission reduction from the heat system. 
Figure 6-8 shows the total GHG emission with respect to the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) 
and the levelized cost of heat (LCOH) in different cases of the equilibrium formulation.  
 
Figure 6-8. Total GHG emission with respect to LCOE and LCOH in different cases of the 
equilibrium model 
As can be seen in Figure 6-8, increasing the carbon price from £18 to £30 and then £70 per tonne 
CO2, does not affect overall (sum of electricity and heat) emission while it leads to an increase in 
the levelized cost of electricity and levelized cost of heat. When carbon price increase from £18 
to £30 and then £70 per tonne CO2, CCGT and natural gas boiler remain the most cost-effective 
technologies in the electricity and heat systems, respectively. As a result, a higher carbon price 
only increases electricity and heat levelized cost while it does not lead to any change in the 
technology mix. 
Figure 6-8, however, shows that while carbon price increase from £18 to £30 and £70 per tonne 
CO2 does not affect GHG emissions, increasing carbon prices to £100, £150, £200, and £300 per 
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tonne CO2, leads to a continuous drop in GHG emissions. A major drop in GHG emission (150.21 
to 100.99 million tonne CO2) happens when carbon price increases from £100 to £150 per tonne 
CO2 due to the replacement of CCGT with nuclear in electricity system and to a lesser degree, 
replacement of Stirling micro-CHP with air-source heat pump in heat system as can be seen in 
Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-6. 
In the case of £300 per tonne CO2 carbon price, emission from electricity supply increases while 
the significant electrification in heat supply (and consequently emission decrease) will lead to a 
decrease in total GHG emission as can also be seen in Figure 6-8. 
The important point to notice here is that if a GHG emission reduction policy is aiming at heat 
electrification to decrease GHG emissions, it should assure that there is enough low carbon 
reliable power generation capacity available to supply the increased electricity demand caused by 
heat electrification. If that is not the case, a heat electrification policy leads to a GHG emission 
increase in the electricity system as was seen in our modeling. 
6.3.2 Results of the centralized model 
In this section, the results of solving the centralized optimization problem in different cases are 
presented. Cases are differentiated based on the carbon price input used. The cases investigated 
in this study are: 
1. Case 8; centralized, carbon price of £18 per tonne CO2 
2. Case 9; centralized, carbon price of £30 per tonne CO2 
3. Case 10; centralized, carbon price of £70 per tonne CO2 
4. Case 11; centralized, carbon price of £100 per tonne CO2 
5. Case 12; centralized, carbon price of £150 per tonne CO2 
6. Case 13; centralized, carbon price of £200 per tonne CO2 
7. Case 14; centralized, carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2  
Figure 6-9 shows the electricity generation capacity in different cases of the centralized 
formulation. As can be seen in Figure 6-9, the total electricity generation capacity has remained 
almost constant in all carbon prices. The differences between cases with increasing carbon prices 
is the replacement of CCGT capacity with nuclear capacity. The electricity generation capacity 
has remained constant as no significant electrification has happened in the heat system. In the 
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equilibrium problem, however, electricity generation capacity increases in carbon prices of £200 
and £300 per tonne CO2 compared to cases with lower carbon prices to respond to heat 
electrification. 
 
Figure 6-9. Electricity generation capacity in different cases of the centralized model 
Figure 6-10 shows the share of technologies in supplying electricity demand in different cases 




Figure 6-10. The share of technologies in supplying electricity demand in different cases of the 
centralized model 
As can be seen in Figure 6-10, nuclear starts to have a share in electricity supply when carbon 
prices is £100 per tonne CO2 and is the dominant electricity supply technology for carbon prices 
of £150, £200, and £300 per tonne CO2. Unlike the equilibrium formulation, CCGT has a marginal 
role in supplying electricity when carbon price is as high as £300 per tonne CO2 (see Figure 6-4).  
Figure 6-11 shows the share of technologies in supplying heat demand in different cases of the 




Figure 6-11. The share of technologies in supplying heat demand in different cases of the centralized 
model 
As can be seen in Figure 6-11, natural gas boiler supplies 80% of the heat demand in cases with 
carbon prices of £18, £30, £70, £100, £150, and £200 per tonne CO2. Even when carbon price 
increases to £300 per tonne CO2, natural gas boiler supplies about 53% of the heat demand. 
Figure 6-12 shows the emission from heat and electricity supply in different cases of the 




Figure 6-12. Emission from heat and electricity supply in different cases of the centralized model 
Similar to the results of the equilibrium model, GHG emission remains constant when carbon 
price increases from £18 to £30, and £70 per tonne CO2. A higher carbon price, however, leads 
to emission reduction from heat and electricity supply. The total amount of GHG emission in each 
case of centralized modeling is similar to what is found in the equilibrium problem. However, it 
is worth noting that while in Case 7; equilibrium, carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2 total 
emission is split between the electricity and heat systems (57% and 43%, respectively), in Case 
14; centralized, carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2, total emission is almost entirely from the 
heat supply (93%). 
6.4 Discussion  
Imposing a carbon price that is effective in reducing GHG emissions in all systems of an energy 
system is a challenge for policymakers and governments all over the world. The results of our 
study show that increasing the carbon price from £18 to £30 and then £70 per tonne CO2 does not 
reduce emissions from electricity and heat systems. Increasing carbon price to £100 per tonne 
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CO2, however, would lead to a 7% GHG emission decrease. More significant GHG emission 
reductions could be observed when carbon prices are £150, £200, and £300 per tonne CO2 with a 
GHG emission reduction of 33%, 40%, and 51% compared to the case with carbon price of £18 
per tonne CO2. These values can be seen in Figure 6-8. 
Increase in carbon prices leads to a replacement of CCGT baseload generation with nuclear power 
generation as can be seen in Figure 6-3 and Figure 6-4. The share of renewable energy generation 
systems, however, does not change with carbon prices as high as £200 and £300 per tonne CO2 
considering their intermittency and high capital cost. Offshore wind power capacity will be 
selected by the model in carbon prices of over £200 per tonne CO2 if a 20% reduction in capital 
cost is achieved. It should be noted that heat electrification will create a need for the development 
of baseload generation capacity. If the development of low-emission or emission-free generation 
capacity is limited (by nuclear build rate, for instance), gas-based electricity generation 
technologies have to be developed to supply the increased electricity demand. 
Natural gas boiler is the most cost-effective heating supply technology for carbon prices of £200 
per tonne CO2 and lower, as can be seen in Figure 6-6. Low capital cost and high efficiency of 
natural gas boiler give it an advantage over other heating supply technologies. The reason for the 
preference of natural gas boilers over other heating technologies even in high carbon prices is the 
effect of a system-wide carbon price mechanism on electricity prices. If carbon prices are imposed 
on carbon emission in all systems of an energy system, electricity generated and supplied to the 
heating system will also have a higher price. As a result, electricity-based heating technologies 
such as heat pumps may not still be able to compete with the natural gas boiler which does not 
need electricity to supply heating demand. As a result, a system-wide carbon price may not work 
in favor of low-emission heating supply technologies. However, the results of our modeling show 
that with a carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2 heating supply moves toward electrification. With 
a carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2, the share of natural gas boiler drops from 80% to 30% 
compared to the case with a carbon price of £200 per tonne CO2 and air-source heat pumps become 
the dominant heating supply technology supplying 60% of the heat demand as shown in Figure 6-6. 
Comparing the results from equilibrium and centralized formulation show that these two 
approaches may have the same results for the optimum mix of heat and electricity supply 
technologies in some cases. The cases with similar results for equilibrium and centralized 
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modeling are cases where there are dominant fossil fuel-based technologies in the system which 
have lower electricity and heat supply costs with a significant margin compared to other 
technologies. In those cases, the equilibrium problem is solved in one iteration where fossil fuel-
based technologies are chosen for both heat and electricity systems. When zero or marginal 
electricity-based technologies are selected in the heating system, there is no or marginal need for 
capacity development in the electricity system. However, when carbon prices increase to a level 
where low or zero-emission technologies in both electricity and heat systems become cost-
effective and can compete with fossil fuel-based technologies, equilibrium and centralized 
modeling approaches lead to different results.  
The results of the equilibrium model show that both electricity supply and heat supply mix move 
toward low emission technology mixes with increasing carbon prices. In other words, both 
electricity and heat supply mixes tend to have lower emissions as the heating and electricity supply 
technologies are not competitors. However, a lower-emission mix in the heat supply mix means 
more electricity-based technologies (such as heat pumps) are used in supplying heat. As a result, 
the electricity demand from heat supply increases which leads to the development of gas-based 
electricity generation technologies as nuclear power has reached its maximum capacity and 
renewable technologies cannot supply the reliable power needed. In the centralized problem, the 
cost of heat and electricity supply are summed up in one single objective function. As a result, the 
cost of electricity and heat supply compete. If a higher heat supply cost leads to a significantly 
lower cost in the electricity system, the model will choose the combination of technologies with 
low electricity supply cost and high heat supply cost which minimizes the overall cost of the 
system. 
Table 6-4 compares electricity generation capacity, heat supply mix, and CO2 emission for 
equilibrium and centralized formulation with £300 per tonne CO2 carbon price. 
Table 6-4. Electricity generation capacity, heat supply mix, and CO2 emission for equilibrium and 
centralized formulation with a carbon price of £ 300 per tonne CO2  
Parameter  equilibrium model Centralized model 
Nuclear capacity  31 GW 30.5 GW 
CCGT capacity  46.6 GW 5.1 GW 
OCGT capacity  42 GW 13.2 GW 
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Renewable (hydro, offshore 
wind, onshore wind, solar) 
capacity  
36.9 GW 36.9  GW 
Emission from the electricity 
system  
41.9 Mt CO2 5.2 Mt CO2 
Air-source heat pump share in 
heating supply  
60 % 30.1 % 
Natural gas boiler share in 
heating supply  
30% 52.7 % 
Biomass CHP share in heating 
supply  
10% 10 % 
FC micro-CHP share in heating 
supply  
0 % 7.2 % 
Emission from the heat system  31.3 Mt CO2 65.1 Mt CO2 
Total emission  73.2 Mt CO2 70.2 Mt CO2 
 
As can be seen in Table 6-4, total emission from solving the model with equilibrium and 
centralized formulation has close values (73.2 and 70.2 Mt CO2, respectively). In the equilibrium 
formulation, the share of electricity and heating systems in total emission is 57% and 43%, 
respectively. In the centralized formulation, however, the share of electricity and heating systems 
in total emission is 7% and 93%, respectively. Table 6-4 also shows that the electricity generation 
capacity developed in the equilibrium formulation is higher than the centralized formulation to 
supply the electricity demand created due to heat electrification. Heating supply mix is also 
different in equilibrium, and centralized formulation as 60 % of heating is supplied by air-source 
heat pump in the equilibrium formulation while only about 30% of the heating is supplied by air-
source heat pump in the centralized formulation. Table 6-4 shows that while the results for total 
emissions is similar for the equilibrium and centralized formulation, the mix of electricity and 
heating supply technologies are very different. 
In real-world situations, different stakeholders are engaged in an energy system and make 
decisions based on their advantage. The decisions made by different stakeholders may be in 
contrast with others and increase the overall cost of the system. Planning for GHG emission 
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reduction using whole-system approaches and central planning, where all systems of the energy 
system are optimized at the same time will show the most cost-effective pathway for meeting 
GHG emission reduction goals. The centralized formulation can help identify the energy systems 
that can contribute to overall GHG emission reduction targets at a lower cost or technologies that 
can replace fossil fuel-based systems cost-effectively. An outcome of centralized planning models 
can be identifying the most cost-effective pathway in reducing GHG emissions. In the modeling 
developed in this study, for instance, centralized planning shows that decarbonizing the electricity 
system is a favorable pathway compared to decarbonizing heat.  This pathway, however, may not 
happen in real-world cases due to the presence of different stakeholders. The results of the 
equilibrium formulation show that when the decisions of different stakeholders are considered in 
the modeling, heat decarbonization may lead to increase in emissions from the electricity system 
with a carbon price of £300 per tonne CO2. Centralized modeling is not able to reflect the real 
world’s situation where different stakeholders make decisions based on their objective and not 
necessarily the whole system’s objective. In that sense, equilibrium and multi-level approaches 
can give a better understanding of the stakeholders’ behavior in an energy system and how they 
interact with each other. 
6.5 Conclusion  
In this study, an equilibrium formulation for the planning of low-carbon electricity and heat is 
presented. In the equilibrium formulation, the electricity system problem is at the higher level 
with the objective of supplying electricity demand with lowest cost. The heat system problem is 
at the lower level with the objective of supplying heat with the lowest cost. While the levels in 
the developed formulation are solved separately, the output of each level affects the decisions 
made at the other level. Electricity prices calculated from the heat problem affect the selection of 
heating technologies in the heat system while the electricity demand used for heating calculated 
in the heat system problem affects the type and mix of electricity generation technologies in the 
electricity system. To show the application of equilibrium modeling in analyzing heat and 
electricity system decarbonization, a centralized formulation that solves the heat and electricity 
problem at the same time is also developed, and the results are presented and compared.  
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Both developed formulations are solved for carbon prices of £18, £30, £70, £100, £150, £200, 
and £300 per tonne CO2. The results of our analysis for both equilibrium and centralized 
formulations shows that for carbon prices of £18, £30, and £70 per tonne CO2, the dominant 
electricity generation technology is CCGT, supplying more than 70% of the electricity demand. 
Natural gas boiler is also the dominant heating technology supplying 80% (the technology limit) 
of the heating demand. in other words, for carbon prices of £70 per tonne CO2, negligible 
decarbonization happens in electricity and heat system and increasing the carbon prices only leads 
to an increase in levelized cost of electricity and heat. When carbon price increases to £100, and 
then £150, and £200 per tonne CO2, decarbonization in the electricity supply happens by nuclear 
power replacing CCGT share in electricity supply. For carbon prices of £100 per tonne CO2 and 
higher, an increase in carbon price leads to a bigger share for nuclear power in electricity 
generation. The share of renewable energy technologies, however, does not change and their 
capacity remains at the current level (current capacity of renewable generation capacity has to be 
maintained in the electricity system as a constraint of the problem). For carbon prices of £100, 
£150, and £200 per tonne CO2, natural gas boiler remains the dominant heat electricity supply 
with 80% share while air-source heat pump starts emerging as a cost-effective technology when 
carbon price increases to £150 per tonne CO2. 
For carbon prices of £200 per tonne CO2 and lower, equilibrium formulation and centralized 
formulation of the problem led to similar results for electricity and heat supply mixes. For a carbon 
price of £300 per tonne CO2, however, equilibrium and centralized formulation lead to very 
different results, though. For the centralized formulation, a carbon price increase from £200 to 
£300 shows a similar trend for carbon price increase from £70 and upward with an increase in the 
share of nuclear power in electricity supply. In the centralized formulation for a carbon price of 
£300 per tonne CO2, heat supply is 52.7% natural gas boiler, 7.2% fuel cell micro-CHP, 10% 
community-scale biomass CHP, and 30.1% air-source heat pump. In the equilibrium formulation, 
heat supply is 30% natural gas boiler, 10% community-scale biomass CHP, and 60% air-source 
heat pump. As can be seen, heat electrification has happened at a larger scale when the problem 
is solved using equilibrium formulation. This electrification, however, leads to an increased share 
of CCGT in electricity supply since nuclear power has reached its capacity limited by technology 
build rate.  
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Our modeling shows that solving the problem via equilibrium and centralized formulation may 
show similar total emission values for heat and electricity supply. However, the mix of 
technologies in electricity and heat supply in the equilibrium and centralized formulation may be 
different. More specifically, the centralized formulation has less complexity compared to 
equilibrium formulation since centralized optimization problems do not have a convergence 
challenge. 
In the centralized formulation, the problem is solved by a single decision-maker, and there is no 
interaction between stakeholders. As a result, emission from heat supply may be sacrificed to 
decrease GHG emission from electricity supply as it leads to a lower overall system cost.  
This study contributes to the literature by presenting an equilibrium planning model for 
interdependent heat and electricity systems that takes into account the decisions made by different 
stakeholders aiming at optimizing their own objectives.  
1. Presenting an equilibrium formulation that reflects the rational decision making of 
stakeholders in the heat and electricity system. 
2. Providing an analytical tool for assessing policies such as carbon pricing on the planning of 
heat and electricity systems. 
3. Analyzing the application of equilibrium and centralized formulation for the planning of low-










7 Contributions, and Future Work 
7.1 Contributions of this work 
This thesis is aimed at developing multilevel models for analyzing the interaction of different 
stakeholders in energy systems. Different models are developed in this thesis to: 
1. Assess the role of renewable energy and energy storage systems in Ontario and how they can 
be used to reduce GHG emissions in the province considering the objectives of all engaged 
stakeholders; and  
2. Analyze the interaction of heat and electricity supply systems to investigate the effect of heat 
decarbonization on the development of heat and electricity technologies using two different 
methodologies.  
This thesis contributes to the area of energy system modeling and analysis by: 
1. Presenting models for analyzing the effect of government incentives on the development of 
renewable energy and storage technologies on the objectives of different stakeholders in a 
microgrid; 
2. Analyzing the cost-effectiveness of government policies for the development of different 
energy conversion and storage technologies for GHG emission reduction in the industrial and 
residential sectors in Ontario, Canada;  
3. Investigating th cost-efficiency of using battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts in 
reducing GHG emissions in Ontario, Canada considering the objectives of different stakeholders; 
and 
4. Investigating the interaction of the heat and electricity sectors at a national scale using bilevel 
and centralized modeling approaches.  
The contribution of this thesis is presented through four studies. In the first and the second studies, 
deterministic models are developed to analyze the interaction of the government, the energy 
investor (energy hub operator), and the energy consumer in the context of a microgrid.  
In the first study, a deterministic model is developed to compare the cost-efficiency of renewable 
energy generation and hydrogen energy storage technologies on the advantages of the government, 
the energy hub operator and energy consumer in Ontario. Different scenarios including hydrogen 
production using Ontario’s electricity with and without underground storage option, hydrogen 
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production using wind power with and without underground storage option, and hydrogen 
production with a mix of wind power and grid electricity are considered. In the first study, it is 
assumed that the produced hydrogen is blended with natural gas to form HENG and is used in an 
industrial facility in internal combustion engines and a drying furnace.  In the first study, it is 
assumed that the government has the option of incentivizing each of these projects and objectives 
of all stakeholders are calculated in each of the mentioned scenarios. The objective of the 
government is spending the minimum amount of incentives for decreasing one kg of CO2 emission. 
The objective of the energy consumer is minimizing energy cost, and the objective of the energy 
hub operator is maximizing their NPV from investing in energy infrastructure. The results of the 
model in the first study show that with the same incentive policy, incentivizing hydrogen 
production with grid electricity is the most cost-efficient option for the government as it leads to 
the highest GHG emission reduction with the same amount of incentives paid. In other words, 
taking advantage of Ontario’s clean surplus power leads to lower GHG emission reduction costs 
compared to the development of new wind power capacity. The results of the first study also show 
that incentivizing wind power development is more profitable for the energy hub operator as it 
leads to a higher NPV for them.  
In the second study, the monetized health impacts from fossil fuel consumption and taxes 
collected from the energy hub operator and the energy consumer are added to the model and the 
effect of battery energy storage on the advantages of stakeholders is also analyzed with a 
deterministic model. Additionally, the effect of the development of wind and solar power plants 
on energy consumer’s electricity cost is considered in the second study.  Two streams of energy 
incentives were compared in the second study: incentives for renewable energy generation 
technologies and incentives for energy storage technologies. The first type aims to increase the 
share of renewable energies in the electricity system while the second type aims the development 
of systems which use clean electricity to replace fossil fuels in other sectors of an energy system 
such as the transportation, residential and industrial sector.  The comparison was based on the 
advantages of the government and the energy consumer in Ontario. The results of the second study 
show that when the electricity grid is highly dependent on fossil fuels, replacing fossil fuel-based 
electricity generation with renewable power is a more cost-effective pathways in reducing GHG 
emissions compared to the development of energy storage systems. However, the development of 
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battery and hydrogen energy storage systems is more cost-effective in reducing GHG emissions 
considering Ontario’s current electricity mix. The analysis in the second study also shows that 
battery storage and hydrogen storage are complementary technologies for reducing GHG 
emissions in Ontario. 
The first two studies were focused on comparing the cost-efficiency of renewable energy 
generation and energy storage technologies on the advantages of all engaged stakeholders in the 
context of a microgrid. The results of the first two studies show that the development of energy 
storage systems and using surplus clean power for reducing GHG emissions in the industrial and 
commercial sectors is a more cost-effective pathway for reducing GHG emissions in Ontario 
compared to the development of more wind and solar power generation capacity considering 
Ontario’s current electricity mix.  
In the third study, an optimization model is developed to find the optimum mix for hydrogen and 
battery energy storage technologies considering Ontario’s electricity mix. The optimization model 
developed in the third study is based on game theory with two players (stakeholders): the 
government and the energy consumer, which is an industrial facility that operates diesel forklifts. 
The energy consumer’s objective is minimizing the cost of operating forklifts, which includes 
capital cost, operation, and maintenance cost, labor cost, and fuel cost. The energy consumer has 
the option of operating diesel, battery-powered, and fuel cell-powered forklifts and will choose 
the forklift mix that has the lowest cost for them. The government’s objective is reducing GHG 
emissions from the energy consumer’s forklift use with the lowest level of incentives paid. The 
results of the third study show that the support from the government for replacement of diesel 
forklifts with battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts is advantageous for both 
stakeholders. The model developed in the third study also helps in determining the optimum mix 
of battery and hydrogen technologies for maximizing the advantages of the government and the 
industrial facility when different social costs of carbon are considered.  
A similar analysis is done to analyze the potential of clean surplus power in Ontario in reducing 
GHG emissions in the residential sector in Ontario in the presence of government incentives.  
In the fourth study, an iterative optimization model is developed to analyze the interaction of the 
heat and electricity sectors at a national level in the Great Britain. Independent mathematical 
models for optimizing the selection of technologies in heat and electricity supply systems are 
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developed. Two developed models are solved iteratively to find the optimum selection of 
technologies in the heat and electricity supply systems when their interaction is considered. 
Additionally, a centralized model is developed, which optimizes heat and electricity supply 
technologies simultaneously. The results of both methods are compared to show the advantages 
of iterative approach in the modeling of energy systems.  
The models developed in the first three studies of this thesis can help policymakers gain insight 
into how the development of energy storage and renewable energy technologies can affect the 
objectives of all stakeholders in a microgrid when GHG emission reduction policies are pursued 
by the government. The models developed in the fourth study enable us to understand the 
interaction of heat and electricity supply systems and how changes in one can affect the other.  
7.2 Recommendations for future work 
Although the models developed in this thesis provide insight on the interaction of different 
stakeholders and energy sectors, there is still opportunity to further investigate energy systems 
using multilevel and multi-stakeholder modeling. Based on the studies done in this thesis, the 
following directions may be recommended for future study in the multi-stakeholder analysis of 
energy systems: 
1. Including uncertainty in modeling: Hourly data for electricity price, wind and solar power 
potential, and electricity and heat demands were considered in this thesis to reflect the variation 
in these factors. However, including uncertainty will make the models more suitable for real-
world applications. While using the available hourly data helps us understand the potential of 
different technologies and how they operate in interaction with each other, stochastic modeling is 
of great importance when a detailed design is required.  
2. Considering more energy conversion and storage technologies in the modeling: The models 
developed in this thesis have contributed to the literature by considering the objectives of multiple 
stakeholders in an energy system and thus, presenting a more comprehensive overview of the 
energy system. However, not all available technologies were considered in the studies. Battery 
and hydrogen energy storage were the storage technologies considered in the first three studies 
while the potential of other types of storage such as compressed air energy storage and flywheels 
may be investigated in future work. Similarly, more technologies can be added to the models 
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developed for heat and electricity supply systems to present a more comprehensive analysis of 
those sectors.  
3. Including all the energy sectors in analyzing the interaction of different sectors in an energy 
system: The interaction of heat and electricity has been investigated in this thesis. However, the 
effect of changes and transitions in other energy sectors such as transportation on heat and 
electricity supply systems has not been investigated in this thesis. In that sense, developing models 
that present a more comprehensive view of a national energy system while all the energy sectors 
including electricity, building, commercial, industrial, and transportation are considered can be of 
great potential for providing a planning tool for policymakers.  
4. More detailed modeling of the technologies and energy sectors: A more detailed modeling of 
technologies and energy sectors would increase the accuracy of the results. For the technologies, 
using more accurate efficiency curves and considering the economy of scale in calculating the 
costs will help in having more accurate comparisons. Considering additional parameters such as 
more detailed modeling of electricity transmission system planning also provides more accurate 
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9 Appendix A: List of Parameters, Variables, Subscripts and 
Indices  
9.1 Appendix A.3.1: List of Parameters and Variables for Chapter 3 
𝐹𝐶𝑖 Fuel cost in case 𝑖 
𝐶𝐶𝑖 Carbon cost in case 𝑖 
𝐻𝑐 Hydrogen consumption in kg per hour 
𝐻𝑝 Hydrogen price in CAD per kg 
𝑁𝐺𝑐 Natural gas consumption in MMBtu per hour 
𝑁𝐺𝑝 Natural gas price calculated based on 2015 average Henry 
Hub natural gas spot price in US Dollar per one Million Btu 
GEP Grid Electricity Price 
LSP Low Set Price 
HSP High Set Price 
PDE Power needed for electrolyzer to meet hydrogen demand 
PST Power needed for electrolyzer to fill the storage tank 
PEL Power fed to the electrolyzer 
Pneeded Power bought from the grid 
ɳE Electrolyzer efficiency 
Hproduced Hydrogen produced by electrolyzer 
Hrated Maximum hydrogen production of electrolyzer 
Hdemand Hydrogen demand 
Hextra Hydrogen sent to the storage tank 
Hneeded Hydrogen from the storage tank 
PWF Power generated by wind farm 
PME Minimum power of electrolyzer 
PDE Power needed for electrolyzer to meet hydrogen demand 
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Pextra Power sold to the grid 
 
9.2 Appendix A.4.1: List of Parameters and Variables for Chapter 4 
𝑟 Discount rate 
𝑡 Year  
𝑇 Project lifetime  
 
9.3 Appendix A.5.1: List of Parameters and Variables for Chapter 5 
𝑓 The government’s objective function 
𝑓𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 The optimum value for the leader’s objective function 
𝑧 The energy consumer’s objective function 
𝑥 The government’s incentive level 
𝑦1 The consumer’s decision variables and show the number of 
battery-powered forklifts 
𝑦2 The consumer’s decision variables and show the number of 
fuel cell-powered forklifts 
𝑦3 The consumer’s decision variables and show the number of 
diesel forklifts 
𝑇𝐷𝐶 The amount of charges paid by the government to cover 
transmission and distribution charges of discounted power in 
CAD per kWh 
𝛼 The social cost of carbon in CAD per tonne of CO2 
𝑒 The emission reduction in tonne of CO2 
𝐴𝐶𝐿 Amortized cost of lift in $ per forklift per year 
𝐶𝐹𝐼 Cost of fuel infrastructure in $ per forklift per year 
𝐶𝑅𝐼 Cost of recharge infrastructure in $ per forklift per year 
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𝐿𝐶  Labor cost in $ per forklift per year 
𝐶𝐼𝑊𝑆 Cost of infrastructure warehouse space in $ per forklift per 
year 
𝐹𝐿𝑀𝐶 Forklift maintenance cost in $ per forklift per year 
𝐵𝑀𝐶 Battery maintenance cost in $ per forklift per year 
𝐹𝐶𝑀𝐶 Fuel cell maintenance cost in $ per forklift per year 
𝐸𝐶 The sum of electricity purchase cost at both discounted and 
not discounted hours in $ per year  
𝐻𝐶 The cost of electricity purchased for producing hydrogen, 
annualized electrolyzer cost, annualized hydrogen storage 
tank cost, and annualized compressor cost in $ per year 
𝑖 Iteration number in the game theory model 
 
9.4 Appendix A.6.1: List of Parameters and Variables for Chapter 6 
𝐻𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖 The annualized capital cost of heating technology 𝑖 in £ per 
unit -15 MWhth- of heat supply 
𝐻𝑇𝑂&𝑀𝐶𝑖 Operation and maintenance cost of the heating technology 𝑖 
in £ per unit-15 MWhth- of heat supply per year 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑡) Heat demand at hour 𝑡 in kWhth 
𝐻𝑇_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒_𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖 The upper limit of heating technology 𝑖 in heating supply 
mix (% of heat supply) 
𝐸𝑚𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑘  The emission factor of fuel input 𝑘 in gram  of CO2 per kWh 
𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  Carbon price in £ per tonne CO2eq 
𝐹𝑃𝑘 Price of fuel 𝑘 in £/kWh 
𝜂ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔,𝑖 Heating efficiency or COP of heating technology 𝑖 (%) 
𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑗 The annualized capital cost of electricity generation 
technology 𝑗 in £/kWe-yr 
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𝐹𝑂&𝑀𝐶𝑗 Fixed operation and maintenance cost of electricity 
generation technology 𝑗 in £ per kWe of technology capacity 
per year 
𝑉𝑂&𝑀𝐶𝑗 Variable operation and maintenance cost of electricity 
generation technology 𝑗 in £ per kWhe of electricity 
generated 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑(𝑡) Electricity demand at hour 𝑡 in kWhe 
𝜂𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑗 Electrical efficiency of electricity technology 𝑗 in % 
𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗 Build rate for electricity technology 𝑗 in kWe per year 
𝑀𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒_𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗 Minimum capacity for renewable electricity technology 𝑗 in 
kWe 
𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜_𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑝 Storage capacity of pumped hydro storage system in kWhe 
𝐻𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐹 Heat supply problem objective function in £ 
𝐻𝑇_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 Share of heating technology 𝑖 in supplying heating demand 
in % 
 𝐸𝐼𝐶𝑘,𝑖(𝑡) Cost of fuel 𝑘 (electricity, biomass, biogas and natural gas) 
in technology 𝑖 at hour 𝑡 in £ per kWh of fuel 
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘,𝑖(𝑡) Fuel 𝑘 consumption in heating technology 𝑖 at hour 𝑡 in kWh 
𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖(𝑡) Heating output of heating technology 𝑖 at hour 𝑡 in kWhth 
𝐸𝑆𝑃𝑂𝐹 Electricity supply problem’s objective function value in £ 
𝑇𝐶𝑗 The capacity of  electricity generation technology 𝑗 in kWe 
𝐸𝐼𝐶𝑘,𝑗 cost of fuel 𝑘 consumption in electricity generation 
technology 𝑗 at hour 𝑡 in £ per kWh of input fuel 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑗(𝑡) The electricity output of electricity generation  technology 𝑗 
at hour 𝑡 in kWhe 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑃𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝐻𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜(𝑡)  Electricity input to pumped hydro technology at hour 𝑡 in 
kWhe 




 __ Pumped HydroStorage level t  Pumped hydro storage level in kWhe 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗 The capacity of electricity generation technology 𝑗 in kWe 
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑘,𝑗(𝑡) Fuel 𝑘  consumption in electricity generation technology 𝑗 at 
hour 𝑡 in kWh of fuel 
𝐸𝐷𝐹𝐻ℎ(𝑡) Electricity demand for heating at hour 𝑡 and iteration ℎ in 
£ per MWhe 
𝐸𝑃ℎ(𝑡)  Electricity price at hour 𝑡 and step ℎ in in £ per MWhe 
𝑇𝐸𝐷ℎ(𝑡) Total electricity demand (electricity demand plus electricity 
demand for heating) at hour 𝑡 and step ℎ in MWhe 
 
 
 
